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Abstract 
The Role of unawareness on functional status in mild Alzheimer‟s dementia 
Emily C. Roseman 
 
Alzheimer‟s dementia (AD) is characterized by a progressive decline in memory in 
addition to decline in at least one other cognitive domain.  Integral to the diagnosis is a 
simultaneous decline in functional abilities such as driving skills, and often an unawareness of 
this decline.  Individuals who are unaware of deficits are often unable to accept the help that they 
need in completing functional tasks and may put themselves in dangerous situations.  For 
example, individuals with an unawareness of their own deficits may prolong driving cessation.  
Cognitive status explains some, but not all, of the variability in functional abilities.  This study 
examined the relationship between cognition, unawareness, and functional ability in individuals 
with mild AD as well as in healthy older adults.  Understanding this relationship in healthy older 
adults will help to establish a baseline prior to disease onset.  This baseline is not well understood 
thereby potentially compromising the safety of even healthy older adults.  For example, current 
driving laws with older adults rely on the assumption that individuals will be able to regulate 
their driving behaviors as they become aware of age-related changes.  This study used a virtual 
reality driving simulator (VRDS) to assess driving performance in healthy controls with 
exploratory analyses conducted on individuals with mild AD.  Awareness was measured by 
participant-reliable informant discrepancy scores on the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living 
(IADL) Questionnaire, as well as discrepancy scores between the participant‟s perception of 
performance on the VRDS versus actual performance.  Results with healthy controls established 
no relationship between functional ability and awareness when holding performance on cognitive 
testing constant.  Instead, a relationship was found between functional ability, as measured by the 
IADL questionnaire, and awareness of functional ability in healthy older adults (r= -.747, p< 
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.01).  As functional ability decreased, awareness of functioning also decreased suggesting that 
those individuals with greater functional impairments are less aware of such impairments and 
therefore pose a safety risk.  The MMSE was also linked to functional ability in healthy controls, 
as measured by the IADL, suggesting a relationship continuum between global cognitive status 
and functioning in healthy older adults from the community.  Additionally, trends in the data for 
individuals with mild AD suggest a correlation between global cognitive status, as measured by 
the MMSE, and measures of awareness on both functional measures.  Findings suggest that 
unawareness can lead to increased safety risks in healthy older adults.  Measurement tools such 
as the IADL and MMSE may serve to identify those individuals at risk for both healthy older 
adults as well as individuals with mild AD.    
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Alzheimer‟s dementia (AD) is characterized by a gradual onset leading to a progressive 
decline in memory as well as impairment in one or more additional cognitive domains.  These 
cognitive deficits result in the decline in the individual‟s previous level of functioning and are not 
otherwise accounted for by a central nervous system condition, a systemic condition, a substance-
induced condition, or an Axis I disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  AD is the 
most common cause for dementia, accounting for 50-75% of all late-life dementias which 
typically occurs after the age of 50 (Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 2006).  In 2000, an estimated 4.5 
million Americans were diagnosed with AD, 93% of which were over the age of 74.  By 2050, 
this number is expected to increase three-fold, effecting approximately 13.2 million people in 
addition to their families and friends (Herbert, Scherr, Bienias, Bennet, & Evans, 2003).   
Neuropathological Presentation of AD 
 The neuropathological characteristics of AD include the presence of amalyoid plaques 
and neurofibrillary tangles in the cortex.  Extracellular amalyoid plaque consists of protein and 
plaque surrounded by glia and dead neurons, which serve as inflammatory markers (Welsh-
Bohmer & Warren, 2006).  Neurofibrillary tangles exist inside cortical cells and interfere with 
intracellular transport, ultimately leading to cell death.  The distribution of these plaques and 
tangles as well as the concomitant clinical features characterizes AD (Hyman, Van Hoesen, 
Damasio, & Barnes, 1984).  The progression of AD pathology is understood to start in the 
parahippocampal region and entorhinal cortex of the medial temporal lobe and eventually spread 
to other areas of the neocortex (For review, refer to Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 2006).  This 
presents as gross atrophy in selected regions of the brain on an MRI.  A study by Braak & Braak 
(1997) examined individuals post mortem and found that the distribution of neurofibrillary 
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tangles began in the entorhinal cortices and spread to temporo-parietal regions, then eventually to 
the frontal lobes. 
 Thompson and colleagues (2003) studied the dynamics of gray matter loss in individuals 
with AD using a 4D method.  They used a novel approach of brain mapping examining high 
resolution MRI scans longitudinally.  Individuals with AD were compared with aged matched 
controls over approximately 2 years (Thompson et al., 2003).  They found the trajectory of 
pathology matched that described by Braak & Braak (1997).  Particularly vulnerable to AD 
pathology were the anterior and ventromedial temporal lobes.  These researchers stated that the 
transition to frontal pathology suggests the degeneration of cortical pathways.  Conversely, the 
neocortical association areas are susceptible because of their integral connection with the limbic 
structures, where much of the pathology begins (Thompson et al., 2003).  They found that 
individuals with AD had differentially faster left hemisphere atrophy as compared to age matched 
controls.   
Behavioral and Cognitive Components of AD 
The most common method of diagnosing AD is behavioral observations such as that seen 
on a neuropsychological evaluation, though an autopsy after death serves to confirm this 
diagnosis (Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004).  AD was first described by Alzheimer in 1907, 
and is now well understood in terms of its clinical presentation.  It is degenerative, and among the 
first symptoms is memory decline, characterized by the inability to encode and consolidate new 
information into an individual‟s memory store.  As AD progresses, performance also declines on 
tests of verbal fluency.  A diagnosis of AD typically requires a comprehensive 
neuropsychological evaluation in addition to a functional assessment provided by a reliable 
informant.  Depression is a common symptom in older adults, and often results in cognitive 
disorders that can mimic dementia.  Conversely, symptoms of AD can mimic depression, as 
individuals become withdrawn, inattentive, and there is often a change in emotional affect (For 
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review refer to Lezak et al., 2004 p. 207-211).  For this reason, diagnosis of AD requires a 
thorough understanding of an individual‟s psychiatric history. (Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 2006).    
Scores on the mini mental state examination (MMSE) serve as a reliable global measure 
of cognitive impairment and are often used clinically (Jefferson et al. 2002).  Individuals with 
AD typically decline by 10% on their MMSE score each year, although this relationship between 
dementia severity and score on the MMSE is not exactly linear (Morris, 1993).  Though the 
MMSE serves as a global measure of cognitive impairment, specific profiles on this test are more 
prototypic of an AD profile.  For example, Jefferson and colleagues (2002) studied individuals 
with AD as well as individuals with other types of dementias.  They found that individuals with 
AD scored comparatively worse on measures of temporal orientation and declarative memory, as 
compared with individuals with other types of dementia.  Temporal orientation scores were 
correlated with performance on a naming test as well as scores on a verbal free recall and delayed 
recognition memory test.   
Although global measures of impairment are used clinically to ascertain the level of 
dementia, specific areas of cognitive impairment are obtained to differentially diagnose dementia 
of the Alzheimer‟s type.  Impairment in declarative and semantic functioning in AD is well 
established (Butters & Miliotis, 1984).  Declarative Memory impairments are perhaps the most 
common and most pronounced evident symptoms.  However, this can present itself in very 
different ways between individuals (Lesak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004, p. 211).  For example, 
due to both impairments in encoding and semantic knowledge, individuals with AD often do not 
benefit from hearing the gist of the story to serve as a cue for tapping their memory (Nebes, 
1992).  Additionally, Individuals with AD have smaller learning curves on memory tests, have 
difficulty encoding new information, and have subsequent low scores on memory tests (Libon et 
al. 1998).  Libon and colleagues (1998) contrasted cognitive test performance and imaging data 
of individuals with AD and ischemic vascular dementia (IVD).  They found that individuals with 
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AD had a smaller learning curve and performed poorly on a verbal memory test, whereas they 
had no impairments on a procedural learning test.   
Impairment on tests measuring verbal functioning is also evident in individuals with AD.  
In fact, early in the disease process, deterioration in verbal expression and comprehension is 
evident.  The cause behind this deterioration has been linked to a disruption in semantic 
knowledge and understanding.  This results in difficulty with word generation, loosening of 
semantic categories, and degradation of concept formation (For review, refer to Lezak, Howieson 
& Loring, 2004).  Passafiume and colleagues examined the disintegration of semantic knowledge 
in individuals with AD (Passafiume, Di Giacomo, & Carolei, 2006).  These researchers 
conducted their study based on the premise that semantic networks contain information about the 
world, and are organized hierarchically.  These researchers studied the integrity of the semantic 
networks in AD by giving individuals a word-stem completion task, a task that measures 
semantic networks and memory.  Individuals with both mild and moderate AD performed worse 
than normal controls on this stem-completion task.  The researchers concluded that this 
performance did in fact represent a disintegration of semantic networks in the brain.  Through 
their work analyzing the responses of individuals with AD on an animal fluency task, Chan, 
Butters, and Salmon (1997) support this claim.  The researchers concluded that semantic 
knowledge systematically deteriorates as Alzheimer‟s disease progresses.   
Visuospatial abilities in AD are also impaired.  Individuals with AD have difficulties with 
line orientation judgment tasks, constructional tasks such as the WAIS Block Design and the 
Clock Drawing Test.  Additional impairment is seen in object recognition.  However, the 
literature regarding visuospatial functioning in AD is mixed.  Though there is undoubtedly a 
decline in visuospatial ability with AD, this decline is relatively small compared to how 
individuals with other dementias perform on this cognitive domain (For review, refer to Lezak, 
Howieson, & Loring, 2004).  A study done by Consentino and colleagues (2004) compared 
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neuropsychological test scores between individuals with AD and individuals with vascular 
dementia (VaD).  Not surprisingly, they found that individuals with VaD scored almost twice as 
high on tests of lexical/semantic knowledge and delayed recognition memory than did individuals 
with AD.  However, individuals with AD scored almost twice as high on tests assessing the 
ability to maintain a mental set as well as tests of visuoconstruction.  Therefore, although 
visuospatial impairments may be impaired in individuals with AD, this construct is a relative 
strength compared with other dementias. 
Impairments in executive control have also been linked to individuals with AD.  One 
study has found that 64% of individuals with AD have executive dysfunction (Swanberg, 
Tractenberg, Mohs, Thal, & Cummings, 2004).  Executive functioning impairment in AD 
presents itself by way of decreased social competence, perseverative and intrusive behaviors, and 
difficulty with sequencing.  Additionally, general cognitive slowing results in slower reaction 
times (Lesak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004).   
In sum, the literature indicates that a constellation of cognitive symptoms are evident in 
AD.  Although global cognitive decline is apparent, discrete cognitive domains are also impacted.  
Such domains include memory, semantic functioning, visuospatial ability, and executive control.  
These symptoms generally deteriorate over time and impact an individual‟s ability to perform 
functional tasks necessary for daily living.   
Functional Components of AD 
Integral to the diagnosis of AD is a concomitant decline in functional abilities.  In fact, 
approximately 37-49% of individuals with AD who live in the community are dependant on 
someone else to aid in meeting their daily needs (Aguero-Torres, Fratiglioni, Guo, Vitanen, & 
Winblad, 1998).  Greater functional dependence leads to institutionalization, increased healthcare 
expenditures, decreased quality of life, disintegration of self-identity, and a burden on caregivers 
(Yu, Kolanowski, Strumpf, & Eslinger, 2006).  Studies show that individuals with mild AD have 
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difficulty with more complex functional tasks ((Feldman, Van Baelen, Kavanagh, & Torfs, 
2005)).  Such tasks are often referred to as “instrumental activities of daily living (IADL)”.  
These tasks include managing finances, taking medications, preparing meals and doing 
household chores, and driving a car.  One study by Yu and colleagues (2006) found that global 
cognitive scores account for approximately 25-50% of the IADL variance.  They found that 
individuals with mild AD lost the ability to perform more difficult tasks, such as remembering 
shopping lists, before loosing the ability to perform simple activities of daily living (ADL), such 
as dressing and bathing.   
Relationship between Cognition and Function 
 Though the relationship between cognitive status and functional status is not absolute, 
decline in cognitive function typically is accompanied by a decline in IADLs.  A study by 
Feldman and colleagues (2005) demonstrated a correlation between cognitive decline, as 
measured by the MMSE, and functional decline over a one-year study (Feldman, Van Baelen, 
Kavanagh, & Torfs, 2005).  Additionally, they found that individuals with lower global cognitive 
scores declined in functional abilities more rapidly.  This functional decline also led to an 
increase in caregiver burden.  These researchers found that the loss of functional abilities in AD 
was hierarchical, beginning with the loss of more complex functional abilities such as organizing 
finances or driving a car.  Basic functional tasks, such as grooming, decline later. 
Jefferson and colleagues (2006) studied the relationship between functional abilities, as 
defined by an individual‟s ability to perform IADLs and ADLs, and cognitive abilities on 
neuropsychological tests.  These researchers posited that global cognitive status is the only 
predictor of IADL and ADL dependence.  Despite this, its inclusion in a prediction model 
obscures the various cognitive components that underlie each functional task.  When global 
cognitive status was removed from the equation individuals were impaired on measures of 
memory, semantic knowledge, and executive control.  However, object recognition measures 
Role of unawareness 20 
 
were ultimately associated with significant impairment on functional tasks for individuals with 
AD (Jefferson, Barakat, Giovannetti, Paul, & Glosser, 2006).  Conversely, other researchers have 
found different cognitive domains that predict functional status (Matsuda & Saito, 2005).  The 
conflicting results among studies highlight the mixed opinions regarding the predictive value of 
the MMSE and various cognitive domains on functional status. 
Several studies have highlighted executive function, memory and visuospatial abilities as 
factors that predict functional performance (For review, refer to Yu et al., 2006).  However, in 
one study by Yu and colleagues (2006), visuospatial abilities were inconsistently related to 
functional performance.  Executive control may also impact functional ability.  Yu and 
colleagues define executive control as the cognitive skills that allow individuals to organize, 
coordinate, and sequence goal-directed behaviors.  In one study, executive dysfunction explained 
17% of the variance in IADL performance in people with AD (Boyle, Malloy, Salloway, Cahn-
Weiner, Cohen, & Cummings, 2003).  The inclusion of memory loss as a factor predicting 
functional performance in AD is not surprising given that it is a hallmark feature of AD.  Still, 
explicit memory impairments have been linked to behavioral changes, greater dependence on 
others, and caregiver burden (Avila, Bottino, Carvalho, Santos, Seral, & Miotto, 2004).  In fact, 
one study by Avila and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that implicit memory training can lead to 
an increase in memory ability on specific functional tasks.  This study adds to the conflicting data 
regarding the link between cognition and functional impairment.  However, perhaps this conflict 
is due to the variability in functional tasks.  Some tasks such as bill paying require a great deal of 
cognitive processing whereas tasks such as grooming are often rote procedures.   
The predictive power of global cognitive status on functional ability is both variable and 
deficient. Yu and colleagues (2006) state that global cognitive impairment accounts for only 
between 25 and 50% of the variance in instrumental ADLs.  Still, a study by Loewenstein and 
colleagues (1995) found that only 9-34% of the variance in functional measures was accounted 
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for by cognitive scores (Lowenstein, Rubert, Arguelles, & Duara, 1995).  Perhaps this lack of 
predictive power in functional status can be accounted for by other variables.  One consideration 
is the sizeable differences among functional tasks (e.g. ADL vs. IADL), with each functional task 
necessitating the use of different cognitive foundations.  It is possible that each functional task 
needs to be examined separately to better understand how it is impacted by cognitive decline.  
Still, when functional tasks are examined separately, the relationship to cognitive status is 
unclear.  One reason why there might be variability is the measurement tool used to examine 
function.      
Measurement of Function 
 There are multiple ways of measuring functional capacity, and consequently variation in 
functional status scores based on the method used to collect the information.  The two primary 
methods of measuring functional ability are using caregiver accounts of patient functioning and 
directly assessing patient functioning.  Caregiver accounts of patient functioning are typically 
gleaned from a questionnaire such as the Lawton and Brody Instrumental Activities of Daily 
Living Questionnaire (Lawton & Brody, 1969).  Research has shown that caregiver accounts can 
be confounded by their level of burden in treating the patient as well as their own levels of 
depression (DeBettignies, Mahurin, & Pirozzolo, 1990).  Despite this it is a common approach to 
functional analysis as it allows for the assessment of activities in day to day life.  Family 
members and caregivers are able to provide accounts of the patient as they perform in their 
natural environment.   
Functional ability is also measured by having patients participate in laboratory controlled 
simulated activities.  While this technique is questioned for its potential lack of ecological 
validity, it allows for the careful analysis of how patients complete the task and what problems 
they encounter.  This allows for control and manipulation of variables for both qualitative and 
quantitative assessment of such behaviors.  One assessment technique used by Giovannetti and 
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colleagues (2002) measures the types of errors made by individuals with AD as they complete 
specific functional tasks such as making coffee and toast (Giovannetti, Libon, & Hart, 2002).   
Another method used by Schultheis (Schultheis, Himelstein, & Rizzo, 2002) is to use a virtual 
reality driving simulator to assess driving performance in a safe manner.  This method of 
assessment is particularly useful because it allows for the interpretation of numerous variables 
while studying driving behavior in a safe but challenging manner (Schultheis et al., 2002).  
One study by Farias and colleagues (2003) studied the relationship between caregiver 
accounts of functional status and the patient‟s functional performance scores on a laboratory test 
(Farias, Harrell, Neumann, & Houtz, 2003).  These researchers found that the correlation between 
these two measurements was -.66, indicating a moderate but not absolute relationship.  These 
researchers added that beyond the type of measurement, the amount of cognition required in each 
functional task also creates variability between functional tasks.  Functional tasks that have a 
large cognitive component are more strongly correlated with neuropsychological test scores than 
those tasks that are more performance driven.   
In sum, one challenge in studying functional performance is the variability in 
measurement tools.  Additionally, the link between function and cognitive status is not entirely 
understood.  This relationship is altered by both the cognitive domains that are examined as well 
as the specific functional task examined.  However, even when a single functional task is 
examined, there is still not a direct relationship to cognitive status.  Therefore, the contribution of 
other factors needs to be considered in order to fully understand the changes in functional ability. 
Unawareness in AD 
 Lack of insight and unawareness is a symptom for individuals with Alzheimer‟s disease 
(Ready, Ott, & Grace, 2006).  In fact, many researchers believe that lack of awareness is one of 
the clinical features of Alzheimer‟s disease (Feher, Mahurin, Inbody, Crook, & Pirozzolo, 1991; 
Green, Goldstein, Sirockman, & Green, 1993).  This symptom is perhaps more common in 
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Alzheimer‟s disease than it is in other progressive neurological disorders (Ansell & Bucks, 
2006).  Terms used to describe a lack of awareness of oneself include, „lack of insight, 
unawareness, metacognitive unawareness, and anosognosia‟.  The term „anosognosia‟ was first 
introduced by Babinski (1914) to describe the lack of knowledge about the existence of a 
neurological disease.  These terms are often used interchangeably and refer to the absence of 
insight into physical, neurological, and/or cognitive deficits (Ansell & Bucks, 2006).  For the 
sake of continuity, it will be referred to as „unawareness‟ throughout this paper.  Unawareness is 
understood to be a variable entity, varying according to degree, type, domain effected, temporal 
stability, and its relationship to the progression of the disease (For review, refer to Ansell & 
Bucks, 2006).     
Variability of Unawareness 
 Unawareness can also be characterized in terms of partiality, extension, temporal stability 
and specificity (Ownsworth, Clare, & Morris, 2006; Schacter & Prigatano, 1991; Weinstein, 
1991).  Partiality refers to the fact that individuals range in the degree of unawareness in regards 
to their deficits.  Individuals with complete unawareness have no awareness of functional deficit, 
whereas partial awareness reflects a limited awareness of deficits (Prigatano, 1991).  Extension 
refers to the way in which their awareness if affected.  For example, some individuals may 
understand that they have a specific deficit but they may be unable to understand the 
consequences.  Conversely, they may not be able to monitor the problem in their daily lives 
(Crosson et al., 1989).  Unawareness also varies temporally.  Some individuals display 
unawareness early in the course of the disease when they demonstrate relatively intact cognitive 
skills.  However in some cases, as the disease progresses, their awareness increases (For review, 
refer to Ownsworth et al., 2006).   
Unawareness can also range in „specificity‟.  This means that it could be domain-specific 
and limited to one area of functioning, or it could be global and exist across abilities (i.e. Toglia 
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& Kirk, 2000).  Some researchers believe that the specificity of awareness can be divided into 
four main levels (Clare, 2004a).  The most basic level is when an individual is in a persistive 
vegetative state or coma, and therefore has no awareness.  The next level is domain-specific 
unawareness which relates to one specific function.   Within this level there are indications that 
there are differences between explicit and implicit awareness in individuals with advanced AD.  
In one study, individuals with advanced AD looked in the mirror to view their own reflection.  
Although these individuals did not explicitly recognize themselves, they demonstrated behaviors 
indicating self-recognition on an implicit level.  (Bologna & Camp, 1997).   
According to Clare (2004a), the third level of unawareness is termed „executive‟ 
unawareness.  Here, the individual is unable to adequately regulate all behaviors, and the 
awareness of such regulation is disturbed.  Finally, general unawareness refers to all areas of 
functioning.  Clare (2004a) posits that any level of unawareness may be present despite normal 
performance on cognitive tests.  The relationship between cognition and unawareness is not well 
understood.  In fact, some individuals report memory deficits but deny any impact of this 
impairment on functional status.  Others avoid specific tasks meanwhile denying that they have 
any cognitive impairment (Agnew & Morris, 1998).    
Theoretical Models of Unawareness 
 Numerous models provide explanations for unawareness in AD ranging from neurological 
causes, changes in cognitive functioning (i.e. Agnew & Morris, 1998), and psychological defense 
mechanisms (i.e. Clare, 2004a).  The variability in models serves as evidence that unawareness is 
still not fully understood.  Several models attempt to understand unawareness in AD from a 
biospsychosocial perspective, addressing defense mechanisms and social roles (For review, refer 
to Clare, 2004a).  Although biopsychosocial models attempt to understand unawareness from a 
holistic perspective, they have numerous limitations.  The primary limitation is that measuring all 
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of these factors is impractical and unfeasible.  Therefore, more parsimonious models attempt to 
understand unawareness from neuroanatomical and cognitive perspectives.   
In 1989, McGlynn and Schacter proposed the dissociable interactions and conscious 
experience (DICE) model of unawareness.  According to this model, the conscious activating 
system (CAS) in the parietal lobe (Schacter, 1990) is the area of global awareness.  Damage to 
this region results in global awareness deficits.  Domain-specific awareness deficits result from a 
disconnection between the CAS and various cognitive domains, including the central executive 
system (CES), found in the frontal lobes (Schacter, 1990).  This model forms the basis for a 
subtype of unawareness proposed in a model by Agnew and Morris (1998).  
Another model proposed by Agnew and Morris (1998) and later expanded upon by 
Morris and Hannesdottir (2004) attempted to address the limitations of the DICE model.  They 
believed that the DICE model failed to address the role that memory deficits play on the degree 
of unawareness.  Their model is called the cognitive awareness model (CAM)(For review, refer 
to Figure 1).  The CAM model is used to explain how cognitive impairment might result in 
unawareness at various stages of cognitive processing.  Though memory impairments might 
sustain unawareness, they are not necessarily causal of unawareness.  Morris and colleagues posit 
that perception of success and failure is based on an appraisal system of behaviors.  Unawareness 
results when this system is disrupted (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004). 
According to Agnew and Morris (1998) and Morris and Hannesdottir (2004), information 
enters short term memory where it is experienced as new information and it is consciously 
processed.  It then goes into long term memory where it is again consciously experienced as a 
personal event.  According to this model, new events are fed to a comparator mechanism, an 
aspect of the central executive system found in the frontal lobes.  The comparator mechanism 
compares this new event to previous events and knowledge from the personal knowledge base, an 
aspect of semantic memory.  If there is a mismatch between the current event and that stored in 
Role of unawareness 26 
 
the personal knowledge base, the cognitive awareness system in the parietal lobes is then given 
information about the discrepency.  For example, if an individual experiences new difficulty with 
their memory and have not previously experienced this problem, the comparator mechanism will 
note a discrepancy between the new event and the information stored in the personal knowledge 
base.  The conscious awareness system will receive this input and the person will then become 
aware of this discrepancy. 
According to Agnew and Morris (1998), there are three different types of unawareness: 
Mnemonic, executive, and primary.  Though there appears to be variability in the specific type of 
unawareness typical in Alzheimer‟s dementia, researchers believe that mnemonic unawareness is 
the most common type at the mild stage in the disease process (Agnew and Morris, 1998; Ansell 
and Bucks, 2006).  According to Ansell and Bucks (2006), mnemonic unawareness in AD is 
particularly common for individuals with mild AD due to the medial temporal lobe and 
hippocampal pathology disrupting semantic memory and therefore an individual‟s ability to 
encode new information.  Mnemonic unawareness results as a consequence of a disruption 
between the comparator mechanism in the central executive and the personal knowledge base, a 
component of semantic memory.  When this occurs, a memory error is detected and the 
individual consciously is made aware of such an error.  However, due to a disruption between the 
comparator mechanism and the personal knowledge base, the individual is not made aware that 
this memory error is a different and unique event.  Their personal knowledge base is not updated 
and essentially the individual forgets that they are forgetting.  According to this model, the 
comparator mechanism remains connected with implicit memory.  As such, individuals can be 
implicitly aware of the discrepancy between their current and previous state.  Agnew and Morris 
note that the high incidence of depression in mild AD accounts for this implicit knowledge that 
one‟s memory is failing. 
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 Support for this model comes from Souchay and colleagues, who add that individuals 
with mild AD show initial awareness when faced with a lapse in memory (Souchay, Isingrini, 
Pillon, & Gil, 2003).  However, they are not able to form a lasting memory of such difficulty 
despite often exhibiting symptoms of depression.  Findings from a study by Ansell and Bucks 
(2006) also support this model.  Still other researchers would argue that this model of 
unawareness is incomplete, as it fails to account for the influence of defense mechanisms and 
social roles on awareness (Clare, 2004a).  Despite these potential limitations, this model has 
many strengths making it the preferred model for this study.  The underpinnings of unawareness 
according to this model are discrete and measurable.  Additionally, this model attempts to 
understand unawareness from a cognitive and neuroanatomical prospective.  This is particularly 
logical when examining AD, which results from brain pathology.  Therefore, this study will use 
the most parsimonious model of unawareness and will therefore avoid addressing social or 
psychological prospective.    
Measurement of Unawareness  
The prevalence of unawareness for people  with Alzheimer‟s disease in the literature is 
variable.  Much of the variability comes from the measurement techniques used to examine 
unawareness (Agnew & Morris, 1998).  The degree of unawareness is typically defined by the 
measurement technique used to examine it.  Whereas some studies have reported the incidence of 
unawareness to be as high as 80% in a sample of individuals with Alzheimer‟s disease (Sevush & 
Leve, 1993), others report a prevalence of 20% (Migliorelli et al., 1995).  This variability is at 
least in part due to the difference in assessment measures used, as each type of measurement taps 
different features of unawareness (Agnew & Morris, 1998).         
The degree of unawareness is typically measured in one of three ways: (1) a clinician 
rating of patient unawareness; (2) The discrepancy between the patient‟s self report of 
functioning and a reliable informant‟s assessment of their functioning; and (3) on-line 
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assessments of awareness.  This includes the discrepancy between the patient‟s self rating of their 
performance and their actual performance on a task, as well as the analysis of error detection and 
correction.  A combination of the aforementioned measurements can also be used.  The 
operational definition of unawareness changes as a function of the measurement type.  Therefore, 
the type of measurement instrument used has an impact on the findings for each study (For 
review, refer to Clare, 2004b). 
Clinical ratings are used as measures of unawareness (i.e. Lopez, Becker, Somsak, Dew, 
& Dekoshy, 1994).  Clinician ratings include structured and unstructured interviews as well as 
patient chart reviews.  One benefit of this technique is that the clinician can explore each area in 
depth for a greater understanding of the patient (Clare, 2004b).  However, this technique assumes 
that the social interaction between the clinician and the patient does not influence what the 
patient reports.  Another problem with this technique is that it assumes that unawareness is a 
symptom that can be rated and classified in a straightforward and reliable manner (Clare, 2004b).     
Many studies employ the patient versus reliable informant discrepancy approach to 
measuring unawareness.  When using this technique, the definition of unawareness becomes the 
discrepancy between the patient‟s ratings of their own functioning compared with their 
informant‟s rating of their functioning on the same measure (Clare, 2004a).  While many studies 
have used this technique to examine unawareness for functional tasks, the majority of studies 
have used this technique to examine memory (For review, refer to Clare, 2004b).  These 
measures are advantageous in that informants such as caregivers give accounts of the patients as 
they perform in their daily lives.  Therefore, this measurement may appear more relevant than 
measures that are taken in a clinical setting.  Additionally, these measures can examine 
unawareness in the context of a variety of settings so as to better understand a myriad of 
cognitive and functional domains.  This can provide for a more detailed understanding of patient 
unawareness (Hardy, Oyebode, & Clare, 2006).  Studies have also found that patients tend to 
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overestimate their performance whereas caregivers tend to underestimate their performance.  One 
drawback to using this approach is that as caregiver burden and depression increase, estimation 
of the patient performance changes (DeBettignies et al., 1990).  Clare (2004b) cautions that this 
type of measurement requires a careful selection of questions that are given to patients and 
informants.   
Another way of measuring unawareness involves comparing the patient‟s assessment of 
performance to their actual performance.  This measurement technique examines „on-line‟ 
awareness, or the monitoring of progress as an individual performs a task.  Therefore, this 
technique works under the assumption that individuals are able to monitor their current 
functioning.  Two methods can be used in this approach.  Individuals can predict their 
performance in a task prior to experience with the task or they can predict performance after they 
have had some experience.  One study using this technique found that approximately 50% of 
individuals with AD studied demonstrated some level of unawareness (Anderson & Tranel, 
1989).   This approach leads to a high number of individuals with AD that over estimate their 
performance on a task (Clare, 2004b).  Cavanaugh (1989) studied individuals using this method.  
The results of this study suggest that prediction accuracy is best for everyday tasks rather than 
laboratory tasks.  Accuracy of prediction increased as a function of familiarity with a task.  This 
finding suggests that prediction accuracy will be better for more well known tasks, and the 
validity of the prediction is questionable for unfamiliar tasks (Clare, 2004b; Hardy, Oyebode, & 
Clare, 2006).  Therefore, when unfamiliar tasks are used, perhaps post task perception of 
performance should be used as a more accurate assessment of unawareness. 
On-line assessment of unawareness can also be done by measuring an individual‟s ability 
to recognize their errors.  This approach is favored by some researchers because it minimizes the 
reliance on expressive or receptive language abilities, which are often affected by brain pathology 
(Hart, Giovannetti, Montgomery, & Schwartz, 1998).  Hart and colleagues (1998) describe one 
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technique which has individuals perform a serious of functional activities such as making coffee 
and toast.  Unawareness is measured by the number of errors identified.  Although this procedure 
has been standardized and assessed for ecological validity, the drawback is that these tests do not 
measure all functional tasks.  Therefore, because different measurement techniques assess 
different types of unawareness, this technique could not easily be used as a comparison of 
unawareness with another functional task.  
Different measurement techniques and therefore different operational definitions of 
unawareness yield inconsistent findings (Agnew & Morris, 1998).  One solution to this problem 
is to use multiple techniques to measure unawareness.  However, these techniques yield different 
levels of awareness which are often uncorrelated, despite the fact that they presumably measure 
the same construct (Clare, 2004b).  For example, Markova and Berrios (2001) have proposed that 
the „object of insight‟, or the assessment measure used to measure awareness, causes the variation 
in unawareness.  Therefore, careful consideration should be made when selecting the appropriate 
measurement technique for examining unawareness.  The assessment tool selected should match 
the domain being investigated.     
Cognition and Unawareness 
 The literature is mixed regarding the relationship between unawareness and global 
cognitive status in AD.  Whereas many studies have found a significant relationship between 
global cognitive status and unawareness (i.e. Kashiwa, Kitabayashi, Narumoto, Nakamura, Ueda, 
& Fukui, 2005), not all studies have yielded this finding (Hardy et al., 2006).  One study by 
Kashiwa and colleagues (2005) assessed individuals with AD and found that level of awareness 
correlated negatively with the Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE).  In this study, as 
cognitive status declined, the level of unawareness increased.  Additionally, as the severity of 
dementia and unawareness increased, functional status declined.  Kashiwa and colleagues found 
that unawareness correlated to specific activities of daily living and specific neuropsychological 
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assessment measures.  They concluded that unawareness is related to global disease progress, but 
that it is heterogeneous between individuals (Kashiwa et al., 2005).  A study by McDaniel and 
colleagues found similar results (McDaniel, Edland, Heyman, and the CERAD Clinical 
Investigators, 1995).   
 Presumably, individuals with more cognitive impairment would have a higher degree of 
unawareness.  However, many studies report findings that are contradictory to this presumption.  
Hardy and colleagues (2006) examined individuals with mild and moderate AD on the MMSE, 
memory tests, and on tests measuring unawareness.  They found that performance on the MMSE 
was significantly correlated with performance on the memory tests.  However, there was no 
significant difference between individuals with mild and moderate dementia on measures of 
unawareness.  Therefore, there was no correlation between global cognitive status and level of 
unawareness.  If global cognitive level is not consistently related to unawareness, perhaps other 
factors impact unawareness. 
 Rather than the global cognitive score, the degree of memory impairment has been found 
to correlate with unawareness.  However, this memory impairment is associated with a 
maintenance factor with unawareness rather than a precipitating factor (For review, refer to 
Agnew & Morris, 1998).  Whitlock (1981) posed that individuals with poor episodic memory are 
less likely to remember that they have memory impairment.  Others agree with this proposition, 
finding that unawareness is significantly associated with one aspect of memory functioning; the 
number of false positives on a recognition test (Reed, Jagust, & Coulter, 1994).  However, others 
fail to find the association between memory and unawareness.  Instead, many researchers 
highlight the impact of frontal lobe impairment on unawareness (i.e. Reed et al. 1994). 
Executive symptoms such as impaired reasoning, problem solving, and mental flexibility 
have all been implicated in various disorders where individuals demonstrate unawareness, 
including AD (Lopez et al., 1994).  Through a neuroimaging study, researchers have found a 
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connection between unawareness and the frontal lobes for individuals with AD (Reed, Jagust, & 
Coulter, 1993).  Specifically, individuals who had unawareness for memory loss had 
hypoperfusion of the right dorsolateral frontal.  However, this was not correlated to dementia 
severity.  Findings from Derousne and colleagues (1999) were not as conclusive regarding the 
role of the frontal lobes on unawareness.  They found that patients with mild unawareness had 
more clinicial symptoms of a frontal lobe dysfunction than individuals with no unawareness 
(32% versus 16%).  However, this difference was not statistically significant.  These studies add 
to the literature which suggests an indirect and poorly understood relationship between cognition 
and unawareness. 
Lopez and colleagues (1994) attempted to further understand the relationship between 
unawareness and frontal lobe impairments as well as other cognitive domains.  These researchers 
ran a stepwise regression to determine what factors are most associated with patient unawareness.  
Results revealed that age and executive functions were the strongest predictors of unawareness.  
Executive functions were the best predictors of which individuals would have awareness of their 
illness.  However, conclusions also supported that as disease progressed, level of awareness 
dropped.  The researchers suggest that the lack of awareness seen in some individuals with AD is 
related to the impairment of CES functioning, or working memory.  Lopez and colleagues are 
clear in their claim that this does not mean that frontal damage is a predominant symptom of AD, 
rather that there may be a greater distribution of pathology in individuals with higher levels of 
unawareness (Lopez, Becker, Somsak, Dew, & DeKosky, 1994).  
In sum, some research shows a direct relationship between global cognitive status and 
unawareness, while other studies show contradictory results.  Some studies have shown that 
memory impairments can maintain a greater degree of unawareness.  Still other studies highlight 
frontal lobe impairment as contributory to unawareness.  Greater frontal lobe impairment could 
be indicative of a greater distribution of pathology in the brain.  The discrepancy among studies 
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is an indication that the underlying constructs of unawareness are poorly understood.  Perhaps it 
is more appropriate to examine the impact of unawareness on functional ability in AD.    
Function and Unawareness 
Individuals with AD have cognitive decline accompanied by a simultaneous decline in 
functional abilities.  The relationship between cognition and function is not direct, suggesting 
other factors that impact functional ability.  Still, research shows that as dementia progresses, 
activities and independent activities of daily living, such as grooming and meal preparation, 
decline (Feldman, Van Baelen, Kavanagh, & Torfs, 2005).  As previously stated, decline in 
cognitive status alone does not account for such changes.  Unawareness of deficits is associated 
with increased dependence and safety concerns (Giovannetti, Libon, & Hart, 2002).   
Research has shown that unawareness contributes to functional decline (i.e. Wild & 
Cotrell, 2003; Pachana & Petriwskyj, 2006) however the relationship is not well understood.  
This is perhaps due to the great degree of variability evident in both unawareness and functional 
ability measured in individuals with AD.  Additionally, one study found that individuals with AD 
have variable levels of unawareness depending on the domain assessed (Ott et al. 1996).  One 
way to address that limitation is to study functional abilities independently.  
One specific functional activity studied extensively in individuals with AD is the ability 
to drive a car.  This is in part due to the importance that individuals place on the ability to drive.  
Driving provides people with a both a means of necessary transportation, but it also promotes the 
feeling of independence and identity. Driving is also an activity that requires intact abilities 
through multiple domains (Pachana & Petriwskyj, 2006).  It is therefore a complex activity that 
becomes troublesome for many older adults.  Research on individuals with AD shows that these 
individuals do not consistently display awareness regarding changes in their ability to drive.  In 
fact in one study 38% of individuals with AD still considered themselves to be safe drivers 
despite failing a road test.  This unawareness can compromise the safety of themselves and others 
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and has been linked to an eightfold increase in accident rates for individuals with AD compared 
to healthy controls (Friedland et al 1988).  It also decreases the likelihood that these individuals 
will be able to live independently (Wild & Cotrell, 2003).  In addition to cognitive status, 
researchers posit that individual awareness and willingness to impose driving restrictions is 
necessary for safe driving.  Therefore, unawareness plays a role in safe driving behavior, though 
it is poorly understood.   
Comparison of Function and Unawareness in Healthy Older Adults 
In contrast to individuals with AD, healthy community dwelling older adults have been 
found to self impose changes in driving as they deem fit, modifying, restricting, and stopping 
driving based on their own judgments (Wild & Kaye, 1991).  A study by Wild and Kaye (1991) 
found that older adults reported making modifications to their driving for reasons such as having 
slower reaction times, being concerned for their safety, or simply feeling too old. The reported 
changes in driving behaviors implied that these individuals had insight into their functioning, and 
were consequently maintaining their safety. 
Older community dwelling healthy adults have been defined as seniors in the community 
who may be experiencing age-related changes in vision, range of motion, slowed speed of 
processing, and medical conditions (Rudman, Friedland, Chipman, & Sciortino, 2006).  By the 
year 2030, the number of seniors aged 65 and older is projected to double and reach 71 million, 
adding a substantial volume to the number of drivers on the road with potential age-related 
declines.  Despite potential impairments, there is no national policy regulating seniors from 
driving at a certain age, as a direct relationship between age and traffic safety has not been found.  
Instead, the current national policy relies on the natural self regulation that appears inherent with 
healthy aging (in Donorfio, D‟Ambrosio, Coughlin, & Mohyde, 2009).  Donorfio and colleagues 
(2009) have defined self regulation as the alteration of driving behavior as one adjusts to changes 
in health or ability.  They note that this self regulation is gradual and common in healthy 
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community dwelling seniors.  Ball and colleagues agree, adding that the majority of seniors they 
interviewed reported reducing night driving and avoiding high traffic roads over time with 
increased age (Ball, Owsley, Stalvey, Roenker, Sloane, & Graves, 1998).  Other conditions in 
which self regulation is common include driving in the rain and driving in situations where 
merging is required (Charlton, Oxley, Fildes, Oxley, Newstead, Koppel, & O‟Hare, 2006).  When 
asked why they regulated their driving under certain conditions, seniors in one study most 
commonly reported that it was their personal preference to do so in response to comfort and 
confidence level (Charlton et al., 2006). 
While age itself is linked to driving ability and self regulation, there is not a direct 
correlation between age and driving.  One study by Donorfio and colleagues (2008) examined 
other factors that contribute to changes in self regulation in driving as a function of age.  Through 
surveys and focus groups, they found the interaction between one‟s perceived health and age was 
the best predictor of self regulation.  The researchers concluded that the interaction between age 
and health directly impacted enjoyment and confidence in driving skills, thus impacting one‟s 
driving practices.  Work by Anstey and colleagues support this claim, adding that an individual‟s 
self-rated health and perceived cognitive abilities were better predictors of driving cessation than 
documented medical or sensory functioning (Anstey, Windsor, Luszcz, & Andrews, 2006).  In 
sum, a senior‟s perception of their own health impacts their perception of their driving, and 
therefore their driving decisions, with age.       
In another study, one‟s perception of the impact of cognitive changes on their driving 
ability precipitated their decision to self restrict their driving.  In this study, Ross and colleagues 
(Ross, Clay, Edwards, Ball, Wadley, Vance, et al, 2009) measured visual processing speed.  They 
found that individuals at higher risk for crashes due to changes in visual processing speeds 
regulated their driving to a greater extent than those with lower crash risks.  The researchers 
concluded that individuals with reduced visual processing speeds were aware of such deficits, 
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and reportedly regulated their driving on their own volition.  Results from this study and one 
conducted by Ackerman, Edwards, Ross, Ball, & Lunsman (2008) suggest that seniors‟ 
perceptions of driving behaviors were accurate, as those at higher risk for crashes regulated their 
driving to greater extent than those at lower risk.  Work by Okonkwo and colleagues (2007) also 
supports this claim.  These researchers examined licensed seniors in the community on factors 
such as driving habits, demographic information, and cognitive measures (Okonkwo, Wadley, 
Crowe, Roenker, & Ball, 2007).  They found that drivers with more impaired visual processing 
reported restricting their driving to a greater degree than those who did not have such 
impairments.  They concluded that older drivers at increased risks for crashes due to changes in 
visual attention were more likely to self regulate as a safety measure.  In sum, seniors with 
greater impairments in cognitive abilities such as visual processing were consistently found to 
self-regulate driving more so than those with less impairments.    
Despite research showing that seniors naturally self regulate driving, some seniors in the 
community as well as researchers express concern about an individual‟s ability to monitor and 
self regulate their driving as they age, noting that there are many factors that impact an 
individual‟s ability to self regulate driving (Rudman et al., 2006).  Freund and colleagues (2004) 
examined seniors in the community who had been referred for a driving evaluation due to 
varying but increased safety risks behind the wheel (Freund, Gravenstein, Ferris, Burke, & 
Shaheen, 2004).  Participants in their study were given cognitive tests, underwent a virtual reality 
driving simulator, and were asked various questions about their driving behaviors.  The 
evaluators found that individuals in their study, despite being at higher risk for crashes as 
measured by a driving referral as well as performance on the virtual reality driving simulator, 
rated themselves as being better drivers than their peers.  In fact, almost forty percent of the 
individuals in the study who were deemed „unsafe drivers‟ via the driving simulator rated 
themselves as the same as or better drivers than their peers.  This suggests that while many 
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seniors are able to self regulate their driving and remain safe behind the wheel, those at greater 
risk may be unaware of any changes in their driving and therefore less likely to self regulate their 
driving.  The researchers suggest that self regulation of driving is mediated by awareness as well 
as a variety of coping mechanisms meant to preserve ones sense of self-esteem, independence, 
and mobility. 
In attempts to understand the factors that contribute to self regulatory driving behavior in 
seniors, Donorfio and colleagues (2009) examined surveys from 3,824 healthy seniors above the 
age of 50 years old in the community.  Similar to results from previous studies, they found that 
seniors viewed driving as a form of maintaining independence that kept them connected to the 
rest of society.  Seniors in their study expressed self awareness regarding changes that occurred 
over time.  They noted that self regulation occurred gradually over time and consisted of both 
attitudes and behaviors that allowed them to compensate for obvious age-related changes.  Four 
specific variables contributed to this self regulation, the first being the observation that age 
contributed to changes in driving abilities, which in turn decreased confidence in driving.  The 
second factor that contributed to self regulation was the role that the car played on one‟s 
independence and connection with society.  Self worth was the third variable, as being able to 
continue driving added to an individual‟s perceived independence and perceived worth.  Lastly, 
the practical role that the car plays and the lack of alternative transportation impacted self 
regulatory behaviors.  Results from surveys in this study revealed that physical changes first 
impacted self regulation, though psychological factors as a result of these physical changes then 
also impacted driving.  The psychological factors such as maintaining self worth, independence, 
and remaining connected strongly influenced an individual‟s self regulatory behavior.  Rudman 
and colleagues (2006) conducted a similar study examining pre-seniors, seniors, and ex drivers in 
the community.  Results from information gleaned from focus groups were similar to the 
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previous study, with themes such as decreased confidence, comfort, and the importance of the car 
for transportation emerging as important factors impacting self regulation.   
 In sum, numerous factors appear to impact an individual‟s awareness and willingness to 
self regulate driving with age.  Perception of one‟s health status, cognitive functioning, and 
physical functioning are some motivating factors for self regulating driving.  Self regulation in 
older adults is reportedly common and gradual over time.  It underlies the current national policy 
which relies on seniors naturally self regulating their driving as they deem appropriate.  Despite 
this, numerous factors appear to influence self regulation in seniors, including the important role 
that driving plays on an individual‟s self worth and mobility.  While the exact relationship 
between self awareness and self regulation in driving for healthy seniors is not entirely 
understood, there appears to be a strong link that does not appear evident in individuals with mild 
Alzheimer‟s dementia.  Understanding self awareness and self regulation in healthy older adults 
will provide a foundation for which to understanding how brain pathology results in disrupted 
self awareness and regulation.   
Measuring Unawareness and Function in AD 
Lack of self awareness impacts self regulation in individuals with AD, resulting in 
potentially unsafe attitudes and behaviors.  As such, it is important to be able to measure 
unawareness in AD.  Giovannetti and colleagues (2002) have examined unawareness of deficits 
through „on-line‟ error detection and correction.  Awareness is measured as an individual is 
actively involved in a task, thereby giving researchers greater understanding regarding the 
relationship between awareness and function.  They have found that individuals with dementia 
identified and corrected significantly less errors on this naturalistic action test than did age 
matched controls.  This finding was true even for individuals with mild AD.  These results 
suggest that individuals with mild dementia make errors in their daily functional tasks, which 
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they do not consistently identify or correct.  This, in turn, compromises their safety and leads to 
greater dependence on caregivers. 
Safe driving behaviors as well as performance on tasks of daily living are crucial for 
patient independence.  The ability to drive is both an important and potentially dangerous 
practice, and the driving simulator provides a safe format for which to examine this behavior 
while providing individuals with challenging and realistic driving scenarios.  Using an on-line 
assessment of driving such as a driving simulator provides another way of examining driving 
beyond using patient/ caregiver discrepancy scores.  On-line assessments also allow for direct 
comparison of the relationship between function and awareness.  In this way, researchers can 
better understand the relationship between cognition, awareness, and function across multiple 
domains.  To date, the literature suggests that cognitive status only explains some of the 
variability in functional status.  Perhaps level of unawareness is another factor that needs to be 
examined when examining functional ability in AD.   
Conclusion 
 Individuals with mild AD experience cognitive changes that are well established and 
understood in the dementia literature.  These individuals also experience a change in functional 
status, which is more idiosyncratic and therefore more difficult to measure.  Nonetheless, it is 
these functional changes that ultimately impact patient safety and independence, causing 
individuals to become dependant on others.  Therefore, it is imperative to understand the 
variables that predict these functional changes.  Research shows that cognitive status and various 
neuropsychological measures predict some of the variability in functional status, but much of the 
changes are left unexplained. 
 Unawareness in AD is also linked to changes in functional status, though the relationship 
between these variables is not well understood.  The lack of understanding between unawareness 
and functional status is perhaps due to the variability within each construct.  Whereas functional 
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status changes are idiosyncratic and impacted by assessment techniques, the same is true for 
changes in unawareness.   Unawareness is not a global construct, nor is its relationship to 
cognitive or impact on functional status well understood.  In order to examine this relationship, 
all of the variables have to be explicitly operationally defined.  Additionally, understanding the 
link between unawareness and functional ability in healthy controls is crucial in order to better 
understand the specific impacts of mild AD on this relationship.  As such, this study aimed to 
examine healthy controls as well as individuals with mild AD on two specific measures of 
functional ability.  One specific measure was driving performance on a virtual reality driving 
simulator, which was administered in the laboratory.  The other measure consisted of the 
participant‟s ability to perform independent activities of daily living, as reported by reliable 
informants.  This study therefore utilized two distinct methods of measuring functional abilities 
and their corresponding measures of unawareness.   
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The Current Study 
 This study aimed to examine the relationship between cognition, unawareness, and 
functional ability in healthy seniors as well as for individuals with mild AD.  The main 
hypothesis of this study was that controlling for cognitive ability, there was a relationship 
between unawareness and functional ability.  The literature suggests that unawareness various 
depending on how functional ability is measured, so this study selected two very different but 
equally as important measurements of functional abilities.  Driving ability on a virtual reality 
driving simulator measured the functional ability of driving in real time.  This task was selected 
for both the importance that individuals place on this activity as well as for the variety of safety 
concerns that arise while driving both in seniors as well as for individuals with AD.  Driving 
ability was measured by a virtual reality driving simulator, so as to expose individuals to 
challenging and realistic driving scenarios while keeping them out of danger.  This assessment 
tool was used as a way of testing driving abilities in real time, so as to better understand the 
driving behaviors in individuals with AD.  Using this technique also allowed for an immediate 
way of testing individual‟s unawareness level without relying heavily on memory.  Immediately 
before and after the driving simulator, participants were asked to rate their performance.  The 
primary analysis examined performance following exposure to the driving simulator.  This 
perceived performance was compared to their actual performance to obtain an unawareness score 
specific to the driving measure.  
 In a clinical setting, reliable informants are often asked to fill out a questionnaire (IADL 
questionnaire) which assesses the individual‟s ability to perform specific functional tasks.  Tasks 
assessed include: Ability to use the telephone, shopping, food preparation, housekeeping, 
laundry, use of transportation, medication management, and the ability to manage their own 
finances.  This measure is the conventional assessment technique used to glean information about 
functional ability in clinical settings, and was therefore be used in the present study.  
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Unawareness scores were obtained by having the participant complete their own form, and then 
contrasting the participant‟s total score with the reliable informant‟s total score.  
 The literature also suggests that specific cognitive constructs are related to functional 
ability in individuals with AD.  This includes performance on tests of memory, executive 
function, and visuospatial abilities.  As such, this study measured cognitive performance on these 
domains.  This study controlled for the participant‟s performance on cognitive measures and 
examined the relationship between unawareness and function.  The study design was 
correlational using first order correlations in a partial correlational model.   
Aims 
Aim 1: Cognitive scores are typically used in the literature when examining functional abilities.  
However, unawareness has also been shown to impact driving performance in both healthy 
controls as well as for people with AD.  The same is true for other functional domains.  The 
primary aim of this study was to examine the relationship between unawareness and functional 
ability, controlling for performance on specific cognitive tasks.  This relationship was examined 
separately for individuals with AD and healthy controls. 
Aim 2: The secondary aim of this study was to examine various aspects of unawareness in the 
context of an on-line functional assessment for both healthy seniors as well as for individuals 
with mild AD.  The virtual reality driving simulator was an unfamiliar task for most if not all of 
the participants in the study.  As such, it provided a way of examining the ability of individuals to 
change their views about their performance after exposure to a task.  Individuals were asked to 
predict how they would perform on the virtual reality driving simulator after they have been 
exposed to a practice session but before they start the test itself.  They were also asked about their 
perceived performance after exposure to the test.  This study compared predicted performance 
with actual performance to get a measure of „predicted awareness‟.  Performance on the driving 
simulator was compared to the participant‟s perceived performance as a task specific measure of 
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„unawareness‟.  Finally, the patient‟s predicted performance was contrasted with their perceived 
performance to get a measure of performance „recognition‟ (Refer to Figure 3).  Analysis of 
unawareness for healthy controls was used to help establish the proposed relationship between 
unawareness and function.  It was also used to provide a „range‟ of unawareness in a healthy 
sample of seniors.   
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODS 
Insert Figure 2: Overview of Study Design 
Overview 
This main objective of this study was to better understand the role of cognition and 
unawareness on functional performance in AD.  Unawareness is a common symptom of AD, and 
it is therefore crucial for clinicians to understand how it impacts activities of daily living so as to 
prolong independence and patient safety.  The current study builds on previous research 
examining the impact of cognition and unawareness on functional ability.  Previous research has 
generally studied cognition and unawareness independently, not accounting for how the 
combination of variables impact individuals.  However clinically, both cognitive decline and 
unawareness are common symptoms of AD, and need to be examined in conjunction with one 
another when examining functional tasks.   
Another focus of the study was to examine the impact of awareness and cognition on 
function in healthy seniors.  Current laws rely on a healthy seniors‟ awareness of, and therefore 
self restriction of, driving in order to maintain safety while also maximizing independence.  
Despite this, not much is known about the exact relationship between functioning, self awareness, 
and self restriction in healthy drivers in the community.  This study used cognitive measures and 
task specific measures of unawareness to examine functional ability both performed in the 
laboratory and as described by reliable informants for both individuals with AD as well as for 
healthy seniors.  To do this the evaluators attempted to recruit a total of 35 individuals with mild 
AD and 35 healthy controls (HC).  However, severe restrictions in enrollment which will be 
discussed below significantly limited the number of participants in the current study. 
All participants were seen for one testing session that lasted approximately one and a half 
hours.  During this session, cognitive tests were administered to all study participants.  The 
selected cognitive tests are commonly used in assessments for AD, and they measure cognitive 
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constructs thought to underlie functional performance in AD.  Driving performance was 
measured by a virtual reality driving simulator (VRDS).  Both before and after this driving test, 
all participants were asked questions related to their driving performance.  The answers provided 
served as a measure of task specific driving unawareness.  Additionally, both participants and 
their reliable informants completed a traditionally used measure of functional ability, the 
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) Questionnaire.  The questionnaire completed by 
the reliable informant served as a general measure of the participant‟s functional ability.  The 
discrepancy score between the informant and the participant‟s total score on the IADL served as 
a measure of unawareness of IADLs.  First order partial correlation analyses were conducted to 
examine the relationship between unawareness and functional ability, controlling for 
performance on cognitive tests. A secondary repeated-measures ANOVA examined the various 
aspects of awareness as they related to the VRDS.   
Detailed Procedures 
Participants 
Study participants were comprised of 4 individuals with mild AD, as determined by 
NINDS-ADRDA criteria (McKhann et al., 1984) and 30 healthy controls.  The University of 
Pennsylvania‟s Alzheimer‟s Disease Research Center and the Department of Neurology through 
the Drexel College of Medicine acted as the primary recruitment site for individuals with AD in 
this study.  This study adhered to the NIH policy regarding inclusion of minorities and children in 
research.  Therefore, an attempt was made to recruit subjects from diverse ethnic, gender, and age 
groups.  However, AD is considered a disease of the aging, and is typically seen in individuals 
over the age of 60.  A different profile of AD is evident with individuals who are younger than 
this.  Therefore, to avoid age as a confounding variable, individuals younger than 60 years old 
were not included in this study. 
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 Thirty healthy controls were recruited for this study as a way of examining the 
relationship between cognition, awareness, and functional status as a function of healthy aging.  
Healthy controls were recruited from the caregivers and family of the participants in the study.  
Additional healthy controls were recruited through flyers posted in the community and 
presentations made to a variety of senior centers in the community.  Presumably, all individuals 
in this study were unfamiliar with all of the evaluation procedures, particularly the virtual reality 
driving simulator.  The healthy controls were included in this study to establish a baseline for 
individuals with mild AD in order to understand the relationship between cognition, awareness, 
and functional status.  Additionally, they were included to better understand awareness, self 
regulation, and functioning in healthy aging.  An attempt was made to match healthy controls 
with individuals with AD for age, gender, years of education, and years of driving experience.  
However, the limited number of participants with AD In this study restricted this matching.   
 All potential participants had to satisfy specific criteria in order to participate in the 
current study.  Specific areas for inclusion in the study included demographic and medical status 
as well as driving status.    
Demographic/ Medical Inclusion Criteria: 
 Age: All participants were between the ages of 60 and 85 years old.  Individuals over the age 
of 85 were excluded due to the potential confounds of aging on functional status. 
 Neurological history: Individuals with a significant history of head injury, stroke, seizures, or 
any other neurological impairment were not included in this study. 
 Psychiatric and substance abuse history: Individuals with significant psychiatric history (i.e. 
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia) or documented substance abuse history were not included in 
the study.  In addition to leading to cognitive deficits, the literature suggests that such a 
history adds to caregiver burden in individuals with mild AD, which could have confounded 
the report of the reliable informant.  
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 Medication: Individuals were included in the study if they were not on medication that 
negatively impacted their cognitive status (i.e. steroids, benzodiazepines, neuroleptics, opiods 
and other narcotic agents). 
Driving Criteria: 
 Individuals had to be considered as „active drivers‟ at the time of evaluation, which is defined 
as having a minimum of two driving experiences every two weeks over the last six months.  
This was to ensure that individuals were familiar with driving, adding to the ecological 
validity of the data. 
 A minimum of one year of driving experience was necessary to be included in this study. 
 Individuals who required adaptive driving devices such as steering wheel turn knobs were not 
included.  The driving simulation environment in this study could not accommodate such 
devices. 
 Simulation sickness history: Simulation sickness could impact how individuals performed on 
the virtual reality driving simulator.  Therefore, individuals with no/low history of motion 
sickness as determined by the modified version of the SSQ questionnaire (Kennedy et al., 
1993) were included.  This questionnaire will be described in detail below. 
 
 The current study included 30 healthy controls as well as participants that had been 
diagnosed with mild AD based on neuropsychologist‟s or physician‟s reports.  Healthy controls 
were defined as individuals in the community who satisfied inclusion/exclusion criteria and had 
never received a diagnosis of cognitive impairment or dementia.  Four individuals with mild AD 
were also included in the study.  Although initial inclusion criteria necessitated a score of 18-24 
on the Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975), problems with enrollment 
resulted in inclusion with a diagnosis of mild AD from a medical provider.  Individuals with 
moderate to severe AD were not considered, as they are often too impaired to perform 
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instrumental activities of daily living independently, which is what was examined in this study.  
Individuals were required to provide a reliable informant who was intimately familiar with the 
participant‟s daily functioning.  This was defined as someone who knew them and who was 
familiar with their daily life.  A reliable informant was necessary because this study examined 
unawareness.  One way of assessing unawareness was to compare the participant‟s view of their 
own functioning with the reliable informant‟s view of their functioning.       
Compensation 
 Participants were compensated $35 for their participation in this study.  Participants were 
also compensated for parking at the time of the study.  All participants were informed of this 
before the study began, and were told that their participation would aid in the understanding of 
awareness in healthy older adults and in people with mild AD. 
Subject Availability and Appropriateness 
 In order to conduct this study with an appropriate power, the evaluators attempted to 
enroll 70 individuals; 35 individuals with mild AD and 35 healthy controls.  However, 
restrictions in interest resulted in four individuals with mild AD and 30 healthy controls.  All 
individuals with mild AD were recruited from the Department of Neurology at Drexel College of 
Medicine and the University of Pennsylvania‟s Alzheimer‟s Disease Research Center despite 
efforts from other institutions.  The Memory Disorders program through the Department of 
Neurology at Drexel College of Medicine offers specialized assessment and treatment services to 
individuals with cognitive and memory disorders through a multidisciplinary team.  It is housed 
in Hahnemann Hospital in central Philadelphia.  University of Pennsylvania Alzheimer‟s Disease 
Center has been serving patients as a federally supported program since 1991, and has served 
over 1,100 individuals over the past five years.  Through a multidisciplinary team of staff, they 
offer services to individuals in the community with cognitive and memory impairments that are 
over 50 years of age.  They provide assessment, treatment, and the opportunity to participate in 
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cutting edge research.  Many people who attend these centers for clinical needs sign a form at the 
onset of their care that they are interested in participating in research studies.  Potential 
participants were identified by the staff at each respective site and were contacted by that site 
through flyers and mailings.  The mailings included the contact information for the investigators 
in the study.  No HIPAA information was released to the study investigators.  If an individual 
responded by calling the study investigator, a telephone screening was conducted to ensure 
inclusion/ exclusion criteria were met prior to scheduling of the testing session.  As previously 
mentioned, healthy controls were recruited as family members of individuals with AD, through 
flyers presented in the community and presentations made to a variety of senior centers in the 
community.     
Power Analysis 
 The primary analyses in this study involved identifying the relationship between 
unawareness and specific functional abilities, controlling for performance on each cognitive 
test.   As such, the study design was correlational using first order correlations in a partial 
correlational model.  The relationships were examined independently for individuals with AD 
and HC for both types of functional abilities measured in this study.   The independent variable 
was participant group (AD and HC).  Groups were attempted to be matched on age, gender, years 
of education, and years of driving experience.  The primary dependent variables were 
performance on cognitive tests (e.g. Judgment of Line orientation, California Verbal Learning 
Test-II Short Form, and Trail Making Test-B), unawareness level (e.g. performance/perception 
discrepancies on the VRDS and patient/caregiver discrepancy on the IADL), and functional 
performance (e.g. performance on the VRDS and score on the IADL questionnaire).  To estimate 
a reasonable effect size for this study, a review of the literature was used.   In a similar study 
measuring cognition and unawareness in individuals with mild to moderate AD yielded a 
moderate effect size ( r = .52)(Feldman et al., 2005).  To obtain a conservative estimate of the 
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effect size to be used in the apriori power analysis, 95% confidence intervals of the reported 
effect sizes were calculated.  The lower limit of the confidence interval was used (r=  .44).  
 Specific power analysis software, G*Power (ver. 3.0.6) was used to estimate the sample size 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  Using a significance criterion of 0.05 with a two-
sided test for a moderate effect of (r = 0.44)  and power of 0.80, yielded a sample size of 35 
subjects per group (AD and HC) necessary to determine the relationship between unawareness 
and each functional task, controlling for performance on cognitive tests.   
Task Descriptions 
All study participants were administered three brief primary cognitive tests which were 
included in the partial correlation (Judgment of Line orientation, California Verbal Learning 
Test-II Short Form, and Trail Making Test-B).  Two exploratory tests (Trail Making Test-A and 
Clock Drawing Test) were added for post-hoc exploratory analysis.  All participants underwent 
one functional evaluation meant to assess driving ability, a functional ability that is often 
particularly troublesome for individuals with AD and is a topic of concern for healthy seniors as 
well.  Both before and after exposure to this task, participants were asked to answer questions 
about their predicted and perceived performance on the VRDS.  Both participants and their 
informants were asked to complete an IADL questionnaire.  Because all participants were 
exposed to a virtual reality driving simulator, all participants were also required to complete a 
questionnaire assessing history of simulation sickness and present symptoms consistent with 
simulation sickness.  Refer to Table 1 for a list of all study variables.   
Insert Table 1: Variables in the Study 
Cognitive Evaluation:  Although some researchers have found a relationship between global 
cognitive status and functional ability in AD, other researchers have highlighted specific 
cognitive domains as predictive of functional ability.  Three specific cognitive domains that have 
been linked to functional ability include memory, executive functioning, and visuospatial 
Role of unawareness 51 
 
abilities.  Because of their presence in the literature along with the desire to keep the testing 
session short to eliminate fatigue, these were the only three cognitive domains assessed in the 
primary analysis.  Each cognitive domain was assessed with one neuropsychological test that has 
been used extensively in AD research.  The Trail Making Test-A and the Clock Drawing Test 
were also included for exploratory purposes, as these test has been linked to driving performance 
in seniors (Duchek, Hunt, Ball, Buckles, & Morris, 1997; Freund et al., 2004).  
California Verbal Learning Test- Second Edition Short Form (CVLT-II Short Form) 
(Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, and Ober, 2000): This was a 9-word list task containing three 
semantically related categories of words presented in a semi-randomized order.  One list was 
presented four times, and participants were instructed to try to remember as many words as 
possible each time.  A distracter task was given and then participants were asked to remember as 
many words as they could from the original word list.  After a 10 minute delay, participants were 
again asked to remember as many words as they could from the original list and were then given 
cues to aid performance.  Finally, participants were presented with a list of words to which they 
were to respond „yes‟ if the word was from the original word list.  This test measured verbal 
learning and memory.  The variable of interest from this test was the standardized d‟ score, which 
reflected the difference between a participant‟s hit rate and false positive rate in standard 
deviation units.  Individuals with AD are differentially impaired on measures of this recognition 
discriminability (Delis et al., 1991). 
Trail Making Test –parts A & B (TMT-A & B: Army Individual Test Battery, 1944): For 
this test participants were asked to connect consecutive numbers in part A, and then to connect 
consecutive numbers and letters in alternating fashion in part B.  The participant was instructed to 
connect the dots as fast as they could.  Scores on both parts A and B were based on time to 
completion.  TMT-B was used in the primary analysis and it assessed visual scanning, motor 
speed, attention, and cognitive flexibility.  This test is sensitive to cognitive decline evident in 
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dementia.  Individuals with AD often have difficulty in dividing and shifting their attention, 
which can be captured by this test.  Difficulty on this task has been linked to difficulties 
performing instrumental activities of daily living as well.  (For review, refer to Lezak et al., 2004, 
p. 214 & p. 373).  The variable of interest from the TMT-B was the standardized time to 
completion (z-score).   
Judgment of Line Orientation (JLO) (Benton, Sivan, Hamsher et al., 1994): This test 
examined visuospatial perception, analysis, and judgment.  Here, individuals were asked to match 
angled line pairs to eleven numbered lines that formed a semi circle.  This test began with five 
practice items followed by a thirty item test.  The total score (0-30) was the number of items in 
which both lines were correctly matched.  Hamsher, and colleagues (1994) note that scores of 21 
and higher reflect average performance.  Individuals with AD have demonstrated impairment on 
this test, though performance has varied from failure to slightly low performance (Ska, Poissant, 
& Joanette, 1990).  Scores were converted into age and gender corrected scores, adapted by 
Benton, Sivan, Hamsher and colleagues (1994).  The variable of interest on this test was the total 
age-corrected score. 
Clock Drawing Test (CDT)(exploratory): For this test, participants were instructed both 
verbally and in writing to draw the face of a clock with all of the numbers, and place the hands 
set to ten minutes after eleven.  Participants were given a blank space for which to draw the 
clock, and performance was untimed, though typically takes less than five minutes for 
completion.  The evaluator was not allowed to give cues during the test, though the participant 
was allowed to self-correct.  The Freund scoring system was used, where participant could earn a 
total of 0-7 points based on number placement, indication of time on the clock, and spacing 
(Fruend et al., 2004).  Using this scoring system, Freund and colleagues (2004) have found that a 
score of 4 or less is predictive of unsafe driving in seniors.  They found that incorrect time setting 
was the most significant predictor of unsafe driving.  The CDT has also been linked to executive 
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functioning in Alzheimer‟s dementia (Royall, Cordes, & Polk, 1998).  The variable of interest on 
this test was the total score (0-7).         
Functional Measures  
 Novel Functional Measure of Driving: Driving ability is a major concern both for healthy 
older adults as well as for individuals with mild AD due to the importance individuals place on 
this ability as well as the tremendous safety issues that potentially arise.  Behind the wheel 
driving evaluations have numerous limitations as well as safety concerns, while cognitive tests 
are not ecologically valid ways of assessing driving ability.  Because of that, this study employed 
a virtual reality driving simulator as a way of measuring driving performance.  Driving 
simulation has been used in this clinical population by a variety of researchers (i.e. Cox, Quillian, 
Thorndike, Kovatchev, & Hanna, 1998; Shua-Haim & Gross, 1996; Szlyk, Myers, Zhang, 
Wetzel, & Shapiro, 2002).  Driving simulation has also been used to study driving in healthy 
older adults (Freund et al., 2004).   
 Virtual Reality Driving Simulator (release 1.0)(VRDS):  This study used the current 
version of the Virtual Reality Driving Simulator (release 1.0).  This system was developed 
through collaboration by Digital MediaWorks Inc. and Maria Schultheis, Ph.D.  The system 
delivered pre-programmed environments to expose individuals to simulated real world driving 
experiences.    Various actions were made by navigating through and interacting with various 
objects and environments through the use of artificial intelligence behavior algorithms.  Medium 
resolution geometry and high resolution textures provided for high quality visuals, which when 
paired with the realistic environments, created a believable driving experience.  Individuals 
controlled their environment by a commercially available steering wheel and foot pedals.  While 
individuals drove through the environment, information about their performance was 
simultaneously tracked and stored in the computer.  Such information included raw steering and 
brake-pedal input, vehicle position, and speed.  This system was designed to operate on an 
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equivalent single processing system to the Pentium 4 class PC.  The information was projected to 
three, flat screen 30-inch monitors.  
The driving system included four types of driving zones: a residential, school, highway, 
and commercial zone.  Each zone flowed into one another, thereby enabling drivers to drive 
through every zone during a 15-minute drive. These zones were specifically selected from 
clinical driving specialists, in an attempt to capture real life driving situations.  This study 
required the individuals to drive through every zone once.  Prior to driving in these zones, 
individuals were asked to drive in practice residential and highway zones for several minutes in 
order to familiarize themselves with the machine, controls, and virtual environment.  Directions 
were given by the computer as the driver drove through the environment.  However, an 
experimenter was also there to provide the instructions if the individual was unable to hear the 
original instructions.  Information was generated by the computer and sampled every 200 ms 
during driving, though no filtering was performed.  Specific variables sampled included speed 
(mph), lane deviation (in feet), acceleration and deceleration rates (average mph), and stopping 
behavior. 
A total of seven measures were sampled throughout the driving route and were used as 
measures of driving performance (for a detailed description, refer to Table 2).  Each of these 
measures were then converted into a final score of one through five so that driving performance 
could be explicitly compared with scores gleaned from an unawareness measure described below.  
Two such measures were driving behaviors at stop signs embedded within the residential section 
and at traffic lights found in the commercial section of the driving environment.  Specifically, 
driving behavior was sampled and averaged from three stop signs and three traffic lights.  This 
behavior included if the individual stopped, the distance stopped from each stop sign or traffic 
light, and the length of time an individual waited before resuming driving.   
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Speed was another important measure to consider when examining driving behavior.  
Speed was sampled from the highway portion of the driving environment, as this portion of the 
environment allowed for measurement over a continuous period of time during which an 
individual was not required to stop or turn.  Two specific highway zones were selected for speed 
sampling based on the relative straightness of the road and lack of extraneous environmental 
challenges.  Lane management was another measure sampled from two predetermined zones of 
the highway in the driving environment as well as overall deviation from the lane throughout the 
entire highway portion.  The two zones selected to measure lane management were picked due to 
the curviness of the road, necessitating more conscious control of the vehicle.  In addition to 
measurement of lane management during these two zones, the number of times that an individual 
deviated, or drove out of the lines demarcating the lane throughout the entire highway portion of 
the environment was also calculated.   
Three driving measures were calculated based on environmental challenges encountered 
by each individual.  The first challenge was encountered on the highway where an individual was 
asked to follow behind a target vehicle at a safe distance for an allotted amount of time as the 
target vehicle‟s speed varied slightly.  Measurements were taken based on the individual‟s 
attempt to follow the target, success at remaining behind the target, and control over their own 
lane management as they attempted to follow the target.  Another challenge was also measured 
during the highway portion of the environment, and included an individual‟s driving behavior 
during a construction zone.  The construction zone was preceded by a sign indicating that the 
individual needed to move to the left-hand lane.  Throughout the construction zone, the right lane 
was barricaded off by cones, and a sign read that the speed limit was changed to 30 mph.  Here, 
the individual‟s driving behavior was measured based on response to road signs and barriers in 
the road, speed during the construction zone, and change in speed after the zone when an 
individual was to return back to an appropriate highway speed.   
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The third environmental challenge was measured by an individual‟s reaction to 
unexpected objects on the road.  One unexpected object occurred in the residential zone where a 
kid and his ball unexpectedly came out into the middle of the street, necessitating the participant 
to stop the car in order to avoid an accident.  Here, driving behavior was measured by an 
individual‟s lane management and stopping behavior to the kid and ball.  Another way of 
measuring driving behavior to unexpected objects was measuring the number of crashes and 
near-crashes experienced by each individual as they navigated the driving environment and 
encountered other cars and objects on the road.  Response to the kid and the ball as well as 
overall reaction to unexpected objects throughout the environment was converted into one score. 
Each of the seven driving measures was sampled using very specific criteria outlined on 
Table 2.  Measurements of such behaviors were compared to scores from a sub section of a 
normative sample collected on the same VRDS.  This normative sample was collected with the 
intension of creating normative data for studies such as the current one.  The current study 
utilized a sample of 10 individuals from the normative study, ranging in age from 33-58 years 
old.  The statistics from the normative study were used as standards for which to compare each 
participant‟s performance during the current study. 
Insert Table 2: Virtual Reality Driving Simulator Variables in the Study 
Simulation sickness was a potential adverse reaction for certain individuals when exposed 
to a virtual environment.  Simulation sickness had the potential to become both a confounding 
variable for the study as well as frustrating for the individual.  Therefore, at screening, 
individuals were asked to complete a screening version of the Simulation Sickness Questionnaire 
(SSQ)(Kennedy et al., 1993).  Individuals with a pronounced history of motion or simulation 
sickness were considered a high risk for developing simulation sickness in this study, and were 
therefore excluded.  An individual was considered high risk if they answered “always” in 
response to “how often would you say you get” sick under a specific condition.  Those who were 
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at low/no risk were included in the study.  Before exposure to the VR environment, individuals 
completed the Pre-Exposure Symptom Checklist of the SSQ (Appendix A) as a measure of how 
they were feeling prior to being exposed to the virtual environment.  Following exposure to the 
VRDS, individuals were administered the Post-Exposure Symptom Checklist of the SSQ to 
compare symptoms prior to and following virtual reality exposure.   
 Traditional Functional Measure of Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL): The 
research shows that individuals with AD have functional impairments along with cognitive 
impairments.  These impairments are what ultimately lead to greater dependency and 
institutionalization for many individuals.   
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) questionnaire (Lawton & Brody, 1969): 
This questionnaire assessed independent living skills in eight functional domains (Appendix B).  
Such domains included the ability to use the telephone, shop, prepare food, maintain the home, 
launder clothes, use transportation, manage medication, and handle finances.  Individuals were 
scored according to their highest level of functioning in each domain.  The total score ranges 
from 0-17, with 0 reflecting low functioning and 17 reflecting virtual independence in all areas 
assessed.  Both individuals with mild AD and healthy controls were required to complete this 
questionnaire.   Reliable informants were asked to complete this form for both groups of 
participants in the study, as this was its intended use.  This measure is commonly used when 
assessing functional ability for individuals with AD (i.e. Farias et al., 2003; Feldman et al., 2005; 
Matsuda & Saito, 2005).  A study by Farias and colleagues (2003) found the inter-rater reliability 
of this questionnaire to be .85.   
Unawareness Measures:   
In this study, unawareness was measured in two ways: participant/reliable informant 
discrepancy scores and participant perception/performance scores.  This study did not employ 
clinical ratings scores based on their subjectivity as well as the limited time in which the 
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clinicians had to assess each participant.  Measures of unawareness were gleaned from 
discrepancy scores for both the VRDS and the IADLs.   
Measure of Unawareness on a Novel Functional Task: This study assessed the 
participant‟s perception of their own functioning both before and after completing the VR 
Driving Simulator (See Appendix C and D).  However, only the individual‟s perception of 
performance post-VRDS exposure was used in the primary analysis, as individuals were 
relatively new to this driving technique and therefore may have had difficulty predicting 
performance.  The individual‟s post-VRDS perception of performance was compared with their 
actual performance on the VRDS to yield an „unawareness‟ score for the task.  This was a task 
specific and novel measure of unawareness, as a participant‟s perception was being compared to 
actual performance on the VRDS.  This study used a self-rating questionnaire similar to one 
created by Hart, Giovannetti, Montgomery, and Schwartz (1998) who created a self-rating 
questionnaire to assess unawareness in individuals with traumatic brain injury on a task assessing 
naturalistic action.  The questionnaire asked participants how they thought they performed on 
specific demands of the naturalistic action task.  Questions were answered on a 1 (Wasn‟t able to 
do) to 5(Did with ease) scale.  A total score was then calculated (range 9-45).  The specific 
questions on this questionnaire were changed to suit the VR Driving Simulator task.  All seven 
driving behaviors sampled on the VR task were explicitly addressed on the unawareness 
questionnaire.  For example, one question on the unawareness questionnaire necessitated the 
participant to score themselves from one through five on how they thought they did at managing 
stop signs.  The total score on the unawareness questionnaire was contrasted to the total score on 
the VRDS to get a task specific unawareness score.  
Secondary analyses examined the qualitative aspects of unawareness.  Here, individuals‟ 
predictions of their performance were contrasted to both their actual performance as well as their 
post-VRDS exposure perceived performance.  The pre-performance predictions were assessed 
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just after the practice trial of the VRDS and right before the actual VRDS test.  This afforded 
participants some exposure to the VRDS so that they could better predict performance.  This 
assessment included the same questions as asked on the post-VRDS exposure questionnaire, 
though here participants were asked to predict how they would do on cognitive, physical, and 
specific task specific VRDS measures.  Refer to figure 3 for a better understanding of the 
unawareness variables gleaned from the VRDS exposure. 
Measurement of Unawareness on a Traditional Functional Tool: A traditional 
measurement of unawareness was gleaned from the discrepancy score between the participant 
and their reliable informant on the IADL questionnaire.  This score is considered „traditional‟ 
because it is has been used in the literature to assess awareness.  Additionally, the IADL is a well 
known measure of functional assessment.  This discrepancy score is labeled “IADL discrepancy” 
score. 
Methods 
Participants with a clinically verifiable history of mild AD and healthy control 
participants were recruited through various hospitals, centers, and community organizations.  
Recruitment was described above.  Interested potential clinical participants were given the 
contact information of the principal investigator and underwent a structured screening to 
determine eligibility if they expressed interest in participating in the study.  Healthy older adults 
in the community similarly contacted the principal investigator if they were interested in 
participating in the study.  If individuals satisfied criteria, they were scheduled for a formal 
testing session.    
At the start of the experimental session, all participants were required to sign an informed 
consent that had been approved from the Institutional Review Board of Drexel University.  All 
participants with mild Alzheimer‟s dementia also signed a medical release form giving the 
researchers in the study access to their medical history for medical verification.  All participants 
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then received a thorough structured interview to ensure eligibility.  The testing session lasted 
approximately one-and-a-half hours.  All testing took place at Drexel University‟s Bossone 
Research Enterprise Center, room 630A.  All participants were required to provide a reliable 
informant to be involved in the study.  All reliable informants signed an informed consent and 
were asked to complete the IADL form describing their interpretation of the participant‟s 
functioning in the community.  A caregiver burden questionnaire was given to reliable informants 
for the participants with mild AD to eliminate the possibility of burden as a covariant to the 
informants‟ responses.  Reliable informants for individuals with mild AD were also required to 
be present for the structured interview to ensure accuracy of personal information.  All 
participants in this study underwent a structured interview, completed all cognitive testing, 
completed forms pertaining to functioning in daily life, and underwent the VRDS and all related 
forms.  Participants completed the VRDS unawareness measures before and after exposure to the 
virtual environment.  The order of administration of the cognitive testing, completion of forms, 
and VRDS were counterbalanced.   
Both the healthy controls and the participants with AD were exposed to the VRDS.  Prior 
to being tested on the VRDS, all participants completed the modified SSQ (Pre-Exposure 
Symptom Checklist) to assess physical symptoms prior to VRDS exposure.  They then completed 
practice trials on a simplified virtual highway and residential environment in order to become 
familiarized with the VR simulator, the steering wheel, and the brake pedals.  Participants next 
completed the pre-test unawareness questionnaire predicting performance on the upcoming 
driving task.  Participants were asked to do this after the practice drive in order to have some 
familiarity with the environment for which to predict performance.  Each participant then 
completed the VRDS driving route, involving exposure to the residential, highway, commercial, 
and school virtual driving zones.  The participants drove through the environment while voice 
commands and the evaluator guided them through the virtual route.  If any participant began to 
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feel the effects of simulator sickness, they were strongly encouraged to discontinue the study 
with no negative consequences to them.  Several participants were discontinued at this time due 
to unanticipated simulation sickness.  Following exposure to the driving route, all participants 
completed the post-test unawareness questionnaire assessing how they thought they performed on 
the task.  Each participant then completed the modified SSQ (Post-Exposure Symptom Checklist) 
to assess for symptoms of simulation sickness.  If symptoms of simulation sickness were present, 
participants were observed by the researcher until these symptoms subsided.  They were then 
debriefed about the study, compensated for their time, and thanked for their participation.     
Planned Statistical Analysis 
Recruitment for the study was severely restricted due to unanticipated confounding 
factors.  Preliminary power analyses for the study revealed that 35 individuals with mild AD and 
35 healthy controls were needed in order to reach appropriate power.  The current study contains 
4 individuals with mild AD and 30 health controls due to difficulty with enrollment.  The primary 
hypotheses and study aims were changed slightly to better reflect the study sample.       
 Before the final analysis of all the variables, tests were run to determine if the data met all 
the necessary parametric assumptions.  Data was analyzed using non-parametric analyses, as 
transformation did not work to normalize the data.  Descriptive statistics were calculated.  This 
included a 95% confidence interval for all significant correlations to better reflect the population 
parameters.  Specific analyses for each hypothesis will be examined below. 
Aim I:  The primary aim of this study was to examine the relationship between unawareness and 
functional ability, controlling for performance on specific cognitive tests.  Data from healthy 
controls were examined quantitatively.  Results from individuals with mild AD were examined in 
an exploratory nature, due to the limited sample size. 
Role of unawareness 62 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Controlling for performance on a verbal memory test (CVLT-II), there 
will be a relationship between unawareness and performance on the virtual reality driving 
simulator in healthy controls.   
Hypothesis 1b. Controlling for performance on an executive control test (TMT-B), there 
will be a relationship between unawareness and performance on the virtual reality driving 
simulator in healthy controls.   
Hypothesis 1c. Controlling for performance on a visuospatial cognitive test (JLO), there 
will be a relationship between unawareness and performance on the virtual reality driving 
simulator in healthy controls.   
Three first order partial correlations were used to determine how much variability in VR 
driving performance was determined by unawareness of the task, holding performance on each 
cognitive test constant.  This study used a two-tailed hypothesis test with a significance criterion 
set to .05.  Diagnostics, analysis of residuals, and standard errors were used to assess variability 
and goodness of fit in this statistical model.  Assumptions such as recursivity, linearity, 
additivity, interval level data, correlation of residual variables, and multicolinearity were checked 
and resulted in the use of nonparametric tests. 
Hypothesis 1d. Controlling for performance on a verbal memory test (CVLT-II), there 
will be relationship between unawareness and functional ability as measured by a discrepancy 
measure from the Independent Activities of Daily Living Questionnaire in healthy controls. 
Hypothesis 1e. Controlling for performance on an executive control test (TMT-B), there 
will be relationship between unawareness and functional ability as measured by a discrepancy 
measure from the Independent Activities of Daily Living Questionnaire in healthy controls. 
Hypothesis 1f. Controlling for performance on a visuospatial cognitive test (JLO), there 
will be relationship between unawareness and functional ability as measured by a discrepancy 
measure from the Independent Activities of Daily Living Questionnaire in healthy controls. 
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 Three partial correlations were used to determine how much variability in general 
functional performance as measured by discrepancy scores in the IADL questionnaire was 
determined by unawareness, holding performance on each cognitive test constant.  This study 
used a two-tailed hypothesis test with a significance criterion set to .05.  Diagnostics, analysis of 
residuals, and standard errors were used to assess variability and goodness of fit in this statistical 
model.  Assumptions such as recursivity, linearity, additivity, interval level data, correlation of 
residual variables, and multicolinearity were checked and resulted in the use of non-parametric 
tests. 
Aim 2: The secondary aim of this study was to examine various aspects of unawareness in the 
context of a novel functional assessment.  This study compared predicted performance with 
actual performance on the VRDS to get a measure of „predicted awareness‟.  Performance on the 
VRDS was compared to each participant‟s perceived performance after their exposure to the 
VRDS as a task specific measure of „unawareness‟.  Each participant‟s predicted performance 
was also contrasted with their perceived performance for a measure of performance „recognition‟ 
(refer to Figure 3).  Analysis of unawareness for healthy controls was used to help establish the 
proposed relationship between unawareness and function on the VRDS.  A quantitative analysis 
could not be run with individuals with mild AD due to the small sample size. 
Hypothesis 2a. There is a significant difference between at least one type of unawareness 
on the VRDS in healthy controls:  the prediction unawareness score, recognition unawareness 
score, and unawareness score.   
Differences between unawareness scores were evaluated using a repeated-measures 
ANOVA using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity due to non-normally distributed 
data.  A two-tailed hypothesis test was conducted using a significance criterion of .05.   
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CHAPTER 3:  RESULTS 
After approximately 19 months of recruitment, the current study contains four individuals 
with mild AD and 30 health controls.  Several sites throughout and neighboring Philadelphia 
agreed to act as recruitment sites for participants with AD including University of Pennsylvania‟s 
Alzheimer‟s Disease Research Center, the Department of Neurology through the Drexel College 
of Medicine, The Center for Neuroscience at Riddle Memorial Hospital, the New Jersey Institute 
for Successful Aging at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Jefferson 
Hospital for Neuroscience, the Alzheimer‟s Association, and the Outpatient Neuropsychology 
Laboratory of Cooper University Hospital.  Four participants were successfully enrolled from 
University of Pennsylvania‟s Alzheimer‟s Disease Research Center and the Department of 
Neurology through the Drexel College of Medicine.  The recruitment of healthy controls was 
expanded to include postings in the community and various senior centers with the result of 30 
healthy controls.  The evaluators were met with unanticipated resistance from individuals to be 
included in the study.  Many potential participants expressed extreme hesitance regarding having 
their driving and cognition tested, despite the confidential nature of the study.  These concerns 
lead to many individuals cancelling appointments before their scheduled dates.  In many cases, 
they were reluctant to reconsider rescheduling, citing their numerous concerns.  Additionally, a 
higher proportion of simulation sickness as a result of exposure to the VRDS resulted in 
incomplete VRDS data collection, as multiple individuals were discontinued from the VRDS 
prior to completion (n=8, 24%).  The primary hypotheses and study aims were modified to better 
reflect the smaller study sample.   
Prior to conducting primary analyses, data was evaluated for normality and descriptive 
characteristics.  Sample characteristics were defined, and data was compared to performance by 
individuals from normative studies.  Several modes of analyses were conducted to test the 
primary hypotheses.  Results were examined separately for healthy controls and individuals with 
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mild AD.  Data from the healthy controls in the study were examined quantitatively.  The number 
of participants with mild AD was too low to conduct quantitative analysis.  Thus, results will be 
presented through case analysis and use of cut scores below.       
Sample Characteristics 
Healthy Controls 
Thirty-five individuals completed this study; thirty healthy controls and four individuals 
with mild AD.  One healthy control participant met inclusion criteria and was enrolled in the 
study.  However, due to simulation sickness during the practice session of the VRDS, no VRDS 
data was collected on this individual.  All of the remaining information from this participant is 
included in the study.   Demographic information for all 30 healthy controls is presented in Table 
3.  Thirty healthy controls ranged in age from 60 to 84 with a mean age of 73.57 years (SD= 
7.70).  Healthy control participants had a range of education from 12 to 21 years, with a mean of 
16.23 years (SD=2.99).  Sixteen females and 14 males were included in the study.  Though the 
study attempted to include individuals from all ethnic backgrounds, 24 Caucasians and 6 African 
Americans acted as controls in this study.  Twenty-eight were right-handed while two were left-
handed.  Thirty-three percent of healthy control participants used a spouse as a reliable informant, 
23% used a child, 17% used a romantic partner, and 13% each used a friend or sibling.  On 
average, these participants reported knowing their reliable informants for 37.65 years 
(SD=23.36).     
Insert Table 3: Demographic Variables for Healthy Controls (n=30) 
 Driving characteristics (Table 4), including current and past driving habits, were collected 
to understand possible factors that might influence the VRDS.  Healthy control participants 
ranged in driving experience from 32 to 77 years with a mean of 55.10 years (SD= 10.20).  
Currently, participants ranged from driving two to 30 days per month, with a mean of 22.37 days 
per month (SD= 8.50).  Mileage per drive ranged from 2.5 to 160, with a mean of 32.58 (SD= 
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40.95) miles.  Twenty percent of participants reported an accident or ticket within the past year 
while 30% of participants reported restricting their driving in some way within the past year.  
Twenty-one percent of participants reportedly were the only drivers in their household.   
Insert Table 4: Driving Characteristics for Healthy Controls  
Clinical Case Examples 
 Four participants with mild Alzheimer‟s dementia were included in the study.  
Although initial inclusion criteria necessitated a score of 18-24 on the Mini Mental Status 
Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975), problems with enrollment resulted in inclusion with 
a diagnosis of mild AD from a medical provider.  Demographic and driving information from 
each clinical participant are presented qualitatively below and important demographic 
information is presented in Table 5.   
Insert Table 5: Demographic Information for Clinical Sample 
Alzheimer’s Dementia Case #1 (AD1). The first clinical participant was a right-handed 73 year 
old female with 16 years of education with an MMSE score of 21.  She had been retired for 
approximately 12 years at the time of the study.  This participant had bilateral cataract surgery 
and reported that her vision is currently „fine‟, occasionally necessitating the use of reading 
glasses.  Her husband, whom she had known for 51 years and with whom she interacted daily, 
acted as her reliable informant.  They noted that she was diagnosed with mild Alzheimer‟s 
dementia approximately 18 months ago by way of blood work and cognitive testing conducted at 
a regional hospital‟s memory center.  At the time of her participation in the study, AD1 was 
currently taking Aricept daily.  As per the participant and her reliable informant, she experienced 
problems with her memory including forgetting what day it is and misplacing things around the 
house.  She had been driving for 57 years and currently reported driving approximately six times 
per month, traveling 10 miles each drive.  She denied receiving any tickets or being involved in 
any accidents within the last year and reported that over the past eight months she had only 
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driven when accompanied by another person.  She reported being more careful when driving.  
She was not the only driver in her household, as her husband also drove.  AD1 had no history of 
exposure to virtual reality or motion sickness.     
Alzheimer’s Dementia Case #2 (AD2). A 75 year old right handed male, this participant scored 
25 on the MMSE.  He had 19 years of education and had been diagnosed with mild Alzheimer‟s 
dementia approximately 9 months prior to participation in the study at a regional hospital‟s 
memory center.  The participant‟s wife acted as his reliable informant, with whom he lived with 
and interacted with on a daily basis.  He noted that he became concerned about memory problems 
when he had difficulty remembering the names of familiar streets and could not remember the 
players‟ names from his favorite sports team.  No other cognitive problems were reported.  The 
participant was on Aricept and Namenda since he was diagnosed with mild AD.  He has 
reportedly been driving for 59 years and remains the primary driver in his household despite the 
fact that his wife also drives.  He reported driving over 60 miles each weekend and an average of 
10 miles during the week.  Both he and his wife had not noticed any changes in his driving, and 
he had not restricted his driving in any way.  The participant had not received any tickets or been 
in any accidents within the last year.  He noted that he had played a virtual reality golf game once 
before, but he had no previous exposure to a virtual reality driving simulation, nor did he have 
any history of simulation or motion sickness.  
Alzheimer’s Dementia Case #3 (AD3). The third clinical case was a right-handed 69 year old 
male with 12 years of education who had retired from work approximately 8 years ago.  He was 
right-handed and scored 17 on the MMSE.  The participant‟s wife, whom he had known for 39 
years and with whom he currently resided, acted as his reliable informant.  They reported that he 
was diagnosed with depression one year prior to his diagnosis of mild Alzheimer‟s dementia.  
Upon diagnosis of depression, his family doctor prescribed him Prozac, which he used to date 
(current GDS=0).  He later received a comprehensive evaluation at a regional hospital‟s memory 
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center, resulting in a diagnosis of mild AD approximately 24 months ago for which he was 
currently taking Aricept.  He and his wife reported difficulty remembering people‟s names, a 
slight decline in concentration, and a propensity for repeating himself and misplacing things.  He 
had been driving for 53 years and currently reported driving approximately 30 miles every day.  
He did not restrict his driving despite the fact that his wife also drove, and noticed no differences 
in his driving abilities though his wife reported that he was less patient than he once was.  He had 
received no tickets and had not been any accidents within the last year.  The participant had no 
history of virtual reality exposure and no history of motion sickness. 
Alzheimer’s Dementia Case #4 (AD4). The last clinical case is a 78 year old right-handed male 
with 16 years of education.  He received a 29 on the MMSE.  AD4 had a history of alcohol 
abuse, but was reportedly sober for the past 21 years.  The participant lived with his wife, whom 
he had known for 25 years and acted as his reliable informant.  He had reportedly suffered from a 
stroke to his brainstem approximately 11 years ago, from which his wife notes he fully recovered 
with no need for rehabilitation.  He is currently on Prozac, though did not meet criteria for 
geriatric depression (GDS=1).  The participant was diagnosed with mild AD approximately 18 
months prior to participation in the study by his primary care doctor.  He is currently involved in 
Alzheimer‟s support groups in the community.  The participant endorsed daily problems with his 
memory.  He had been driving for 62 years and currently drove 10 miles every day.  Although his 
wife also drove, the participant reportedly did not restrict his driving, though noted that he 
preferred not to drive at night due to limited night vision.  He had no prior exposure to virtual 
reality, and had no history of simulation sickness.    
Data Processing 
Primary Cognitive Variables 
 The CVLT (short form), TMT-B, and JLO were used as primary cognitive variables for 
the current study.  Upon completion, scores from these tests were converted into standardized 
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scores for the purposes of comparing across participants with varying backgrounds.  The „yes/no‟ 
forced recognition subsection of the CVLT was converted into a standardized d’ score which 
controlled for a participant‟s age and gender.  This d’ score was the difference between a 
participant‟s hit rate and false positive rate in standard deviation units.  Results from the TMT-B 
were converted into T-scores (using normative data from Heaton, Grant, & Matthews, 1991), 
which accounted for age, education, gender, and ethnicity.  T-scores were then converted into z-
scores so that they could be directly compared to performance on the CVLT.  Performance on the 
JLO was converted into age and gender corrected scores, adapted by Benton, Sivan, Hamsher and 
colleagues (1994).  This test does not utilize normative scores, relying instead on cutoff scores.     
Functional Variables 
Traditional Functional Measure:  The IADL questionnaire was given to all participants and 
reliable informants.  The IADL score (0-17) from the reliable informant was used as the 
participant‟s measure of functioning.   
Novel Functional Measure: The VRDS was given to all participants as a novel measure of one 
instrumental activity of daily living: driving.  Raw data from the VRDS were analyzed and 
converted into scores based on pre-determined measurements of variables.  Seven key variables 
were examined (described in detail in Table 2): Behavior at stop signs, behavior at traffic lights, 
speed maintenance at various sections of the route, lane management during various sections of 
the driving route, behavior when following a target vehicle, behavior at a construction zone, and 
response behaviors to unexpected objects.  Raw data was contrasted to scores from a normative 
database of 10 healthy controls ranging in age from 33-58 years old.  The normative database 
was collected for another study in attempts to norm variables using this VRDS.  The data from 
the normative group reflects scores that are slightly divergent from real-life driving criteria.  For 
example, the mean driving speed for individuals in this normative group during a construction 
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zone was 34.74 mph despite the fact that the speed limit was posted at 30 mph.  Despite being 
over the posted limit, this mean score was used as a standard for the current study.   
An unexpected limitation of the current study was the high incidence of simulation 
sickness, resulting in discontinuation of the VRDS for 8 participants.  This was 23% of the study.  
The final VRDS score was the total score for each participant for only the variables that were 
completed for that individual.  For example, if a participant never made it to the residential zone 
and therefore was never exposed to stop signs due to simulation sickness, a total score for stop 
sign behavior was not calculated into the total score.  
Unawareness Variables 
Unawareness was measured in multiple ways for a comprehensive understanding of this 
experience.  The tool used to measure unawareness reflected the function being assessed.   
Traditional Unawareness: One unawareness score was the difference between the participant‟s 
score and the reliable informant‟s score on the IADL.  This yielded a traditional unawareness 
score for general activities of daily living called “IADL discrepancy score”.   
Novel Unawareness: The other unawareness score related to the VRDS and was generated by 
way of the unawareness questionnaire completed after exposure to the VRDS.  This post-
assessment questionnaire asked participants questions about their performance that directly 
compared to performance being measured on the VRDS (i.e., speed management).  The score for 
each participant was calculated only for those variables that were completed on the VRDS.  For 
example, if the participant was never exposed to stop signs due to simulation sickness, that 
variable was not factored into the total score for that questionnaire.  Using the total score on that 
questionnaire, the VRDS “unawareness score” was the post-assessment unawareness total score 
minus the participant‟s total VRDS score.  A score of zero meant that the person‟s perception of 
their performance was the same as their score on the VRDS, indicating accurate awareness.  A 
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higher positive score reflects a participant‟s overestimate of driving performance.  A lower 
negative score reflects a participant‟s underestimation of their performance. 
 Aim II of this study examined two additional forms of novel VRDS-related awareness: 
„prediction awareness‟ and „recognition awareness‟.  Prediction awareness was the total score on 
the unawareness questionnaire that a participant completed prior to the testing portion of the 
VRDS and after the practice trial.  This questionnaire asked the participants how they thought 
they were going to perform on the VRDS, and is directly comparable to the post-assessment 
VRDS unawareness questionnaire.  The total prediction awareness score included only those 
variables which the participant completed in the VRDS.  The recognition awareness score was 
the difference between the prediction score and the post-assessment unawareness score.  The 
recognition awareness score attempted to identify if a participant changed their assessments of 
themselves based on their perceived driving performance. 
Analyses of Covariates 
Primary variables were evaluated at three different levels to assess for potential 
covariates.  All variables were correlated with demographic information to assess for covariates.  
Additional information about driving behaviors was correlated with study-related driving 
variables.  Finally, information about participant relationships with their reliable informants was 
correlated with scores from the IADL for potential covariates. 
1. Covariates to Demographic Variables    
Demographic variables were evaluated as potential covariates to the primary variables.  
Spearman‟s rho correlations were used to evaluate continuous variables and Mann Whitney U 
tests were used to determine significant differences in medians between categorical variables 
(Table 6 below).  Age was significantly related to the standardized performance on the TMT-B, 
despite the fact that standardization corrected for age, r=.349, p<.05.  As age increased, the 
TMT-B z-score improved.  Education was significantly correlated with the age-corrected 
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performance on the Judgment of Line Orientation test, r= .382, p<.05.  As education increased, 
the age-corrected score on the JLO improved.  Education was also significantly related to 
performance on the VRDS, r= .489, p<.01.  Higher education was correlated with greater 
performance on the VRDS.  There was a significant difference in the median CVLT d’ scores 
between Caucasian participants and African American participants, U=22.50, z= -2.61, p<.01.  
On average, Caucasian participants scored higher on the CVLT d’ than did African American 
participants.  There was also a significant difference in the median CVLT d’ score between male 
and female participants, U=37.50, z=-3.14, p<.01.  The median score for males on the CVLT d‟ 
was 1.0 while the median score for females was -0.5.  Gender differences existed despite 
normative corrections for this factor.  Lastly, education was significantly negatively correlated 
with the recognition awareness score, r= -.368, p<.05. 
Insert Table 6: Relationship between Demographics and Primary Variables in Healthy Controls 
   
2. Covariates to Driving Variables 
Additional driving variables were evaluated as potential covariates with the VRDS and 
VRDS awareness measures.  Spearman‟s rho correlations were used to evaluate continuous 
variables and Mann Whitney U tests were used to determine significant differences in the 
medians between categorical variables.  Variables examined included the number of years a 
participant had been driving, the number of days a participant currently drove per month, the 
number of miles driven each outing, tickets and accidents received within the year, if the 
participant was the only driver in their household, and if they had restricted their driving.  No 
driving variables were significantly correlated with performance on the VRDS or awareness 
scores.  Relationships between each variable are described in Table 7 below.  
Insert Table 7: Relationship between Driving Variables and VRDS-Related Measures in Healthy 
Controls 
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3. Covariates to IADL Scores 
Additional factors had the potential to impact scores on the IADL for the participant and 
the reliable informant.  The length of time the participant had known their reliable informant was 
compared to the IADL score (r= -.07, p=ns) and IADL discrepancy score (r= .019, p=ns) using  
Spearman‟s rho correlations.  Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to determine if there were any 
significant differences in IADL and IADL median discrepancy scores based on the type of 
relationship the participant had with the reliable informant.  There were no significant differences 
between groups.  For complete statistics, refer to Table 8. 
Insert Table 8: Relationship between Demographic Variables and IADL‟s in Healthy Controls 
Preliminary Analyses 
Statistical Power 
A power analysis for the current study was based on a literature review for a similar study 
examining individuals with mild AD, which yielded a moderate effect size (Feldman et al., 
2005).  The present study aimed to be conservative, and therefore used the lower of the 95% 
confidence interval of the effect size, yielding an effect size of r= .44.  Though the study aimed 
for power of .80, this yielded a total of 35 participants needed in each group to test Aim I in this 
study (G* Power: Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  The current study had complete 
results for 30 healthy controls.  With an effect size of r=.44 and an alpha level of .05, this yielded 
a power of 0.69.  Given the reduced sample size, it is likely that the study had insufficient power 
to detect a minimal meaningful effect.  As this is one of the first studies to examine the 
relationship between awareness and performance on a VRDS, estimates of the effect were used to 
ensure a 95% probability of a true population parameter in future studies.  This was done for 
significant relationships for only the primary variables.  This study conducted exploratory work 
to better understand cognition, function, and awareness in older adults.  As such, it is likely that 
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one or more of the significant correlations may be spurious given the inflated type I error for the 
number of correlations calculated. 
Individuals with mild AD were not examined quantitatively for the original hypothesis 
due to the small sample size (n=4).  This sample size resulted in insufficient power to determine a 
minimal meaningful effect.  Rather, each individual was analyzed as a separate case, yielding a 
case series. 
Healthy Controls 
 Primary variables were evaluated for normality, distribution, and descriptive statistics.  
The distribution of data across variables was not normally distributed, as performance across 
cognitive, functional, and unawareness tests were skewed.  Logarithmic and linear transformation 
of the data was attempted, though it did not result in the data being normally distributed.  
Therefore, nonparametric analyses were conducted.  Table 9 displays the means, standard 
deviations, quartiles, minimum, and maximum scores for each variable for a more complex 
understanding of each variable.   
Insert Table 9: Cognitive and Functional Characteristics for Healthy Controls  
A Spearman‟s rho correlation matrix of primary variables was conducted and is presented 
on  Table 10.  Scores from the TMT-B and JLO were significantly and positively related, r= 
.411, p< .05 as well as the JLO and the CVLT, r=.373, p<.05.  As the standardized score on the 
TMT-B increased, the age-corrected score on the JLO also increased.  Similarly, as scores on the 
JLO improved, performance on the CVLT also improved.  A significant correlation existed 
between the VRDS and the CVLT, r=.563, p <.01.  As performance on the VRDS improved, 
similar performance was noted on the CVLT.  A significant correlation was also evident between 
the VRDS and the JLO, r= .452, p< .05.  Higher performance on the VRDS was associated with 
better performance on the JLO.  The IADL was significantly correlated with the IADL 
discrepancy score, r= -.747, p< .01.  An increase in IADL score was correlated with a decrease in 
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the discrepancy between the participant and the reliable informant on the IADL (IADL 
discrepancy score).  The predicted awareness score was significantly, negatively correlated with 
both the scores on the CVLT, r=-.471, p<.01 as well as with the TMT-B, r= -.378, p<.05.  As 
these cognitive scores improved, the participant tended towards underestimating their predicted 
performance on the VRDS.  There was also a significant and negative correlation between the 
TMT-B and the recognition awareness score, r= -.380, p<.05.  As the z-score for the TMT-B 
increased, there was a tendency for a participant to minimize perceived performance from pre- to 
post- VRDS.  There was a significant and negative relationship between the predicted awareness 
score and performance on the VRDS, r= -.433, p<.05.  Better performance on the VRDS was 
associated with an underestimation of VRDS performance.  There was also a significant and 
negative correlation between the VRDS and the recognition awareness score, r= -.440, p<.05.  
Better scores on the VRDS were associated with a tendency to minimize perceived performance 
from pre- to post- VRDS.  Lastly, there were significant correlations found between recognition 
awareness and both predicted awareness (r=.697, p<.01) and unawareness post VRDS exposure 
(r=-.507, p<.01).  Table 11 shows the 95% confidence intervals for significant correlations which 
may be helpful for future studies to have estimations of the relationship between the measures.  If 
there were multiple random samples taken of the measures from the same parent population, the 
true population correlation coefficient would be between the lower and upper limits of the 
confidence interval. It is unlikely (5%) that the true value of the correlation coefficient would be 
outside the confidence limits.   The lower limit of the confidence intervals also provide important 
information as estimates of the population effect size for apriori power analyses. 
Insert Table 10: Spearman‟s rho Correlation Matrix for Primary Variables for Healthy Controls 
Insert Table 11: 95% Confidence Intervals for Significant Correlations 
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Analyses of Hypotheses 
Aim 1:  The first aim of this study was to examine the relationship between unawareness and 
functional ability for healthy controls, controlling for performance on each cognitive task.  
Functional ability was measured by the IADL, a traditional questionnaire of daily functioning as 
well as by performance on the VRDS, a more novel on-line measure of one specific functional 
task: driving performance.  Unawareness was measured in two ways, the first being the 
discrepancy between a participant‟s score on the IADL and their reliable informant‟s score on the 
IADL.  The second measure of unawareness was the discrepancy between the participant‟s actual 
performance on the VRDS and their perception of their performance following VR exposure.  
Cognitive tasks that this study controlled for included the CVLT (d’ score), the TMT-B (z-score), 
and the JLO (age-corrected score).  See Table 12 for a list of partial correlations among variables.  
Hypothesis 1a. Controlling for performance on the CVLT, a verbal memory test, there 
was not a significant covariance between performance on the VRDS and unawareness of 
performance, r= .33, p=.08.  Controlling for performance on the CVLT, unawareness accounted 
for 11% of the variance in VRDS performance.  When performance on the CVLT was not 
controlled for, unawareness shared 3% of the variance with performance on the VRDS.     
Hypothesis 1b. Controlling for performance on an executive control test, the TMT-B, 
there was not a significant covariance between unawareness and performance on the VRDS, 
r=.14, p=.48.  Unawareness accounted for 2% of the variance of performance on the VRDS, 
controlling for performance on TMT-B.  Unawareness shared 3% of the variance with 
performance on the VRDS when not controlling for performance on the TMT-B. The TMT-B is a 
suppressor variable in the relationship between unawareness and performance on the VRDS. 
Hypothesis 1c.  There was not a significant covariance between unawareness and 
performance on the VRDS when controlling for performance on a visuospatial test, the JLO, r= 
.184, p=.35.  Controlling for performance on the JLO, unawareness accounted for 3% of the 
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variance of performance on the VRDS.  When not controlling for performance on the JLO, 
unawareness accounted for 3% of the variance in VRDS performance.  The JLO did not clarify 
the relationship between unawareness and performance on the VRDS. 
Hypothesis 1d.There was a significant covariation between unawareness and functional 
ability, as measured by the IADL when controlling for performance on the CVLT, r= -.662, 
p<.0001.  Controlling for performance on the CVLT, unawareness of one‟s functional ability 
accounted for 44% of the variance on the IADL score.  When not controlling for performance on 
the CVLT, unawareness accounted for 44% of the variance on the IADL score.  Therefore, 
although there is a significant covariance between unawareness and IADL score when controlling 
for CVLT, it appears that controlling for the CVLT does not clarify the relationship between the 
two variables. 
Hypothesis 1e.  A significant covariation exists between unawareness of functional ability 
and score on the IADL when controlling for performance on the TMT-B, r=-.656, p<.0001.  
Controlling for performance on the TMT-B, unawareness of functional ability accounted for 43% 
of the variance on the IADL.  Although this is significant, unawareness accounted for 44% of the 
variability in IADL score when not accounting for score on the TMT-B.  Therefore, controlling 
for the score on the TMT-B does not clarify the relationship between IADL and unawareness of 
functional ability. 
Hypothesis 1f. There is a significant covariation between unawareness of functional 
ability and score on the IADL when controlling for performance on the JLO, r=-.661, p<.0001.  
Unawareness of functional ability accounted for 44% of the variance on IADL score when 
controlling for performance on the JLO.  When not controlling for performance on the JLO, 
unawareness also accounted for 44% of the variability on the IADL score.  
Insert Table 12: Partial Correlations for Primary Variables for Healthy Controls  
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Aim 2:  The second aim of the study was to evaluate different types of awareness of a more novel 
functional assessment, the VRDS.  Participants were asked to predict their performance prior to 
driving in the VRDS, and after a practice trial.  This score was called “predicted awareness”.  
They were then asked to rate their perceived performance (unawareness score) upon completion 
of the VRDS.  This comparison served as the primary unawareness score for Aim I of this study.  
Perceived awareness and unawareness were contrasted to better understand if participant‟s views 
about themselves change upon exposure to a task.  Perceived awareness and unawareness after 
exposure to the VRDS were contrasted in a „recognition awareness‟ score.  This score reflects the 
change in unawareness scores from prior to post VRDS exposure.    
Hypothesis 2a: A repeated-measures ANOVA using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity show that there was not a significant difference in the type of awareness used for the 
VRDS, F(1.18, 32.92)= .591, p>.05.  There was no significant difference between predicted 
awareness, unawareness, and recognition awareness. 
Hypothesis 2b: Due to the restricted clinical sample size of participants with mild AD, a 
repeated-measures ANOVA could not be run.   
Results for Clinical Case Examples 
 There were four participants with mild Alzheimer‟s dementia in the study.  Quantitative 
measures were not appropriate for analysis of the original hypotheses.  Instead, the scores for 
each clinical case example were contrasted to the mean of the healthy controls for each primary 
variable.  This comparison is displayed graphically in Figures 4-12 below.  In addition, cut scores 
were introduced for each primary variable, and results from each clinical case example were 
contrasted to these cut scores.  Therefore, the four clinical cases will be described qualitatively 
and quantitatively below.   
Cut Scores: Normative data from both the CVLT (CVLT-Short form normative data in Delis et 
al, 2000) and TMT-B (Heaton et al., 1991) allowed for conversion of scores into z-scores.  Cut 
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scores of both 1 and 2 standard deviations were used for each test for a comparison of how each 
clinical participant scored in contrast to both the normative data as well as to the healthy controls, 
which served as the normative data for this clinical sample.  Although there was no normative 
data for z-score conversions on the JLO, normative data from Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, and 
colleagues (1994) provided cut scores at which point scores reflect mild to moderate impairment 
(scores between 17 and 20) and at which point scores reflect severe impairment (below 17).   
The remaining primary variables were scores on the IADL, the IADL discrepancy score, 
performance on the VRDS, the unawareness score, the predicted awareness score, and the 
recognition awareness score.  These variables were compared to the performance from the 
healthy controls by converting scores into z-scores using the healthy controls from this study as 
the normative population.  Cut scores of 1- and 2- standard deviations from the mean were used 
as comparisons for each clinical case.  Scores for the clinical sample are presented in Table 13.   
AD1: With scores well below the 2-standard deviation cut score on both the CVLT (d‟= -
5.50) and TMT-B (z= -2.30), this participant had difficulty with cognitive tests measuring verbal 
memory and executive functioning.  In contrast, she performed within normal limits on the JLO.  
Her IADL score (10/16) was well beyond 2 standard deviations from the mean of the healthy 
controls in the study, indicating difficulty on functional tasks.  The IADL discrepancy score of 6 
indicates a degree of unawareness related to these instrumental activities of daily living.  She 
significantly overestimated her functional abilities as compared to what her reliable informant 
reported.  In contrast, the participant scored above the mean for the healthy controls on the 
VRDS, an on-line test of functional ability.  Whereas the participant had overestimated her 
functional ability on instrumental activities of daily living on the IADL questionnaire, she 
underestimated her ability on the VRDS both when predicting how she would do (within one 
standard deviation from the healthy control mean), and following exposure to the test (greater 
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than one standard deviation from the healthy control mean).  Therefore, her awareness of 
functional ability is not accurate both for traditional and more novel functional measures. 
AD2: This participant demonstrated the greatest difficulty on the CVLT, scoring below 2 
standard deviations from the normative mean (z= -4.0).  Performance on the TMT-B was less 
than one standard deviation from the normative mean (z= -1.70), while performance on the JLO 
was substantially above the cut score.  This participant‟s IADL score indicated mild difficulty on 
functional tasks, and his score was greater than 1 standard deviation lower than the mean for the 
healthy controls.  His IADL discrepancy score was over 1 standard deviation from the healthy 
controls‟ mean from this study, indicating a degree of unawareness in overall traditional 
measures of functioning.  In contrast, his performance on the VRDS was above the healthy 
controls‟ mean from this study, and both his predicted awareness as well as his unawareness 
score after exposure to the test was within one standard deviation to the mean, indicating a degree 
of accuracy when measuring performance on the more novel functional task.  His awareness 
therefore differed between traditional and more novel functional measures. 
AD3: While his score on the TMT-B was above the cut score and within normal limits, 
his performance on the CVLT was below 2 standard deviations from the normative mean (z= -
3.5), indicating difficulty with verbal memory.  His score on the JLO was in the range considered 
mild to moderately impaired, evidencing difficulty with visuospatial perception.  The IADL score 
indicated significant difficulty on functional tasks (beyond 2 standard deviations below the 
healthy control‟s mean), and there was a substantial discrepancy from his and his reliable 
informant‟s perception of his functioning.  This discrepancy was beyond 2 standard deviations 
from this study‟s healthy controls‟ mean, indicating problems in awareness on traditional 
measures of daily functioning and a tendency for him to overestimate overall functioning.  He 
also demonstrated unawareness on the VRDS both prior to and following exposure to the task 
(beyond 1 standard deviation from the mean).  Although his performance on the VRDS was 
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within normal limits, he significantly overestimated his performance on both occasions.  
Therefore, he demonstrated limited awareness on both traditional and novel functional tasks. 
AD4: This participant scored within normal limits on tests measuring verbal memory and 
executive functioning.  His score of 20 on the JLO was in the mild to moderate impairment 
range.  His reliable informant indicated difficulty on several aspects of instrumental activities of 
daily living (scoring 12/17).  There was a discrepancy of two points between his score and his 
reliable informant‟s score on this measure, which was beyond 1 standard deviation from this 
study‟s mean.  While he tended to overestimate his general functional abilities, he demonstrated 
intact awareness of performance on the VRDS.  His actual performance on the VRDS was within 
normal limits. 
Insert Table 13: Cognitive and Functional Characteristics for Clinical Sample 
Exploratory Analyses 
Simulation Sickness 
One of the major unanticipated findings in this study was the number of participants who 
experienced simulation sickness as a result of VRDS exposure.  Eight of the participants in this 
study experienced symptoms consistent with simulation sickness requiring the discontinuation of 
the driving environment.  This is equivalent to approximately 24% of the study sample.  One 
participant experienced symptoms after exposure to the training session which lasted less than 
five minutes, and therefore was never exposed to the VRDS for testing.  In attempts to 
understand factors that may have been significantly correlated to simulation sickness, the data 
from all 34 participants were examined.  Chi squared analyses were conducted to determine a 
significant association between the presence of simulation sickness during the study (yes/no) and 
other categorical variables such as gender and ethnicity.  Mann Whitney tests were conducted to 
determine if there were significant differences in the mean age, days per month a participant 
drove, miles driven each drive, history of past simulation sickness, and cognitive and IADL 
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variables for all the participants who got simulation sickness versus those who did not.  Chi 
squared analyses yielded no significant associations, and Mann Whitney tests yielded no 
significant differences between groups of people who experienced simulation sickness and those 
who did not.  To further clarify potential factors that may relate to simulation sickness, the total 
score on the post-VRDS SSQ was also compared to all of the variables mentioned above through 
Spearman‟s rho correlations and Mann Whitney tests with no significant findings. 
 Other Cognitive Variables 
The MMSE was given to all participants to screen for inclusion criteria.  Additionally, the  
Clock Drawing Test and Trail Making Test- Part A (TMT-A) were also given as exploratory 
tests, due to their link to functional performance in previous studies (Duchek, Hunt, Ball, 
Buckles, & Morris, 1997; Freund et al., 2004).  Exploratory correlation analyses were run to 
identify any significant relationships between these cognitive measures and performance on the 
VRDS, IADL, or unawareness scores in healthy controls.  A significant correlation was found 
between the MMSE and the IADL score, r= .509, p<.01.  As the score on the MMSE increased, 
the score on the IADL also increased.  The raw score on the Clock Drawing Test was 
significantly correlated with the score on the IADL, r=.391, p<.05.  As performance on the Clock 
Drawing Test improved, the sore on the IADL also increased.   
Exploratory Partial Correlations 
Correlational analyses revealed significant relationships between several measures of 
cognition and performance on the VRDS with predicted awareness scores and recognition 
awareness scores.  Because of this, exploratory partial correlations were run using this variable in 
place of the previously used unawareness score when examining the first aim of the study for 
healthy controls.  No significant relationships were found between performance on the VRDS 
and predicted awareness, when controlling for performance on the CVLT, TMT-B, or JLO.  
While significant relationships were found between performance on the VRDS and recognition 
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awareness controlling for each cognitive variable, controlling for such variables did not clarify 
the relationship between the VRDS and recognition awareness.  In fact, controlling for such 
variables resulted in less variation explained between VRDS and recognition awareness. 
 When exploring the primary aim of the study for healthy controls, partial correlations 
were run between performance on the VRDS, unawareness, and performance on several 
cognitive measures.  Holding performance on cognitive measures constant, there was no 
significant relationship between performance on the VRDS and unawareness score.  However, 
holding unawareness constant, significant relationships were found between performance on the 
VRDS and performance on cognitive tests which warrant discussion.  The results for healthy 
controls are presented in Table 12 below.  Controlling for unawareness, there is a significant 
relationship between performance on the VRDS and CVLT, as measured by the d’, r=.610, 
p<.001.  Controlling for unawareness, performance on the CVLT accounted for 37.3% of the 
variance in VRDS performance.  When unawareness was not controlled for, the CVLT shared 
31.7% of the variance with performance on the VRDS.  Controlling for unawareness, there is a 
significant correlation between performance on the VRDS and the JLO, r=.453, p<.05.  When 
holding unawareness constant, performance on the JLO accounted for 20.5% of the variance in 
VRDS.  However, when not holding unawareness constant, performance on the JLO shared 
20.4% of the variance in VRDS.  Therefore, though there was a significant relationship, 
controlling for unawareness did not serve to clarify the relationship between VRDS and 
performance on the JLO.  See Table 14 for additional partial correlations. 
Insert Table 14: Additional Partial Correlations for Primary Variables for Healthy Controls 
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CHAPTER 5:  DISCUSSION 
 The intended focus of the present study was to examine the relationship between 
unawareness and functional ability holding cognitive factors constant in individuals with mild 
AD.  Enrollment challenges resulted in a total of four individuals with mild AD who completed 
the study, making the originally proposed quantitative analyses within this group inappropriate.  
Instead, the majority of the participants in the study included healthy older adults from the 
community.  Thus, the originally proposed study design was examined quantitatively for healthy 
controls only, and its importance is two-fold.  Understanding this relationship in healthy controls 
will serve as a baseline for which to compare results for individuals with mild AD in future 
studies.  Additionally, due to the importance placed on driving as well as the inconsistent policies 
restricting driving as adults age, it is crucial to understand the factors that lead to unsafe driving 
in older adults.  Current policies rest on the assumption that healthy older drivers are able to 
restrict their own driving as they become aware of sensory, functional, and cognitive age-related 
changes(in Donorfio, D‟Ambrosio, Coughlin, & Mohyde, 2009).  These policies thus rely on an 
individual‟s awareness of any driving changes.  Studies conducted on older adults have also 
shown that individuals report less accurate awareness of driving difficulties as problems in 
cognition arise (Freund et al., 2004).  In sum, understanding the relationships between 
unawareness, cognition, and functional ability can help to establish safer driving laws as well as 
promote greater safety as individuals age.      
Examining Functioning in Healthy Older Adults 
 Two most commonly used methods of measuring functional ability in individuals with 
mild AD are by way of caregiver accounts of performance and by directly assessing individuals 
in laboratory settings.  Studies examining functioning in older adults have also relied on response 
to questionnaires as well as performance in laboratory settings.  The current study measured 
function using both methods in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
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functioning.  The study used the Lawton and Brody Instrumental Activities of Daily Living 
Questionnaire (IADL questionnaire), which is one traditional measurement of functional 
performance by way of caregiver account.  The study also used the virtual reality driving 
simulator(VRDS), a novel method of functional.  Farias and colleagues (2003) have found a 
correlation of -.66 between the more traditional caregiver assessment of functioning and the more 
novel laboratory assessment of function.  Specifically, they used the IADL questionnaire and the 
Direct Assessment of Functional Status Scale, which measures the individual‟s performance in a 
laboratory setting on a variety of tasks, such as dialing a telephone and writing a check.  They 
posit that the level of cognition involved in a functional task contributes to the variability in 
measurements. In contrast to their study, the current study found a weak correlation of r=.145 
between the traditionally used IADL questionnaire and the novel VRDS in assessing functional 
performance.  The VRDS functional score showed a strong relationship to measures of cognition, 
unlike the IADL functional score. 
In order to better understand these findings, it is important to consider the difference 
between these functional measures.  First, the VRDS provides an objective measurement of 
specific functional behavior while the IADL is a subjective measurement which assesses general 
functional performance on a variety of tasks.  The VRDS allowed for the carefully controlled 
measurement of functional performance in real-time, thereby allowing for observation of driving 
performance under specific and challenging conditions.  In contrast, the IADL relied on a 
caregiver or reliable informant‟s assessment of functioning in daily functioning over a variety of 
conditions.  Although the scoring on the VRDS was objective across all participants in the study, 
the normative data used to assess driving performance was based on a small sample size of 
individuals and was specific to the virtual environment used in the present study.  Conversely, the 
IADL is a heavily utilized instrument in both clinical and research settings with more established 
psychometrics (i.e. Farias et al., 2003).  In sum, the two measures of functional assessments used 
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in this study were distinct from one another in numerous ways, and were minimally correlated.  
The distinct qualities of each assessment measure have implications for their relationship with 
measures of cognition and awareness, and will be described below. 
Examining Awareness in Healthy Older Adults 
 One of the primary aims of the present study was to examine unawareness in individuals 
with mild AD as well as in healthy older adults.  The literature suggests that the operational 
definition of unawareness changes as a function of the technique used for measurement (Agnew 
& Morris, 1998).  Because of this, different measures of unawareness are often uncorrelated 
(Clare, 2004b).  Despite this relationship, studies suggest that using multiple techniques for 
which to measure unawareness will result in a more comprehensive understanding of this 
construct.  Additionally, studies suggest using measures of unawareness that are appropriate for 
the domain being assessed.  The present study examined awareness of functioning as measured 
by both the IADL questionnaire as well as performance on the VRDS, which are vastly different 
constructs of functioning.  As such, the use of the term „unawareness‟ throughout is defined as a 
score an individual received on one of two measurement techniques.  While the study attempted 
to equate this score to an individual‟s level of insight into their own functioning, it is important to 
understand that the „unawareness‟ scores used in the study are a narrow measurement of a broad 
and complicated construct.     
 In examining functional ability by way of the IADL questionnaire, unawareness was 
defined as the discrepancy between the participant‟s reports of their own functioning versus their 
reliable informant‟s assessment of their functioning.  While it allows for an account of a 
participant‟s functioning in their daily lives, it is potentially influenced by the relationship 
between the reliable informant and participant.  The current study found no significant 
differences in IADL scores by the reliable informants as a function of length or type of 
relationship with the participant.  Studies involving both individuals with mild AD (Clare, 2004b) 
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as well as healthy older adults (Freund et al., 2004) have also found that individuals tend to 
overestimate their functional performance in their daily lives as well as in their driving abilities. 
Findings from this study support these claims.  Participants tended to rate themselves with higher 
IADL scores than did their reliable informants, although the discrepancy between participants 
and their reliable informants was much greater for individuals with mild AD.  
Awareness was also examined in relation to performance on the VRDS.  Three measures 
of VRDS-awareness were examined.  „Predicted awareness‟ was the participant‟s assessment of 
their predicted performance minus their actual performance on the VRDS.  „Unawareness‟ was 
the participant‟s perception of their performance minus their actual performance on the VRDS.  
Finally, „recognition awareness‟ was their predicted awareness score minus their unawareness 
score, or the amount of change in perception after exposure to the VRDS.  Studies have shown 
that accuracy of predicted awareness changes as a function of an individual‟s familiarity to a task 
(Cavanaugh, 1989).  As the study relied on a virtual driving environment which was novel to 
most participants, predicted awareness was not used as the primary unawareness variable.  
Instead, the primary variable used in the study was „unawareness‟, or the participant‟s perception 
of their performance on the task after exposure. 
Results from the present study found no significant relationship between post-assessment 
unawareness of driving ability and performance on the VRDS.  There were significant 
relationships between performance on the VRDS and both predicted awareness as well as 
recognition awareness.  However, the significance of this relationship is minimized as research 
suggests that the validity of awareness measures change as a reflection of task familiarity.  As 
participants in the study were unfamiliar with the virtual environment, their predicted awareness 
score is therefore deemed less valid than their assessment after exposure to the environment.  
Additionally, when comparing the three types of unawareness measures, no differences were 
found, suggesting a spurious significance.  The lack of relationship between the VRDS and 
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unawareness score can be considered in light of the cognitive awareness model (CAM) outlined 
by Morris and Hannesdottir (2004) and described by Ansell and Bucks (2006).    
The CAM model of unawareness was developed for individuals with mild AD, and 
explains different types of unawareness based on disruption of information processing as a result 
of brain pathology.  The assumption in the given study was that the healthy controls did not have 
the brain pathology evident with individuals with mild AD.  However, this model posits that 
unawareness results when an individual‟s appraisal system of success and failure is disrupted.  
Healthy controls in the study may not have had an accurate appraisal of their performance on the 
VRDS due to the novelty of the virtual reality instrument.  According to the model, new events 
and information are processed by the central executive system in the frontal lobe.  A comparator 
mechanism in the executive system compares this new event to knowledge from the individual‟s 
personal database.  Any mismatch between a new event and personal knowledge is processed by 
the cognitive awareness system in the parietal lobe, which ultimately results in an individual‟s 
awareness of that discrepancy.  Healthy controls in the study had no past knowledge for which to 
compare their current level of functioning on the VRDS.  As such, there was no mismatch 
between the new VRDS event and previous performance.  This may have resulted in an 
individual‟s inability to assess their current performance.  This model may also account for the 
lack of significant changes in awareness over time (i.e. no significant difference between 
predicted awareness, unawareness, and recognition awareness).  Participants in the study were 
more likely to be consistent with their original hypothesis about their performance in such a 
novel environment. For this reason, some researchers suggest that the validity of certain 
awareness measures is questionable for unfamiliar tasks (Clare, 2004b; Hardy, Oyebode, & 
Clare, 2006).  Thus, using virtual technology with older adults might be a limitation in accurately 
assessing awareness of function.   
Function, Awareness, and Cognition in Healthy Older Adults 
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 Controlling for scores on cognitive tests did not serve to clarify the relationship between 
function and awareness of function in healthy controls.  This was seen in both traditional and 
novel assessments of functioning.  The individual relationships between function, awareness, and 
cognitive variables differed based on the construct examined.  Results warrant further discussion.   
Function, Awareness, and Cognition Using Traditional Measures 
 Controlling for cognition did not clarify the relationship between functioning, as 
measured by the traditional IADL questionnaire, and unawareness, as measured by the 
participant-reliable informant discrepancy score.  This discrepancy score had low variability for 
healthy controls (the maximum discrepancy score was five points).  This may have been due to 
the fact that the IADL questionnaire was designed for individuals with dementia, and is therefore 
not as sensitive to functional changes in healthy older adults.  Despite this, the study did find a 
relationship between function and awareness using the IADL, not controlling for cognition.  
Significant findings are based on a maximum five-point discrepancy between the participant and 
the reliable informant, and should therefore be interpreted with caution.  One possible 
interpretation of these scores is the suggestion that higher functional status, as reported by a 
reliable informant, is related to greater awareness of functional ability.  Likewise, awareness 
declines as functioning declines.  This relationship was not seen when using the VRDS to assess 
awareness and function. 
The relationship between IADLs and awareness of functional status, as measured by the 
discrepancy score, in this study suggests that those healthy older adults with intact functional 
abilities demonstrate more awareness regarding these abilities.  The reverse relationship is also 
true, though should be interpreted with caution due to the low variability in scores as well as lack 
of sensitivity of the IADL questionnaire for healthy older adults.  However, an individual‟s 
ability to self regulate is likely to decline as their awareness of ability declines.  Current policies 
regarding driving rely on the individual to restrict their driving as they deem necessary in order to 
Role of unawareness 90 
 
avoid any potentially unsafe driving practices.  While this policy may maintain the safety for 
those individual with intact awareness, it may put those at risk who lack the awareness to regulate 
their own driving as a result of functional changes.  While the current study used a questionnaire 
that was designed for individuals with dementia, results suggest a relationship between function 
and awareness.  Future studies should further examine this relationship using instruments 
designed specifically for healthy older adults.   
Exploratory analyses for the healthy controls revealed significant and positive 
relationships between both the MMSE, a global measure of cognition, and the Clock Drawing 
Test, a measure of visuospatial processing and executive functioning, with scores on the IADL. 
This is not surprising, as research has linked higher scores on the MMSE with higher functional 
status in both healthy older adults as well as for people with dementia (i.e. Ford, Haley, Thrower, 
West, & Harrell, 1996).  Studies have also established a relationship between the Clock Drawing 
Test and IADL‟s, particularly in individuals with Alzheimer‟s dementia (Freund et al., 2004).  In 
fact, some suggest that the Clock Drawing Test is so predictive of activities of daily living in 
individuals with Alzheimer‟s dementia that it might even work to take the place of the IADL 
questionnaire (Fukui & Lee, 2008).   
Although neither the MMSE nor the Clock Drawing Test were correlated to unawareness 
of IADL scores in this study, the correlation between them and IADL scores in healthy controls 
is important.  Both the MMSE and Clock Drawing Test are well established cognitive tests, quick 
to administer, and well known to geriatric healthcare providers.  In fact, the Clock Drawing Test 
has been shown as useful for predicting driving in older adults (Freund et al., 2004).  Higher 
scores on the MMSE and Clock Drawing Test were correlated with greater functionng, which in 
turn was associated with greater awareness of functioning and potentially greater safety due to 
appropriate self restriction.  Conversely, lower scores were associated with lower IADL scores, 
which were associated with less awareness and therefore potential safety concerns due to the 
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decreased likelihood of appropriate self regulation.  Future studies should further examine this 
relationship.    
Function, Awareness, and Cognition Using Novel Measures 
 Controlling for cognition did not further clarify the relationship between functioning and 
awareness on the VRDS, a novel functional task.  Significant relationships were found between 
performance on the VRDS and several cognitive tests, which is not surprising as researchers posit 
that functional tasks that require a great deal of cognitive capacity such as driving are more 
strongly correlated with performance on neuropsychological tests (Farias et al., 2003).  There was 
a significant relationship between performance on the VRDS and scores on a test measuring 
visuospatial processing (JLO).  A significant relationship between driving performance and 
scores on visuospatial tests is well established in the literature both in individuals with mild AD 
(Yu et al., 2006) as well as in healthy older adults (Okonkwo et al., 2007).  In fact, numerous 
driving studies have linked impairments in visuospatial processing with worse driving 
performance and therefore greater self-restricted driving practices in otherwise healthy older 
adults (Okonkwo et al., 2007).  The relationship between performance on the VRDS and 
visuospatial processing was not linked to awareness of one‟s performance.  A lack of awareness 
corresponding with increased visuospatial problems could possibly result in unsafe driving in 
those individuals with visuospatial impairments. 
Clinical Findings 
 With four clinical participants in the study, quantitative analyses were not appropriate.  
Rather, each clinical participant‟s findings were compared to results from normative data or 
results from the healthy controls if normative data was unavailable.  Trends in the data suggest 
that scores on the MMSE were related to awareness of both IADL‟s and VRDS performance, as 
operationally defined by way of discrepancy scores.  This relationship was not seen in healthy 
controls, though the MMSE was linked to functional performance.   
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The MMSE currently serves as the gold standard for which to summarize cognitive status 
in individuals with dementia, and has been correlated with functional ability in individuals with 
dementia (Feldman et al., 2005).  The MMSE has also been linked to functional status in older 
healthy adults both in previous studies (ie., Ford et al., 1996) and in the current study.  This 
instrument is widely used, quick and easy to administer, and well known to numerous geriatric 
healthcare professionals.  Some researchers argue that the MMSE is too general an instrument to 
measure the exact cognitive mechanisms underlying function in individuals with mild AD 
(Jefferson and colleagues, 2006).  However, the association between MMSE score and measures 
of awareness in individuals with mild AD in the current study merits examination. 
Determination of disease stage is often made based on the MMSE score.  Individuals with 
Alzheimer‟s are generally considered to be mild in the disease process if they score between 18 
and 24 on this test (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975).  Lower scores are associated with lower 
cognitive functioning whereas higher scores are associated with higher cognitive functioning.  As 
such, lower scores are reflective of greater disease involvement.  Lower MMSE scores in this 
study were also associated with a general trend towards more unawareness on both traditional 
and novel functional tasks.  Conversely, greater MMSE scores are reflective of less disease 
involvement and were associated with a general trend towards less unawareness on both 
traditional and novel functional tasks.   
Taken together, data from this study suggests that the MMSE may be a useful tool for 
understanding changes in awareness as the AD disease process progresses.  Although the MMSE 
measures global cognitive functioning, it reflects disease progression in mild AD that is known to 
originate in the medial temporal lobes and hippocampus (Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 2006).  As 
such, mnemonic unawareness as described by the CAM model may explain the progression of 
unawareness as scores on the MMSE decline (Agnew and Morris, 1998; Ansell and Bucks, 2006; 
Morris and Hannesdottir, 2004).  Lower MMSE scores reflect greater disease progression, which 
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in turn reflects greater pathology in the medial temporal lobes and hippocampus in individuals 
with mild AD.  According to Ansell and Bucks (2006), this pathology disrupts an individual‟s 
ability to update or accurately access their personal knowledge database, an aspect of semantic 
memory that contains knowledge of one‟s self.  As such, an individual is therefore not able to 
encode changes in cognitive or daily functioning.  Thus, they are unable to accurately compare 
present performance to their personal knowledge of oneself.  Therefore, no discrepancy is 
detected between present and past performance, resulting in an unawareness of functional or 
cognitive changes.  As AD evolves, unawareness evolves because an individual becomes less 
able to encode new information and compare new information to previous information about 
oneself.     
Additional support for mnemonic unawareness as suggested by the CAM model comes 
from qualitative examination of unawareness scores on both traditional and novel functional tasks 
for participants with mild AD.  Consistent with the literature (Clare, 2004b), clinical participants 
in this study tended to overestimate their daily functioning, as measured by the IADL.  Although 
healthy controls in the study also overestimated their daily functioning, individuals with mild AD 
did so to a far greater degree.  A tendency to overestimate present functioning is fitting with the 
model in that individuals are not able to encode new functional capabilities, nor are they able to 
accurately compare present abilities to past abilities.  This results in a self construct that reflects 
past functional abilities, thus overestimating current functional capacity as disease progress leads 
to decreased functional capacity.     
 The CAM model describing mnemonic unawareness is further supported by the pattern 
of awareness scores regarding performance on the VRDS in clinical participants.  Similar to 
performance from the healthy controls, clinical participants tended to maintain the same level of 
awareness both pre- and post- VRDS exposure.  Both groups of participants had virtually no 
exposure to a VRDS, and therefore had no prior knowledge for which to compare their present 
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performance.  In both groups of individuals, it follows that individuals therefore could not 
accurately appraise their present performance with past performance, leading to a tendency to be 
consistent with their original hypothesis about their performance in this novel environment. 
The lack of a relationship found between memory measures and unawareness scores in 
individuals with mild AD are not fitting with the CAM model of unawareness.  It is possible that 
the sample size used in this study was too small to find a minimal meaningful result.  Another 
possibility is that global cognitive measures, such as the MMSE, are more sensitive to overall 
awareness levels at the earlier stages of Alzheimer‟s dementia.  Future studies should further 
explore the relationship between memory and awareness in individuals with mild AD.  
Unanticipated Findings 
Difficulty with Enrollment 
Perhaps the most interesting and unanticipated finding of the current study was the 
extreme hesitance for individuals to enroll in the study.  As difficulty with enrollment emerged, a 
total of seven clinical sites in the community agreed to aid in recruitment for the study.  
Additionally, postings and presentations in the community were introduced as methods for 
recruitment of healthy controls.  Feedback from these sites over time revealed that potential 
participants were hesitant to have their driving and cognition assessed despite the confidential 
nature of the study.   
Several theories emerged underlying hesitation for study enrollment particular to 
individuals with mild AD.  Numerous individuals were informed about the study during their 
feedback session from a neuropsychological evaluation, an evaluation deemed appropriate due to 
the individual‟s cognitive and/or functional decline.  As such, these individuals may have already 
felt anxious about these changes.  The current study examined cognition and function, thus 
serving to further increase anxiety.  Additionally, feedback sessions are generally a time when an 
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individual is first told about their diagnosis of mild AD.  This diagnosis is a great deal for an 
individual to process, leaving the importance of participation in the study of low priority.     
 Healthy controls were also hesitant to enroll in the study, necessitating recruitment from 
community centers throughout the Philadelphia County in addition to recruitment from the seven 
clinical sites.  When approached about the study, three factors emerged as reasons for resistance 
to participate in the study.  Several individuals noted the inconvenience of the study location. 
Inconvenience was largely due to distance from the individuals‟ homes or the preference of 
individuals to avoid navigating in the city.  A second factor that emerged was the hesitancy 
individuals expressed about participating in a study that assessed cognitive functioning.  Lastly, 
numerous individuals conveyed reluctance towards having their driving assessed.  Speculation 
about the resistance could be the relationship between driving and self worth, independence, and 
one‟s link to the community (Donorfio et al., 2009).  This could be a reason why individuals 
might not self regulate driving as they age, which could in turn lead to unsafe driving practices. 
Simulation Sickness:  
 An unanticipated negative side effect of the study was the high percentage of people who 
experienced simulation sickness symptoms severe enough to warrant discontinuation of the 
VRDS.  Eight of the 34 participants in the study discontinued the VRDS due to such symptoms, 
which was approximately equivalent to 24% of the study sample.  Several other participants in 
the study experienced symptoms consistent with simulation sickness that were mild, not 
interfering with their completion of the VRDS.  The high rate of discontinuation due to 
simulation sickness was surprising, because although research suggests that up to 60% of 
individuals can develop some symptoms of simulation sickness upon exposure to a virtual 
environment (Lawson, Graeber, & Mead, 2002), these symptoms are reportedly typically mild 
and do not warrant discontinuation from the environment (in Nichols and Patel, 2002).  
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Additionally, steps were taken in the design of the study in attempts to minimize simulation 
sickness.  These steps are described below.   
 Simulation sickness, also known as cybersickness, includes symptoms such as nausea, 
sweating, increased salivation, disorientation, headache, and dizziness (Nichols & Patel, 2002).  
Although simulation sickness is not clearly understood, one popular theory to explain the 
constellation of symptoms is based on sensory conflict (Reason & Brand, 1975; in Nichols & 
Patel, 2002), and posits that the virtual environment creates a disconnect in the sensory system.  
While the eyes indicate that the person has moved, both the vestibular and proprioceptive 
systems indicate otherwise.  Factors that influence simulation sickness include individual 
characteristics, system characteristics, and the interaction between the individual and the task 
(Nichols & Patel, 2002).  Age has been linked to simulation sickness, with a peak in simulation 
sickness between age 2 and 12 years old.  Reason and Brand (1975) have reported that 
susceptibility to simulation sickness gradually wanes after 12 years old and those around 50 years 
of age are much less prone to such symptoms.  Additional individual characteristics influencing 
simulation sickness include gender, with females being more susceptible to sickness due to a 
wider field of vision, experience with virtual environments, anxiety, coping strategies, and 
perceptual styles (Biocca, 1992).     
 System characteristics thought to impact simulation sickness include the mode of visual 
presentation.  For example, virtual environments presented through a head mounted display are 
associated with a greater degree of sickness than are environment presented by way of a flat 
screened monitor (In Nichols & Patel, 2002).  Additionally, the feeling of motion is associated 
with greater simulation sickness due to the disconnection between visually represented motion 
and the absence of motion experienced through the vestibular systems (in Nichols & Patel, 2002).  
One study by Mourant and Thattacherry (2000) found that greater perceived vehicle velocity in 
the virtual environment was associated with greater symptoms of simulation sickness.  
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 In general, the incidence of simulation sickness is hard to predict and not well understood.  
One model found a complicated relationship between gender, age, mental rotation ability, and 
postural stability (Kolasinski, 1996).  Nichols & Patel (2002) have also reported a relationship 
between past history of motion sickness and simulation sickness susceptibility.  Numerous 
factors impact simulation sickness and the exact underlying mechanisms of this phenomenon are 
incompletely understood.  Therefore, controlling for simulation sickness in virtual reality is 
difficult.   
Despite the inability to completely avoid simulation sickness, this study attempted to 
control for as many factors as possible to minimize the onset of sickness.  The modified SSQ was 
given to all potential participants in the current study, and those with a past history of severe 
motion sickness were excluded from the study.  Additionally, as research has shown that older 
adults are less likely to get simulation sickness (Reason & Brand, 1975), it was predicted that the 
incidence of sickness would be low.  Holland and Rabbit (1992) conducted research on older 
drivers and found that visual problems for older adults are evident due to the shrinkage of the 
visual field.  Research on simulation sickness posits that wider field of views are associated with 
greater simulation sickness (Nichols & Patel, 2002).  Therefore, it was predicted that simulation 
sickness would be lower in the current study due to the smaller field of vision and less visual 
perception of peripherals in older adults.  Lastly, the study attempted to avoid simulation sickness 
by presenting the virtual environment through three flat screen monitors versus a head mounted 
display.  Despite this, a high incidence of simulation sickness was reported.   
In attempts to understand potential factors that correlated with the presence and intensity 
of simulation sickness symptoms, exploratory analyses examined numerous individual factors 
including past history of motion sickness, driving history, age, cognitive, and functional status.  
No significant correlations were found.  Anecdotally, several participants who discontinued the 
VRDS in the current study appeared quite anxious in the driving trial.  While this study was not 
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designed to properly examine the impact of anxiety and coping strategies on simulation sickness, 
future studies should examine this relationship in greater detail.    
Implications 
 The present study served as one of the first to examine awareness and function in both 
healthy older adults and those with mild AD by way of a VRDS.  The results serve as a baseline 
for which to understand cognition, unawareness, and function for these individuals.  It should be 
noted that „unawareness‟ in this study was defined by discrepancy scores between the 
participant‟s perception of functioning and either their actual performance on a driving simulator 
or their reliable informant‟s perception of their functioning.  Although these are common ways of 
measuring awareness, they reflect insight into a very specific functional construct and by an 
equally specific measurement tool.  Interpretation using such methods should be taken with 
caution.   
Enrollment issues that emerged resulted in an inability to quantitatively examine 
individuals with mild AD.  However, these enrollment issues served to bring to light the 
hesitation that many older adults possess regarding having their cognition and functional abilities 
examined.  Particularly noteworthy is the resistance many individuals exhibited regarding having 
their driving assessed despite both the confidential nature of the study as well as the lack of 
implications the study had on driving privileges.  This highlighted the importance many 
individuals place on the ability to drive, and it supports theories suggesting that driving serves to 
promote a sense of connection with society, feeling of independence, and self worth.  While it is 
essential to foster positive self worth and mood as people age, it is also essential to maintain their 
safety.  Future studies should examine whether hesitation in having driving assessed is linked to a 
greater likelihood of unsafe driving behavior and lack of self regulation.   
Novel Measures of Functioning 
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 The current study was one of the first to evaluate cognition, function, and awareness 
through virtual reality in individuals with AD as well as healthy older adults.  As such, the 
resulting correlations can serve as estimates of population parameters for future studies.  The use 
of VRDS in examining driving for older adults is not well established and this study serves to 
better understand the factors that impact this type of assessment in the given population.  Results 
suggest that measuring awareness by way of a VRDS is challenging due to the novel nature of 
the environment.  The validity of the awareness measures related to the VRDS were questionable, 
as participants in the study had no prior knowledge for which to compare their performance on 
the VRDS.   
 An additional challenge when using a VRDS was the incidence of simulation sickness.  
Although some studies posit that simulation sickness is less likely in older adults, the high 
incidence of sickness in the current study suggests that the factors underlying simulation sickness 
are still not well understood.  Exploratory analyses revealed no significant correlations between 
simulation sickness and demographics, driving experience, cognitive or functional status.  
Although the study was not developed to examine the relationship between both anxiety and 
coping strategies with simulation sickness, anecdotal observations suggest a possible relationship 
that should be examined further. 
 Despite the drawbacks of using the VRDS, multiple strengths in using this method of 
functional assessment also became evident throughout the study.  The VRDS allowed for the 
examination of driving in a safe and controlled environment, in which limits of driving behavior 
could safely be examined.  In fact, 24% of the study sample collided with another object while 
18% almost collided with either another vehicle or object on the road.  Twelve percent of the 
study sample lost control over the vehicle at some point in their drive, and 6% drove the wrong 
way on a one-way street.  These are factors that could not have been studied on a behind the 
wheel test due to safety concerns.  In addition to objectively measuring driving behaviors in a 
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safe manner, the VRDS has the benefit of challenging individuals in ways that could mimic real 
life situations while studying the types of errors and accidents that older adults might be prone. 
Given the lack of understanding about the factors that impact driving in adults as they age, this is 
a viable, inexpensive, and safe manner for which to study this impact.  A solid understanding of 
this population will serve as a foundation for which to understand the functional and awareness 
changes that result as a function of mild AD.  The significant relationship between the VRDS and 
measures of visuospatial processing (JLO) is consistent with previous studies examining driving 
behavior (i.e. Okonkwo et al., 2007).  These studies suggest a link between driving abilities with 
visuospatial processing, attention, and speed of processing in older adults.  Results suggest that 
these cognitive measures may have predictive value in determining safe driving practices in older 
adults.    
Traditional Measures of Functioning 
 Two significant findings emerged as a result of using a traditional measure of functioning, 
the IADL questionnaire on healthy controls.  The first finding is the significant correlation 
between functioning and awareness of functioning, as operationally defined by this study.  
Though much is known about the lack of awareness in individuals with mild AD, intact 
awareness in healthy older adults appears assumed.  In fact, current driving policies regarding 
older adults rely on the assumption that individuals have awareness of driving abilities enough to 
self regulate when they deem appropriate.  The relationship between functioning and awareness 
in this study suggests that those individuals with less functional independence have less 
awareness of such.  However, noteworthy is the lack of variation in IADL and IADL discrepancy 
scores, reflective of the lack of sensitivity of this tool for the use of healthy older adults.  Despite 
this, the significant relationship found in the study raises possible concerns about the likelihood 
that an individual will demonstrate awareness if self regulation of driving behavior becomes 
necessary in order to maintain safety.  Awareness of functional ability and therefore restriction of 
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potentially unsafe behaviors should not be assumed in healthy older adults.  Effective measures 
may be necessary to ensure proper regulation of driving as adults age. 
 The second significant finding is the link between specific cognitive measures with scores 
on the IADL.  Both the MMSE and the Clock Drawing Test were correlated with the IADL in 
healthy controls, and suggest a relationship between general cognitive functioning and functional 
ability for healthy older adults.  Although this relationship has been established in individuals 
with mild AD, it suggests a relationship continuum between cognition and functioning that is 
present without the existence of a dementing illness.  This finding lends support for the educated 
use of both cognitive tools by healthcare providers as screeners for older adults who might have 
safety risks or have greater needs for assistance in accomplishing daily functional tasks. 
Individuals with Mild AD 
 Although the number of clinical participants was too small to run quantitative analyses, a 
trend was seen between global cognitive functioning, as measured by the MMSE, and awareness 
of functioning.  This relationship was seen in awareness measures of both traditional and novel 
functional measures.  As the MMSE serves as a tool to capture global cognitive status, results 
suggest that disease progression is accompanied by progression of unawareness of functioning.  
A trend was present for individuals with lower cognitive capacity due to disease progression to 
score lower on measures of awareness, which might lead to additional safety concerns as 
individuals lack the awareness to regulate their behaviors.  Examination of individuals with AD, 
as well as healthy controls in the study, support the CAM model which posits that mnemonic 
unawareness results from an inability to accurately appraise one‟s behaviors.   
Limitations 
 When conducting the study, a number of unforeseen difficulties were encountered, and 
several limitations are reported that have implications on future research.  The major limitation 
was the lack of an adequate sample size to be able to run quantitative analyses on individuals 
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with mild AD.  The primary focus of this study originally was to better understand the factors 
that impact awareness and functional ability in individuals with mild Alzheimer‟s dementia.  As 
problems with enrollment emerged, inclusion criteria became less stringent, thereby resulting in 
several participants with potentially confounding factors impacting mood, cognition, and 
function.  A strength of making criteria less stringent is that the clinical population in this study 
may better reflect and generalize to other individuals with mild AD in the community.  However, 
despite the difficulty in recruiting clinical participants, the study was able to recruit healthy older 
adults, which can serve as a baseline for which to understand awareness and functional ability in 
cognitively intact individuals.   
 This study‟s original purpose was to investigate individuals with mild AD while healthy 
older adults served as a control group.  Because of this, the study was designed to measure 
unawareness using methods common to examining this clinical population: using a participant- 
reliable informant discrepancy score as well as using a participant perception versus actual 
performance discrepancy score.  Using such scores is less common for healthy older adults, and 
would not have been the method employed had healthy adults been this study‟s target population.  
Instead, the study would have focused on self-regulatory practices related to driving and activities 
of daily living.  The current study used the IADL questionnaire to assess functional activities 
such as driving.  However, this questionnaire is designed for individuals with dementia and is not 
sensitive to the functional changes of healthy older adults.   Questionnaires pertinent to  healthy 
aging, such as those related to sensory functioning, cognition, and physical functioning would 
have been employed instead.  Information would have been collected to assess the importance of 
driving and independence in each individual‟s daily lives.  A limitation of this study is the lack of 
information gathered about these changes, attitudes, and behaviors in healthy controls.  Future 
studies should aim to examine the link between self regulation and unawareness in older healthy 
adults, as it relates to driving and functional ability.      
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A strength of this study was the ability to examine driving behavior in a safe and 
manageable way by using a VRDS.  However, the size and lack of portability of this instrument 
resulted in the necessity for participants to come into the lab for complete assessment.  
Throughout recruitment, several individuals declined to participate in the study due to distance, 
hesitation of traveling to an unknown destination, or fear of commuting into the city of 
Philadelphia by way of car, train, or public transportation.   The current study only included 
individuals that were both willing and able to navigate to the lab.   
Transportation difficulties resulted in a biased study sample.  Additional factors 
contributed to a biased sample, including the fact that individuals could only participate if they 
were able to provide a reliable informant who had known them for at least a year.  While this did 
not appear to impact participation, it may have acted as a deterrent for those individuals who 
could have been uncomfortable stating they could not provide a reliable informant.  Still other 
factors that resulted in a biased sample were the fact that this study assessed people on several 
cognitive factors as well as driving factors.  Difficulties in enrollment reflects the fact that many 
individuals expressed discomfort with assessment of both factors, and some chose not to 
participate because of this.  The resulting sample reflects a group of individuals that were more 
comfortable in being assessed on such measures.  This sample is more highly educated than the 
average individual in Pennsylvania, and most likely reflects a group of individuals who are 
intrigued by research and academia.  In fact, the mean education level for healthy controls in the 
study was approximately 16 years.  The minimum level of education for participants in this study 
was 12 years and almost 62% of the study held at least a bachelor‟s degree.  This is in contrast to 
the approximately 22% of individuals in Pennsylvania over the age of 25 who were reported to 
hold bachelor‟s degrees or higher in the United States census conducted in 2000 (Census, 2000).  
This may limit the ability to generalize findings to other healthy older adults in the community or 
individuals with mild Alzheimer‟s dementia.    
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Additionally this study is correlational, and therefore cannot make any statements 
regarding causation.  Correlational studies typically require approximately 50 cases for ample 
power.  The small sample size of individuals with mild AD as well as healthy controls may have 
been insufficient to detect a meaningful effect. Future studies should attempt to further 
understand the specific relationships between functional status, cognitive status, and awareness as 
they relate to individuals with mild AD.  A broader understand of this relationship could help in 
treatment planning and possible implications for behavior changes as the disease progresses.   
 
Role of unawareness 105 
 
List of References 
 
Ackermann, M.L., Edwards, J.D., Ross, L.A., Ball, K.K., & Lunsman, M. (2008). Examination of 
cognitive and instrumental functional performance as indicators for driving cessation risk 
across 3 years. The Gerontologist, 48, 802-810. 
 
Agnew, S.K. & Morris, G. (1998). The heterogeneity of anosognosia for memory impairment in 
Alzheimer‟s disease: a review of the literature and a proposed model. Aging & Mental 
health, 2, 7-19. 
 
Aguero-Torres, H., Fratiglioni, L., Guo, Z., Viitanen, M., & Winblad, B. (1998). Prognostic 
factors in very old demented adults: A seven-year follow-up from a population-based 
survey in Stockholm. American Journal of Public Health, 46(4), 442-452. 
 
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders- 
Text Revision. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press. 
 
Anderson, S.W., & Tranel, D. (1989). Awareness of disease states following cerebral infarction, 
dementia and head trauma: Standardised assessment. Clinical Neuropsychologist, 3, 327-
339. 
 
Ansell, E.L., & Bucks, R.S. (2006). Mnemonic anosognosia in Alzheimer‟s disease: A test of 
Agnew and Morris (1998). Neuropsychologia 44, 1095-1102. 
 
Anstey, K. J., Windsor, T. D., Luszcz, M. A., & Andrews, G. R. (2006). Predicting driving 
cessation over 5 years in very-old adults: Psychological wellbeing and cognitive 
competence are stronger predictors than physical health. Journal of the American 
Geriatrics Society, 54, 121-126. 
 
Army Individual Test Battery. (1944). Manual of directions and scoring. Washington, DC: War 
Department, Adjutant General‟s Office. 
 
Avila, R., Bottino, C.M.C., Carvalho, I.A.M., Santos, C.B., Seral, C., & Miotto, E.C. (2004). 
Neuropsychological rehabilitation of memory deficits and activities of daily living in 
patients with Alzheimer‟s disease: a pilot study. Brazilian Journal of Medical and 
Biological Research, 37, 1721-1729.  
 
Babinski, J. (1914). Contribution a l'etude des troubles mentaux dans l'hemiplegie organique 
cerebrale (agnosognosie). Rev Neurol 27, 845-847. 
 
Ball, K., Owsley, C., Stalvey, B., Roenker, D.L., Sloane, M.E., & Graves, M. (1998). Driving 
avoidance and functional impairment in older drivers. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 
30(3), 313-322.   
 
Benton, A.L., Sivan, A.B., Hamsher, K.D., Varney, N., & Spreen, O. (1994). Contributions to 
neuropsychological assessment. A clinical manual (2
nd
 ed.). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Role of unawareness 106 
 
Biocca, F. (1992). Will simulation sickness slow down the diffusion of virtual environment 
technology? Presence: Teleoperators Virtual Environment 1(3), 334–343. 
 
Bologna, S.M., & Camp, C.J. (1997).  Covert versus overt self-recognition in late stage 
Alzheimer‟s disease. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 3, 195-
198. 
 
Boyle, P.A., Malloy, P.F., Salloway, S., Cahn-Weiner, D.A., Cohen, R., & Cummings, J.L. 
(2003). Executive dysfunction and apathy predict functional impairment n Alzheimer 
disease. American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 11(2), 214-221. 
 
Braak, H. & Braak, E. (1997). Frequency of stages of Alzheimer-related lesions in different age 
categories. Neurobiology of Aging, 18, 4, 351-357. 
 
Butters, N. & Miliotis, P. (1984). Amnestic Disorders. In K.M. Heilman & E. Valenstein (Eds). 
Clinical Neuropsychology (2
nd
 Edition). (pp. 4-03-454). New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Cavanaugh, J.C. (1989). The importance of awareness in memory aging. In L. W. Poon, D.C. 
Rubin, & Wilson, B.A. (Eds.) Everyday cognition in adulthood and late life. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Census (2000). Pennsylvania educational attainment 1990-2000.  Retrieved April 2010, from 
http://www.censusscope.org/us/s42/chart_education.html. 
 
Chan, A.S., Butters, N., & Salmon, D.P. (1997). The deterioration of semantic networks in 
patients with Alzheimer‟s disease: A cross-sectional study. Neuropsychologia, 35, 241-
248. 
 
Charlton, J.L., Oxley, J., Fildes, B., Oxley, P., Newstead, S., Koppel, S. et al. (2006). 
Characteristics of older drivers who adopt self-regulatory driving behaviors. 
Transportation Research Part F (9), 363-373. 
 
Clare, L. (2004a).  The construction of awareness in early-stage Alzheimer‟s disease: A review of 
concepts and models. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43, 155-175. 
 
Clare, L. (2004b). Awareness in early-stage Alzheimer‟s disease: A review of methods and 
evidence. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43, 177-196. 
 
Cosentino, S., Jefferson, A.L., Carey, M., Price, C., Davis-Garrett, K., & Libon, D.J. (2004). The 
clinical diagnosis of cerebrovascular dementia: A comparison among four classification 
systems. The Clinical Neuropsychologist - Vascular Dementia Special Edition, 18(1), 6-
21. 
 
Cotrell, V. & Wild, K. (1999). A longitudinal study of self-imposed driving restrictions and 
deficit awareness in patients with Alzheimer's disease. Alzheimer's Disease and Associated 
Disorders, 13, 151-156. 
 
Role of unawareness 107 
 
Cox, D.J., Quillian, W.C., Thorndike, F.P., Kovatchev, B.P., & Hanna, G. (1998). Evaluating 
driving performance of outpatients with Alzheimer disease. Journal of the American 
Board of Family Practice, 11(4), 264-271. 
 
Crosson, B.C., Barco, P.P., Velozo., C.A., Bolseta, M.M., Werts, D., & Brobeck, T. (1989).  
Awareness and compensation in post-acute head injury rehabilitation. Journal of Head 
Trauma Rehabilitation, 4, 46-54. 
 
DeBettignies, B.H., Mahurin, R.K., & Pirozzolo, F.J. (1990). Insight for impairment in 
independent living skills in Alzheimer‟s disease and multi-infarct dementia. Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 12, 355-363. 
 
Delis, D. C., Kaplan, E., Kramer, J., & Ober, B. A. (2000). California Verbal Learning Test-
Second Edition (CVLT-II). San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
 
Delis, D.C., Massman, P.J., Butters, N., Salmon, D.P., Cermak, L.S., & Kramer, J.H. (1991). 
Profiles of demented and amnesic patients on the California Verbal Learning Test: 
Implications for the assessment of memory disorders. Psychological Assessment: A 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 3, 19-26. 
 
Delis, D.C., Wetter, S.R., Jacobson, M.W., Peavy, G., Hamilton, J., Gongvatana, A., et al. 
(2005). Recall discriminability: Utility of a new CVLT-II measure in the differential 
diagnosis of dementia. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 11, 708-
715. 
 
Derousne, C., Thibault, S., Lagha-Pierucci, S., Baudouin-Madec, V., Ancri, D., & Lacomblez, L. 
(1999). Decreased awareness of cognitive deficits in patients with mild dementia of the 
Alzheimer type. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 14, 1019-1030. 
 
Donorfio, L.K.M., D‟Ambrosio, L.A., Coughlin, J.F., & Mohyde, M. (2009). To drive or not to 
drive, that isn‟t the question- the meaning of self-regulation among older drivers. Journal 
of Safety Research, 40, 221-226.   
 
Duchek, J.M., Hunt, L., Ball, K., Buckles, V., & Morris, J.C. (1997). The role of attention in 
driving and dementia of the Alzheimer‟s type. Alzheimer Disease and Associated 
Disorders, 11, 48-56. 
 
Farias, S.T., Harrell, E., Neumann, C., & Houtz, A. (2003). The relationship between 
neuropsychological performance and daily functioning in individuals with Alzheimer‟s 
disease: ecological validity of neuropsychological tests. Archives of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, 18, 655-672. 
 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39, 175-191. 
 
Feher, E.P., Mahurin, R.K., Inbody, S.B., Crook, T.H., & Pirozzolo, F.J. (1991). Anosognosia in 
Alzheimer‟s disease. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology and Behavioral Neurology, 4, 
136-146. 
Role of unawareness 108 
 
 
Feldman, H.H., Van Baelen, B., Kavanagh, S.M., & Torfs, K.E.L.  (2005). Cognition, function, 
and caregiving time patterns in patients with mild-to-moderate Alzheimer Disease. 
Alzheimer Dissoc Disord, 19, 29-36. 
 
Folstein, M.F., Folstein, S.E., & McHugh, P.R. (1975). “Mini-Mental State” – a practical method 
for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician. Journal of Psychiatric 
Research, 12, 189-198. 
 
Ford, G.R., Haley, W.E., Thrower, S.L., West, C.A.C., & Harrell, L.E. (1996). Utility of Mini-
Mental State Exam scores in predicting functional impairments among white and African 
American dementia patients. The Journals of Gerontology, 51A, M185-M188. 
 
Friedland, R.P., Koss, E., Kumar, A., Gaines, S., Metzler, D., Haxby, J.V., et al. (1988). Motor 
vehicle crashes in dementia of the Alzheimer type. Annals of Neurology, 24, 782-786.  
 
Freund, B., Gravenstein, S., Ferris, R., Burke, B., & Shaheen, E. (2004). Drawing clocks and 
driving cars: Use of brief tests of cognition to screen driving competency in older adults. 
Journal of General Internal Medicine, 20(3), 240-244.  
 
Fukui, T. & Lee, E. (2008). Clock Drawing Test may represent a sensitive surrogate measure of 
activities of daily living in patients with Alzheimer‟s disease. Alzheimer’s and Dementia, 
4, T558. 
 
Giovannetti, T., Libon, D.J., & Hart, T. (2002). Awareness of naturalistic action errors in 
dementia. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 8, 633-644. 
 
Green, J., Goldstein, F.C., Sirockman, B.E., & Green, R.C. (1993). Variable awareness of deficits 
in Alzheimer‟s disease. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, and Behavioral Neurology, 
6, 159-165.  
 
Hardy, R. M., Oyebode, J.R., & Clare, L. (2006). Measuring awareness in people with mild to 
moderate Alzheimer‟s disease: Development of the memory awareness rating scale- 
adjusted. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 16, 2, 178-193. 
 
Hart, T., Giovannetti, T., Montgomery, M.W., & Schwartz, M.F. (1998). Awareness of errors in 
naturalistic action following traumatic brain injury. Journal of Head Trauma and 
Rehabilitation, 13, 16-28. 
 
Heaton, R.K., Grant, I.,  & Matthews, C.G. (1991). Comprehensive Norms for an Expanded 
Halstead-Reitan Battery: Demographic Corrections, Research Findings, & Clinical 
Applications.  Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. 
 
Herbert, L.E., Scherr, P.A., Bienias, J.L., Bennett, D.A., & Evans, D.A. (2003). Alzheimer 
disease in the US population. Arch Neurol, 60, 1119-1122. 
 
Holland, C.A. & Rabbit, P.M.A. (1992). People‟s awareness of their age-related sensory and 
cognitive deficits and the implications for road safety. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6, 
217-231. 
Role of unawareness 109 
 
 
Hyman, B. T., Van Hoesen, G. W, Damasio, A. R., & Barnes, C. L. (1984). Alzheimer's disease: 
Cell-specific pathology isolates the hippocampal formation. Science, 225, 1168-1170. 
 
Jefferson, A.L., Barakat, L.P., Giovannetti, T., Paul, R.H., & Glosser, G. (2006).  Object 
perception impairments predict instrumental activities of daily living dependence in 
Alzheimer‟s disease. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 28, 884-
897. 
 
Jefferson, A.L., Cosentino, S.A., Ball, S.K., Bogdanoff, B., Leopold, N., Kaplan, E., et al. (2002). 
Errors produced on the mini-mental state examination and neuropsychological tests 
performance in Alzheimer‟s disease, ischemic vascular dementia, and Parkinson‟s 
disease. J Neuropsychiatry Clin Neurosci, 14(3), 311-320. 
 
Kashiwa, Y., Kitabayashi, Y., Narumoto, J., Nakamura, K., Ueda, H., & Fukui, K. (2005). 
Anosognosia in Alzheimer‟s disease: Association with patient characteristics, psychiatric 
symptoms and cognitive deficits. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 59, 697-704. 
 
Kennedy, R.S., Lane, N.E., Berbaum, K.S., & Lilienthal, M.G. (1993). A simulator sickness 
questionnaire (SSQ): A new method for quantifying simulator sickness. Int J Aviat 
Psychol, 3(3) 203-220. 
 
Kolasinski, E.M. (1996). Prediction of simulation sickness in a virtual environment. Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 57-03B,2189. 
 
Lawson, B.D., Graeber, D.A., & Mead, A.M. (2002). Signs and symptoms of human syndromes 
associated with synthetic experience. In K.M. Stanney (Eds.) Handbook of virtual 
environments: Design, implementation, and applications (pp. 589-618). Mahwah : IEA. 
 
Lawton, M.P. & Brody, E.M. (1969). Assessment of older people: self-maintaining and 
instrumental activities of daily living. Gerontologist, 9, 179-186. 
 
Lezak, M.D., Howieson, D.B., Loring, D.W. (2004).  Neuropsychological Assessment (4
th
 
edition). New York, NY: Oxford Press. 
 
Libon, D.J., Bogdanoff, B., Cloud, B.S., Skalina, S., Giovannetti, T., Gitlin, H.L. et al. (1998). 
Declarative and procedural learning, quantitative measures of the hippocampus, and 
subcortical white alterations in Alzheimer‟s disease and ischemic vascular dementia. 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 20, 30-41. 
 
Lopez, O.L., Becker, J.T., Somsak, D., Dew, M.A., & DeKosky, S.T. (1994). Awareness of 
cognitive deficits and anosognosia in probable Alzheimer‟s disease. European Neurology, 
34, 277-282. 
 
Lowenstein, D.A., Rubert, M.P., Arguelles, T., & Duara, R. (1995). Neuropsychology test 
performance and prediction of functional capacities among Spanish-speaking and 
English-speaking patients with dementia. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 10, 75-
88. 
 
Role of unawareness 110 
 
Marková, I.S. Berrios, G.E. (2001) The 'Object' of Insight Assessment: Relationship to Insight 
'Structure'. Psychopathology 34: 245-252. 
 
Matsuda, O., & Saito, M. (2005). Functional competency and cognitive ability in mild 
Alzheimer‟s Disease: relationship between ADL assessed by a relative/ carer-rated scale 
and Neuropsychological performance. International Psychogeriatrics, 17, 275-288. 
 
McDaniel K, Edland S, Heyman A, & the CERAD clinical investigators (1995). Relationship 
between level of insight and severity of dementia in Alzheimer's disease. Alzheimer 
Disease and Associated Disorders, 9, 101-104. 
 
McGlynn, S.M., & Schacter, D.L. (1989). Unawareness of deficits in neuropsychological 
syndromes. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 11, 143-205. 
 
McKhann, G., Drachman, D., Folstein, M., Katzman, R., Price, D., & Stadlan, E.M. (1984). 
Clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer‟s disease: report of the NINCDS-ADRDA work group 
under the auspices of department of health and human services task force on Alzheimer‟s 
disease. Neurology, 34, 939-943. 
 
Migliorelli, R., Teson, A., Sabe, L., Petracca, G., Petracchi, M., Leiguarda, R., et al. (1995). 
Anosognosia in Alzheimer‟s disease: a study of associated factors. Journal of 
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 7, 338-344. 
 
Morris, J.C. (1993). The Clinical Dementia Rating (CDR): current version and scoring rules. 
Neurology, 1993, 2412-2414. 
 
Morris, R.G. & Hannesdottir, K. (2004). Loss of „awareness‟ in Alzheimer‟s disease. In: Morris, 
R., Becker J., (Eds). Cognitive Neuropsychology of Alzheimer's Disease. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press; 2004:275-296. 
 
Mourant, R.R., Thattacherry, T.R. (2000). Simulator sickness in a virtual environment driving 
simulator. Proceedings of the IEA 2000/HFES 2000 Congress. 
 
Nebes, R.D. (1992). Semantic memory dysfunction in Alzheimer‟s disease: Disruption of 
semantic knowledge or information-processing limitation?  In L.R. Squire & Butters, N. 
(Eds.), Neuropsychology of Memory (2
nd
 Ed.). New York: Guildford Press. 
 
Nichols, S & Patel, H. (2002). Health and safety implications of virtual reality: a review of 
empirical evidence. Applied Ergonomics, 33, 251-271. 
 
Okonkwo, O.C., Wadley, V.G., Crowe, M., Roenker, D.L., & Ball, K. (2007). Self-regulation of 
driving in the context of impaired visual attention: Are there gender differences? 
Rehabilitation Psychology, 52, 421-428. 
 
Ott, B.R., Lafleche, G., Whelihan, W.M. Buongiorno, G.W., Albert, M.S., & Fogel, B.S. (1996). 
Impaired awareness of deficits in Alzheimer disease. Alzheimer Disease and Associated 
Disorders, 10(2), 68-76. 
 
Role of unawareness 111 
 
Ownsworth, T., Clare, L., & Morris, R. (2006). An integrated biopsychosocial approach to 
understanding awareness deficits in Alzheimer‟s disease and brain injury. 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 16(4), 415-435. 
 
Pachana, N.A. & Petriwskyj, A.M. (2006). Assessment of Insight and Self-Awareness in Older 
Drivers. Clinical Gerontologist, 30, 23-38. 
 
Passafiume, D., Di Giacomo, D., & Carolei, A. (2006). Word-stem completion task to investigate 
semantic network in patients with Alzheimer‟s disease. European Journal of Neurology, 
13, 460-464. 
 
Prigatano, G.P. (1991). Disturbances of self-awareness of deficit after traumatic brain injury. In 
Prigatano, G.P., & Schacter, D.L., Awareness of Deficit After Brain Injury (pp. 111-126). 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ready, R.E., Ott, B.R., & Grace, J. (2006). Insight and cognitive impairment. American Journal 
of Alzheimer’s Disease & Other Dementias, 21(4), 242-248. 
 
Reason, J.T. & Brand, J.J. (1975). Motion Sickness, Academic Press, London. 
 
Reed, B.R., Jagust, W.J., & Coulter, L. (1994). Anosognosia in Alzheimer‟s disease: 
relationships to depression, cognitive function and cerebral perfusion. Journal of Clinical 
and Experimental Neuropsychology, 15, 231-244. 
 
Rizzo, M., Reinach, S, McGehee, D., & Dawson, J. (1997). Simulated car crashes and crash 
predictors in drivers with Alzheimer disease. Archives of Neurology, 545-551. 
 
Ross, L.A., Clay, O.J., Edwards, J.D., Ball, K.K., Wadley, V.G, Vance, D.E., et al. (2009). Do 
older drivers at risk for crashes modify their driving over time? The Journals of 
Gerontology, 64B;2, 163-170. 
 
Royall, D.R., Cordes, J.A., & Polk, M. (1998). CLOX: An executive clock drawing task. Journal 
of Neurology, Neurosurgery, & Psychiatry, 64, 588-594.  
 
Rudman, D.L., Friedland, J., Chipman, M., & Sciortino, P. (2006). Holding on and letting go: 
The perspectives of pre-seniors and seniors on driving self-regulation in later life. 
Canadian Journal on Aging, 25(1), 65-76. 
 
Schacter, D.L. (1990). Toward a cognitive neuropsychology of awareness: Implicit knowledge 
and anosognosia. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 12, 155-178. 
 
Schacter, D.L. & Prigatano, G.P. Forms of unawareness. In Prigatano, G.P & Schacter, D.L. 
(Eds). (1991). Awareness of deficit after brain injury: Clinical and theoretical issues. (pp. 
258-262) pp. New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schultheis, M.T., Himelstein, J., & Rizzo, A.A. (2002). Virtual reality and neuropsychology: 
Upgrading the current tools. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 17, 378-394. 
 
Schultheis, M.T., Simone, L.K., Roseman, E., Nead, R., Rebimbas, J., & Mourant,  
Role of unawareness 112 
 
R. (2006). Stopping behavior in a VR driving simulator: A new clinical measure for the 
assessment of driving?  Paper and presentation at the 28
th
 Annual International 
Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society (in press). 
 
Sevush, S. & Leve, N. (1993). Denial of memory deficit in Alzheimer‟s disease. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 150, 748-751. 
 
Shua-Haim, J.R. & Gross, J.S. (1996). A simulated driving evaluation for patients with 
Alzheimer‟s disease. American Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, 2-7. 
 
Ska, B., Poissant, A., & Joanette, Y. (1990). Line orientation judgment in normal elderly and 
subjects with dementia of Alzheimer‟s type. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 12, 695-702. 
 
Souchay, C., Isingrini, M., Pillon, B., & Gil, R. (2003). Metamemory accuracy in Alzheimer‟s 
disease and in Frontotemporal lobe dementia. Neurocase, 9(6), 482-492. 
 
Swanberg, M.M., Tractenberg, R.E., Mohs, R., Thal, L.J., & Cummings, J.L. (2004). Executive 
Dysfunction in Alzheimer Disease. Archives of Neurology, 61, 556-560.  
 
Szlyk, J.P., Myers, L., Zhang, Y.X., Wetzel, L., & Shapiro, R. (2002). Development and 
assessment of a neuropsychological battery to aid in predicting driving performance. 
Journal of Rehabilitation Research and Development, 3(4), 483-496. 
 
Thompson, P., Hayashi, K.M., Zubicaray, G., Janke, A.L., Rose, S.E., Semple, J. et al. (2003). 
Dynamics of gray matter loss in Alzheimer‟s disease. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
23(3), 994-1005. 
 
Toglia, J. & Kirk, U. (2000). Understanding awareness deficits following brain injury. 
NeuroRehabilitation,15(1), 57-70. 
 
Weinstein, E.A. Anosognosia and denial of illness. In Prigatano, G.P. & Schacter, D.L. (Eds). 
(1991). Awareness of deficit after brain injury: Clinical and theoretical issues. (pp. 240-
257). 271 pp. New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press. 
 
Welsh-Bohmer, K.A. & Warren, L.H. Neurodegenerative Dementias.  In Attix, D.K. & Welsh-
Bohmer, K.A. (eds.) (2006). Geriatric Neuropsychology Assessment and Intervention. 
The Guilford Press, NY.   
 
Whitlock, F. (1981). Some observations on the meaning of confabulation. British Journal of 
Medical Psychology, 54, 213-218. 
 
Wild, K., & Cotrell, V. (2003). Identifying Driving Impairment in Alzheimer Disease: A 
Comparison of Self and Observer Reports Versus Driving Evaluation. Alzheimer Disease 
and Associated Disorders, 17, 27-34. 
 
Wild, K.V. & Kaye, J.A. (1991). Correlates of driving status in the healthy very old. 
Gerontologist 31, 340. 
 
Role of unawareness 113 
 
Yesavage, J.A., Brink, T.L., Rose, T.L., Lum, O., Huang, V., Adey, M.B., & Leirer, V.O. (1983). 
Development and validation of a geriatric depression screening scale: A preliminary 
report. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 17, 37-49. 
 
Yu, F., Kolanowski, A.M., Strumpf, N.E., & Eslinger, P.J. (2006). Improving cognition and 
function through exercise intervention in AD. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, Fourth 
Quarter, 358-365. 
 
 
Role of unawareness 114 
 
 
Figure 1. Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM) (Agnew and Morris, 1998) 
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Figure 2: Overview of Study Design 
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Figure 3: Virtual Reality Driving Simulator Unawareness Variables 
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Figure 4: CVLT d‟ Scores for Clinical Participants 
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Figure 5: TMT-B Scores for Clinical Participants 
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Figure 6: JLO Correction Scores for Clinical Participants 
 
Role of unawareness 120 
 
Figure 7: VRDS Scores for Clinical Participants 
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Figure 8: Unawareness Scores for Clinical Participants 
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Figure 9: Predicted Awareness Scores for Clinical Participants 
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Figure 10: Recognition Awareness Scores for Clinical Participants 
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Figure 11: IADL Scores for Clinical Participants 
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Figure 12: IADL Discrepancy Scores for Clinical Participants 
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Table 1: Variables in the Study 
Measure Variables collected Manipulation to the 
Variables 
Studies that 
have used this 
technique 
Final 
Variable 
Cognitive 
Measures 
CVLT-II Short Form: 
Recognition 
Discriminability 
Score 
Hit rate minus false 
positive rate in standard 
deviation units 
Reviewed in 
Delis et al., 2005 
CVLT-II d' 
Recognition 
Discriminability 
Score 
TMT-B: Time to 
completion in 
seconds 
Age, gender, education, 
and ethnicity 
corrections 
No manipulation  TMT-B z-score 
JLO- Total correct 
out of 30 
Age and gender 
corrections 
Benton, Sivan, 
Hamsher, 
Varney, & 
Spreen, 1994 
JLO Corrected 
Score 
Virtual Reality 
Driving 
Simulator 
Distance from Stop 
Signs 
Traffic light behavior 
Mean Speed: 
residential and 
highway zones 
Mean Lane Deviation 
in residential and 
highway zones 
Following a vehicle 
Responding to 
construction 
Responding to 
something in the road 
All measures will be 
converted to a Z score.  
These Z scores will be 
added together to form a 
total global driving 
score. 
Schultheis, 
Simone, 
Roseman, Nead, 
Rebimbas, & 
Mourant, 2006 
VRDS Total 
Score for 
sections 
completed 
VRDS 
Unawareness 
Measure 
9-item questionnaire 
measuring patient 
perception of their 
performance using a 
5-point scale 
This questionnaire will 
be correlated with the 
contrasted with actual 
performance on the VR 
task.   
Hart et al., 1998 VR 
Unawareness= 
Correlation 
Score 
Instrumental 
Activities of 
Daily Living 
Questionnaire 
8-item questionnaire 
measuring patient 
functioning on 
various domains.  
This is completed by 
a reliable informant, 
and scores range from 
0-17. 
Total score (0-17) Derouesne et al., 
1999 
Salmon et al., 
2005 
IADL Total 
Score 
Instrumental 
Activities of 
Daily Living 
Unawareness 
Measure 
8 question scale for 
patient 
8 question scale for 
caregiver 
Difference score 
between the caregiver 
and the patient. 
Cotrell & Wild, 
1999 
Ott et al., 1996 
Traditional 
Unawareness 
Score 
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Secondary Analyses: Exploratory: VRDS Unawareness Measures 
Pre- VRDS 
exposure 
questionnaire 
9-item questionnaire 
measuring patient 
prediction of their 
performance using a 
5-point scale 
Difference score 
between pre-exposure 
questionnaire and actual 
performance on the 
VRDS 
“Prediction Unawareness” 
Pre- VRDS 
exposure 
questionnaire 
9-item questionnaire 
measuring patient 
prediction of their 
performance using a 
5-point scale 
Difference score 
between pre exposure 
questionnaire and post-
exposure questionnaire 
“Recognition Unawareness” 
Post-VRDS 
exposure 
questionnaire 
9-item questionnaire 
measuring patient 
perception of their 
performance using a 
5-point scale 
This questionnaire will 
be correlated with the 
contrasted with actual 
performance on the VR 
task. 
“VR Unawareness” 
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Table 2: Virtual Reality Driving Simulator Variables in the Study 
Driving Performance Recording Sheet 
  Topic Sub-Topic Criteria   Points 
Total 
Points 
       
1 
Stop Sign 
(SS)         
   (residential) Stop Sign 1 They Stopped   3   
    (res1) Did not stop   1   
    old highway exit -15.84 to 6.24 ft from stop sign   (-2 - 2 SD from norm mean) 1   
      > -15.84 ft from the stop sign 
 
0   
      > 6.24 ft from stop sign   0   
      Wait ≥ 1.55 seconds before driving (normative mean) 1   
      Wait < 1.55 seconds before driving   0   
    Stop Sign 2 They Stopped   3   
    (res3) Did not stop   1   
    2nd stop after -15.84 to 6.24 ft from stop sign   (-2 - 2 SD from norm mean) 1   
    residential start > -15.84 ft from the stop sign 
 
0   
      > 6.24 ft from stop sign   0   
      Wait ≥ 1.55 seconds before driving (normative mean) 1   
      Wait < 1.55 seconds before driving   0   
    Stop Sign 3 They Stopped   3   
  
 
(res4) Did not stop   1   
  
turn to school -15.84 to 6.24 ft from stop sign   (-2 - 2 SD from norm mean) 1   
  
  > -15.84 ft from the stop sign 
 
0   
  
  > 6.24 ft from stop sign   0   
  
  Wait ≥ 1.55 seconds before driving (normative mean) 1   
  
  Wait < 1.55 seconds before driving   0   
      Stop Sign Behavior      (Total SS1 + SS2 + SS3)/3                                                   
       
2 
Traffic Light 
(TL)         
   (commercial) Traffic Light 1 They stopped   2   
    (Comm 1) Did not stop   1   
    1st traffic light -13.62 to -6.93 ft from traffic line  (-2 - 2 SD from normative  2   
      >-13.62 or <-6.93 from traffic line  mean) 0   
      Wait ≥ 9.51 seconds before driving (normative mean) 1 
       Wait < 9.51 seconds before driving   0   
    Traffic light 2 They stopped   2   
    (Comm 2) Did not stop   1   
    2nd traffic light -13.62 to -6.93 ft from traffic line  (-2 - 2 SD from normative  2   
      >-13.62 or <-6.93 from traffic line  mean) 0   
      Wait ≥ 9.51 seconds before driving (normative mean) 1 
       Wait < 9.51 seconds before driving   0   
    Traffic light 3 They stopped   2   
    (Comm 3) Did not stop   1   
    3rd traffic light -13.62 to -6.93 ft from traffic line  (-2 - 2 SD from normative  2   
      >-13.62 or <-6.93 from traffic line  mean) 0   
      Wait ≥ 9.51 seconds before driving (normative mean) 1 
       Wait < 9.51 seconds before driving   0   
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Traffic Light Behavior     (Total TL1 + TL2 + 
TL3)/3   
 
              
3 Speed         
     Highway 1 45.82 - 50.9 mph (-1/2 SD to 1/2 SD from mean) 5   
    (55 mph) 43.29-45.81 mph OR 51-53.43 mph (-1 to 1 SD from normative mean) 4   
    (zone 23-24) 38.22-43.28 mph OR 53.43-58.5 mph (-2 to 2 SD from normative mean) 3   
    min/max mph 33.15-38.21 mph OR 58.51-63.57 mph (-3 to 3 SD from normative mean) 2   
       ≤ 33.14 OR ≥ 63.58 (> 3 SD from normative mean) 1   
    Highway 2 45.82 - 50.9 mph (-1/2 SD to 1/2 SD from mean) 5   
    (55 mph) 43.29-45.81 mph OR 51-53.43 mph (-1 to 1 SD from normative mean) 4   
 
  (zone 27-28a) 38.22-43.28 mph OR 53.43-58.5 mph (-2 to 2 SD from normative mean) 3   
    min/max mph 33.15-38.21 mph OR 58.51-63.57 mph (-3 to 3 SD from normative mean) 2   
       ≤ 33.14 OR ≥ 63.58 (> 3 SD from normative mean) 1   
    Highway 3 45.82 - 50.9 mph (-1/2 SD to 1/2 SD from mean) 5   
    (55 mph) 43.29-45.81 mph OR 51-53.43 mph (-1 to 1 SD from normative mean) 4   
    (zone 29b-30) 38.22-43.28 mph OR 53.43-58.5 mph (-2 to 2 SD from normative mean) 3   
    min/max mph 33.15-38.21 mph OR 58.51-63.57 mph (-3 to 3 SD from normative mean) 2   
       ≤ 33.14 OR ≥ 63.58 (> 3 SD from normative mean) 1   
      Speed    (HW1 + HW2 + HW3)/3   
 
               
4 
Lane 
Management         
     Highway 1 ≤ 199.41 inches from middle of road 1 SD from mean of the min and 1.5 
     (zone 25a-25b) ≥ 78.23 inches from middle of road max lane deviation of norm 0   
    Highway 2 ≤ 199.41 inches from middle of road 1 SD from mean of the min and 1.5 
     (zone 26a-26b) ≥ 78.23 inches from middle of road max lane deviation of norm 0   
  
Lane Busts Total highway lane busts < 7 Approximate normative mean 2 
 
  
  Total highway lane busts ≥ 7 
 
1   
      
Lane Management Behavior:     Total 
Highway 1 + Highway 2 + Lane Busts   
 
              
5 
Target 
Vehicle (zone 24-27) Attempts to follow entire time 
 
2 
       Attempts to follow part of the time 
 
1 
 
  
  No attempt to follow   0   
  
  Stays with vehicle entire time   2   
  
  Stays with vehicle until zone 26 
 
1 
 
  
  Looses vehicle before zone 26   0   
  
  Remains in control of vehicle (< 2 lane busts, no crashes) 1 
 
      Poor control of vehicle (≤2 lane busts or crashes) 0   
      
Following behavior:  Total Attempts + Stays 
+ Control   
 
               
6 
Construction 
Zone (zone 28a-28b) Move to left lane at sign and avoid barriers 
 
          2 
 
      Don't respond appropriately            1 
 
 
  
(zone 28a-28b) 27.32-42.16 mph (-1 - 1 SD from normative mean) 2 
 
   
19.9-27.31 mph OR 42.17-49.58 mph (-2 - 2 SD from normative mean) 1   
  
  ≤19.89 mph OR ≥ 49.59 mph (>2 SD from normative mean) 0   
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(zone 28b-29a) 
Mean(28b-29a) ≥11.02 mph mean(28a-
28b)   (Mean speed difference from  1 
       mean difference < 11.02 mph     normative sample) 0   
      Total Construction behavior    
               
7 
Unexpected 
objects Kid/Ball 
Stays on the road when sees kid 
 Swerves off of the road 
LbN=0 
LbN > 0 
2 
1 
 
 
  
 
  Stops when sees kid   1 
   
 
  Does not stop   0   
  
 
 Throughout 
environment 
No accident risk with other vehicles/ 
objects (Over entire course) 7 
 
  
 
  Accident risk with others 3.5 
 
 
  
 
  Accident with others 
 
0   
      
Reaction to unexpected objects:   (Stay on 
road + Stops + Accident Risk)/2   
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Table 3 
Demographic Variables for Healthy Controls (n=30) 
Demographic Variables   Number of Subjects    %                    
Gender 
 Female     16    53 
Male      14    47 
Ethnic Identity 
 Caucasian     24    80   
African American    6          20 
Handedness 
 Righty      28    93 
 Lefty      2    7 
Relationship with reliable informant 
 Husband/Wife     10    33 
 Child      7    23 
 Partner      5    17 
Friend      4     13 
 Sibling      4    13 
 
Demographics Variables              Mean/ Standard Deviation   Min/Max____ 
Age       73.57   (7.70)   60/84 
Education Level     16.23   (2.99)   12/21 
Reliable Informant length    37.65 (23.36)   1/74 
Mini Mental Status Examination   28.97    (1.19)   25/30 
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Table 4 
Driving Characteristics for Healthy Controls  
Driving Characteristics     Number of Subjects    %__________ 
Self restrictions on driving 
 Yes       9    30 
 No     21     70 
Only driver in the household 
 Yes       7     23 
 No     23     77 
Accidents/ tickets in the past year   
 Yes       6     20  
 No     24     80 
 
Driving Characteristics     Mean/ Standard Deviation   Min/Max         
Days driven in the month   23.37 (  8.50)   2/30 
Miles driven each time drive   32.58 (40.95)   2.5/160 
Length of time with license   55.10 (10.20)   32/77 
 
Role of unawareness 133 
 
Table 5 
Demographic Information for Clinical Sample 
 AD1 AD2 AD3 AD4 
Gender Female Male Male Male 
Ethnicity Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian 
Age 73 75 69 78 
Education 16 19 12 16 
Time Since Diagnosis (months) 18  9  24 18 
MMSE 21 25 17 29 
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Table 6 
Relationship between Demographics and Primary Variables in Healthy Controls 
 Age Education Ethnicity Gender 
 Spearman’s rho Correlation Mann-Whitney test 
CVLT d’ r= -.037 r= .275 U=22.50, z=-2.61** U=37.50,  z=-3.14** 
TMT-Z r= .349* r= .156 U=71.00, z=-0.59 U=131.00,z=-0.47 
JLO Corrected r= .206 r= .382* U=55.00, z=-0.89 U=97.00,  z=-0.63 
VRDS r= -.036 r= .493** U=44.00, z=-1.35 U=81.00,  z=-1.05 
IADL r= -.120 r= -.118 U=34.00, z=-1.13 U=77.00,  z=-0.94 
IADL Discrepancy r= -.032 r= .067 U=44.00, z=-0.16 U=58.50,  z=-1.85 
Unawareness r= .104 r= .284 U=49.00, z=-1.08 U=90.50,  z=-0.63 
Predicted 
Awareness 
Recognition Aware. 
r= -.272 
r= -.156 
r= -.344 
r= -.368* 
U=45.00, z=-1.29 
U=66.00, z=-0.16 
U=75.50,  z=-1.29 
U=80.00,  z=-1.09 
* p<.05,  **p<.01 
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Table 7 
Relationship between Driving Variables and VRDS-Related Measures in Healthy Controls 
 # yrs 
driving 
Days/month 
driving 
Miles 
driven 
Tickets/Accidents Any 
Restrictions 
Only Driver 
 Spearman’s rho Correlation Mann-Whitney test 
VRDS r= .045 r= .159 r= .068 U=62.00, z=-0.38  U=74.00, z=-0.49  U=61.50, z=-0.40 
Predicted Awareness r= -.273 r= -098 r= .140 U=46.50, z=-1.21  U=76.00, z=-0.39  U=54.00, z=-0.81  
Unawareness 
Recognition Aware. 
r=.035 
r= -.102 
r= -.186 
r= .129 
r= -.146 
r= .262 
U=59.00, z=-0.54 
U=58.50, z= -0.57  
U=78.50, z=-0.27  
U=70.50, z= -0.66 
U=47.00, z=-1.19 
U=55.00, z=-0.76  
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Table 8 
Relationship between Demographic Variables and IADL‟s in Healthy Controls 
 Length of relationship with RI Type of relationship with RI 
 Spearman’s rho correlation Kruskal-Wallis test 
IADL r= -.10 H(4)= 2.25 
IADL Discrepancy r=  .019 H(4)= 0.931 
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Table 9 
Cognitive and Functional Characteristics for Healthy Controls  
Variable Mean (SD) Median 1st/3rd quartile Min/Max 
CVLT d’ Score  -0.08   (1.75)   0.50    -.50/ 1    -7/2 
TMT-B Z Score    0.16  (1.17)   0.60 -1/ .93    -2.6/2.3 
JLO Correction Score 26.0    (5.34) 28 24.50/ 29.25    5/30 
IADL Score 16.52 (1.12) 17 17/17  12/17 
IADL Discrepancy Score   0.56  (1.05)  0   0/ 1    0/5 
VRDS Score 20.69 (5.22) 21.25  17.67/ 24.33    7/31.33 
Predicted Awareness Score*  -0.62 (6.32)  -2.58 -5.67/3.88   -9.5/17.17 
Unawareness Score* 
Recognition Score† 
  0.52  (5.39) 
 -1.14 (7.39) 
 0 
-1.00 
-3.04/ 4.79 
-8.50/4.00 
  -9.33/15.67 
-13/19 
 
*Greater positive scores reflect an over-inflation of perceived performance.  Greater negative scores reflect a 
participant thought they performed worse than they actually performed. 
†Greater positive scores reflect a participant‟s minimizing their perceived performance over time.  Greater negative 
scores reflect a participant‟s perceived performance is inflated over time. 
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Table 10 
Spearman‟s rho Correlation Matrix for Primary Variables for Healthy Controls 
Variable CVLT d’ TMT-B z JLO 
Corr. 
IADL IADL 
Discrep. 
VRDS Pre. 
Aware 
Unaware Recog. 
Aware 
CVLT d’ 1   .264  .373*  .223 -.077   .563**  -.471**  -.163  -.228 
TMT-B z  .264 1  .411*  .109 -.149   .274   .378*   .173  -.380* 
JLO Correction  .373*   .411* 1  .018 -.065   .452*  -.339   .036  -.178 
IADL  .223   .109  .018 1 -.661**   .145  -.007   .345  -.249 
IADL Discrepancy -.077  -.149 -.065 -.661** 1  -.096  -.072  -.269  -.068 
VRDS   .563**   .274  .452*  .145 -.096 1  -.433*   .180  -.440* 
Pre. Awareness -.471**  -.378* -.339 -.007 -.072  -.433* 1   .124   .697** 
Unawareness 
Recog. Aware 
-.163 
-.228 
  .173 
 -.380* 
 .036 
-.178 
 .345 
-.249 
-.269 
-.068 
  .180 
 -.440* 
  .124 
  .697** 
1 
 -.507** 
 -.507** 
1 
*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01  
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Table 11 
95% Confidence Intervals for Significant Correlations 
Variables Correlated Lower Limit Upper Limit 
CVLT d’ - JLO Corr.   .016     .768 
CVLT d’ - VRDS   .261   1 
CVLT d’ - Predicted Awareness -.887    -.135 
TMT-B z - JLO Correction   .061     .813 
TMT-B z - Predicted Awareness   .022      .774 
TMT-B z - Recog. Aware -.776    -.024 
JLO Corr. - VRDS   .111      .863 
IADL - IADL Discrepancy -1          -.395 
VRDS - Predicted Awareness -.809    -.088 
VRDS - Recog. Aware -.848    -.090 
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Table 12 
Partial Correlations for Primary Variables for Healthy Controls  
 
Partial Correlation r r2 t p 
r(VRDS)(Unawareness).CVLT   .333 .111   1.80   .084 
r(VRDS)(Unawareness).TMT    .140 .020   0.72   .478 
r(VRDS)(Unawareness).JLO   .184 .034   0.95   .351 
r(IADL)(IADLDiscrepancyScore).CVLT  -.662 .439 -4.33 <.0001 
r(IADL)(IADLDiscrepancyScore).TMT  -.656 .430 -4.26 <.0001 
r(IADL)(IADLDiscrepancyScore).JLO  -.661 .437 -4.32 <.0001 
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Table 13 
Cognitive and Functional Characteristics for Clinical Sample 
Variable AD1 AD2 AD3 AD4 
MMSE 21 25 17 29 
CVLT d’ -5.50 -4.00 -3.50 0.0 
TMT-B z -2.30 -1.70 -0.60 0.30 
JLO Correction 22 25 17 20 
TMT-A z 0.60 -0.70  0.70 -0.60 
Clock 7 4 6 5 
IADL/ Z Score using study norms 10/ -5.82 15/ -1.36 11/ -4.93 12/ -1.89 
IADL Discrep./ z score using study norms 6/ 5.18 2/ 1.37 6/ 5.18 2/ 1.37 
VRDS/ Z Score using study norms 23.17/ 0.47 29.33/ 1.66 19.83/ -0.16 16.17/ -0.87 
Predicted Awareness/ z score using study 
norms 
-5.17/ -0.72 4.67/ 0.84 15.17/ 2.50 -3.17/ -0.40 
Unawareness/ z score using study norms 
Recognition Aware./ z score using study 
norms 
-6.17/ -1.24 
1/ 0.29 
0.67/ 0.03 
4/ 0.70 
15.17/ 2.72 
0/ 0.15 
-3.17/ -0.68 
0/ 0.15 
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Table 14 
Additional Partial Correlations for Primary Variables for Healthy Controls 
Partial Correlation                 r      r
2
     t        p   
r(VRDS)(CVLT).Unawareness    .610  .373  3.93  .0006* 
r(CVLT)(Unawareness).VRDS    -.325  .106  -1.75  .092   
r(VRDS)(TMT).Unawareness    .251  .063  1.32  .198 
r(TMT)(Unawareness).VRDS   .131  .017  .670  .509 
r(VRDS)(JLO).Unawareness   .453  .205  2.59  .016* 
r(JLO)(Unawareness).VRDS   -.052  .003  -.260  .797 
r(IADL)(CVLT).IADLDiscrepancy  .230  .053  1.16  .258 
r(CVLT)(IADLDiscrepancy).IADL  .096  .009  .470  .643 
r(IADL)(TMT).IADLDiscrepancy  .014   0  .070  .945   
r(TMT)(IADLDiscrepancy).IADL  -.103  .011  -.510  .615 
r(IADL)(JLO).IADLDiscrepancy  -.033  .001  -.160  .874 
r(JLO)(IADLDiscrepancy).IADL  -.071  .005  -.350  .729 
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Appendix A: Simulation Sickness Questionnaire 
 
MODIFIED- SIMULATOR SICKNESS QUESTIONNAIRE (M-SSQ) 
 
Subject ID #                                        Age         Gender ( M / F)   Date                      
 
1. Previous Simulator Experience 
 Have you had any prior exposure to simulators?  YES           NO 
 If yes, how long has it been since your last exposure in a simulator?                Days 
 Did you experience any sickness from your simulator experience?    YES     NO 
 If yes, please describe:_______________________________________________ 
 
 
2.        Previous Flying Experience 
 How long has it been since your last flight in an aircraft?                     days  
 Did you experience any sickness from your flying experience?    YES     NO 
 If yes, please describe:_______________________________________________ 
 
  
  
 
 
3. Previous Shipboard Experience 
 How long has it been since your last voyage at sea?                     days  
 Did you experience any sickness from your shipboard experience?    YES     NO 
 If yes, please describe:_______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
  
4. Previous Virtual Environment (VE) Experience 
 Number of exposures/hours in a VE   ____number of exposures  ____ approximate hours 
 How long has it been since your last exposure in a virtual environment?                     days  
Is sickness same or different as prior to injury or illness?     SAME            
DIFFERENT 
 
Is sickness same or different as prior to injury or illness?     SAME            
DIFFERENT 
 
How often would you say you get airsick? 
Always______  Frequently______  Sometimes_____  Rarely_____  Never_____ 
How often would you say you get seasick? 
Always______  Frequently______  Sometimes_____  Rarely_____  Never_____ 
Is sickness same or different as prior to injury or illness?     SAME            
DIFFERENT 
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 Did you experience any sickness from your VE experience?    YES     NO 
 
 
5. Do you get sick while riding in a car?       YES     NO 
 If yes, please describe:_______________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
6. Do you get sick when riding on roller coasters?   YES     NO 
 If yes, please describe:_______________________________________________ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
PRE-EXPOSURE PHYSIOLOGICAL STATUS INFORMATION 
1. Are you in your usual state of fitness? (Circle one)     YES        NO 
 If not, please indicate the reason:                                             
 
2. Have you been ill in the past week? (Circle one)         YES        NO 
 If "Yes", please indicate: 
 a) The nature of the illness (flu, cold, etc.):                           
 
 b) Severity of the illness:    Very Mild---------------------Very Severe 
      
 c) Length of illness:                                    Hours  /  Days 
 
 d) Major symptoms:                                                        
 
 e) Are you fully recovered?      YES     NO 
 
3. How much alcohol have you approximately consumed during the past 24 hours? 
 
          12 oz. cans/bottles of beer             ounces wine              ounces hard liquor 
 
4. Please indicate all medication you have used in the past 24 hours.  If none, check the  
Is sickness same or different as prior to injury or illness?     SAME            
DIFFERENT 
 
How often would you say you get carsick? 
Always______  Frequently______  Sometimes_____  Rarely_____  Never_____ 
Is sickness same or different as prior to injury or illness?     SAME            
DIFFERENT 
 
Is sickness same or different as prior to injury or illness?     SAME            
DIFFERENT 
 IN GENERAL, HOW SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOTION SICKNESS ARE YOU? 
 
Extremely______  Very______      Moderately_____     A little_____        Not at all_____ 
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 first line: 
 
 a)   NONE         ________________ 
 b)   Sedatives or tranquilizers                                       
 c)   Aspirin, Tylenol, other analgesics                                    
 d)   Anti-histamines                                          
 e)   Decongestants                                       
 f)   Other (specify):                                          
 
 
5. a)   Approximately how many hours of sleep did you get last night?            hours 
 
 b)  Was this amount sufficient? (Circle one)     YES     NO 
 
6. Please list any other comments regarding your present physical state which 
 might affect your performance on our test battery. 
  
 
PRE-EXPOSURE SYMPTOM CHECKLIST 
Instructions: Circle how much each symptom below is affecting you right now.   
 
 1.  General discomfort   None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 2.  Fatigue                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 3.  Boredom                            None       Slight    Moderate Severe 
 4.  Drowsiness                         None       Slight    Moderate Severe 
 5.  Headache                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 6.  Eye strain                          None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 7.  Difficulty focusing                 None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 8 . Changes in Salivation   None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 9.  Sweating                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
10.  Nausea                               None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
11.  Difficulty concentrating  None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
12.  "Fullness of the Head"         None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
13.  Blurred vision               None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
14.  Dizziness with eyes open  None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
15.  Dizziness with eyes closed  None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
16.  *Vertigo                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
17.  **Visual flashbacks            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
18.  Faintness                    None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
19.  Changes in breathing             None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
20.  Stomach discomfort              None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
21.  Decreased appetite               None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
22.  Increased appetite             None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
23.  Desire to move bowels      None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
24.  Confusion                    None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
25.  Burping                       None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
26.  Vomiting                      None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
27.  Yawning                      None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
28.  Light -headedness               None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
29.  Other                                                                                     
 
*   Vertigo is experienced as loss of orientation with respect to vertical upright. 
**  Visual illusion of movement or false sensations of movement, when not in the simulator, car, or aircraft. 
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*** Stomach awareness is usually used to indicate a feeling of discomfort which is just short of nausea. 
POST-EXPOSURE SYMPTOM CHECKLIST 
 
Instructions:  Circle how much each symptom below is affecting you right now.  
 
 1.  General discomfort   None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 2.  Fatigue                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 3.  Boredom                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 4.  Drowsiness                         None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 5.  Headache                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 6.  Eye strain                          None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 7.  Difficulty focusing                 None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 8a. Salivation increased             None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 8b. Salivation decreased             None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
 9.  Sweating                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
10.  Nausea                               None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
11.  Difficulty concentrating  None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
12.  Mental depression           None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
13.  "Fullness of the Head"         None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
14.  Blurred vision               None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
15a. Dizziness with eyes open  None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
15b. Dizziness with eyes closed  None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
16.  *Vertigo                            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
17.  **Visual flashbacks            None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
18.  Faintness                    None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
19.  Aware of breathing              None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
20.  ***Stomach awareness         None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
21.  Loss of appetite               None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
22.  Increased appetite             None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
23.  Desire to move bowels      None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
24.  Confusion                    None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
25.  Burping                       None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
26.  Vomiting                      None      Slight     Moderate Severe  
27.  Yawning                      None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
28.  Light -headedness               None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
29.  Other                                None      Slight     Moderate Severe 
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*   Vertigo is experienced as loss of orientation with respect to vertical upright. 
**  Visual illusion of movement or false sensations of movement, when not in the simulator, car or aircraft. 
*** Stomach awareness is usually used to indicate a feeling of discomfort which is just short of nausea. 
 
 
 
POST-EXPOSURE INFORMATION 
 
 
Instructions:  Please fill out this page AFTER you have completed your virtual environment experience. 
 
 
1. While in the virtual environment, did you get the feeling of motion (i.e., did 
 you experience a compelling sensation of self motion as though you were actually moving)?   
 (Circle one) 
     YES   NO  SOMEWHAT 
 
 
2. a. Did any unusual events occur during your exposure? (Circle one)    YES   NO 
 
 b. If YES, please describe                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
3. a. Time spent in VE                                b. The time now                       
 
 
4. On a scale of 1 (POOR) to 10 (EXCELLENT) rate your performance in the virtual environment:          
 
5. Virtual Reality Device:                              Visual scene:                            
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Appendix B: Questions from Instrumental Activities of Daily Living Questionnaire 
A.) Ability to use the telephone 
1.) Operates the phone (3). 
2.) Dials a few well known numbers (2). 
3.) Answers the telephone, but does not dial the phone (1). 
4.) Does not use the telephone at all. 
 
B.) Shopping 
1.) Takes care of all shopping needs independently (1). 
2.) Shops independently for small purchases. 
3.) Needs to be accompanied on any shopping trip. 
4. Completely unable to shop alone. 
 
C.) Food Preparation 
1.) Plans, prepares, and serves adequate meals independently (1). 
2.) Prepares adequate meals if supplied with ingredients. 
3.) Heats and serves prepared meals, but does not maintain adequate diet. 
4.) Needs to have meals prepared and served. 
 
 
D.) Housekeeping 
1.) Maintains house alone or with occasional assistance (4). 
2.) Performs light daily tasks, i.e., dish washing and bed making (3). 
3.) Performs light daily tasks, but cannot maintain acceptable level of cleanliness (2). 
4.) Needs help with all home maintenance tasks (1). 
5.) Does not participate in any housekeeping tasks. 
 
E.) Laundry 
1.) Does personal laundry completely (2).  
2.) Launders small items, i.e., stockings etc. (1). 
3.) All laundry must be done by others. 
 
F.) Mode of Transportation 
1.) Travels independently on public transportation or drives own   car (3). 
2.) Arranges own travel via taxi, but does not otherwise use public transportation (2). 
3.) Travels on public transportation when accompanied by another person (1). 
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4.) Travel limited to taxi or automobile with assistance of another person. 
5.) Does not travel at all. 
 
G.) Responsibility of Medication 
1.) is able to take medication in correct dosage at the correct time (1).  
2.) Takes responsibility for medication if it is prepared in advance such as using a weekly pill container. 
3.) Is not capable of dispensing own medication. 
 
H.) Ability to Handle Finances 
1.) Manages financial matters independently, i.e., writes checks, pays bills, goes to the bank, etc. (2). 
2.) Manages day-to-day purchases, but needs help with banking, major purchases (1). 
3.) Is incapable of handling money. 
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Appendix C: Pre- VRDS Questionnaire 
Pre- Virtual Reality Driving Simulator Questionnaire 
 
Prediction of Performance 
 
Please use the following scale to answer the questions below: 
 
1   Will do badly 
 
2   Will have some trouble 
 
3   Will do ok/ don‟t know/ average 
 
4   Will do ok, but not my best 
 
5   Will do very good 
 
 
1. How will you do with the physical demands of this activity, such as using the steering wheel, 
using the foot pedals, coordinating these movements, and being able to see what is presented on 
the screen?  ______ 
 
2.  How will you do with the overall mental demands of the activity, such as monitoring your 
speed, planning your movements, remembering everything, and following directions? ______ 
 
3.  How will you do with: 
 
a.)  managing the stop signs _____ 
b.)  managing the traffic lights _____ 
c.)  managing your speed _____ 
d.)  your ability to manage the lanes _____ 
e.)  following another vehicle _____ 
f.)  managing a construction zone _____ 
g.) responding to unexpected objects in the street _____ 
 
 
 
 
 
         Total Score ________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from the questionnaire created by Hart, Giovannetti, Montgomery, & Schwartz, 1998 
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Appendix D: Post- VRDS Questionnaire 
 
Post- Virtual Reality Driving Simulator Questionnaire 
 
Perception of Performance 
 
Please use the following scale to answer the questions below: 
 
1   Did badly 
 
2   Had some trouble 
 
3   Did ok/ don‟t know/ average 
 
4   Did ok, but not my best 
 
5   Did very well 
 
 
1. How did you do with the physical demands of this activity, such as using the steering wheel, 
using the foot pedals, coordinating these movements, and seeing what was presented on the 
screen?  ______ 
 
2.  How did you do with the overall mental demands of the activity, such as monitoring your 
speed, planning your movements, remembering everything, and following directions? ______ 
 
3.  How did you do with: 
 
a.)  managing the stop signs _____ 
b.)  managing the traffic lights _____ 
c.)  managing your speed _____ 
d.)  your ability to manage the lanes _____ 
e.)  following another vehicle _____ 
f.)  managing a construction zone _____ 
g.) responding to unexpected objects in the street _____ 
 
 
 
         Total Score ________ 
 
 
 
Adapted from the questionnaire created by Hart, Giovannetti, Montgomery, & Schwartz, 1998 
 
